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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
George Nickolas Fourlas
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
September 2014
Title: Justice As Reconciliation: Political Theory in a World of Difference
Divisiveness routinely turns violent, thus making research into alternative means 
of dealing with conflict an urgent necessity. This dissertation focuses on the politics of 
divisiveness and the techniques of conflict transformation. In this, I offer a robust and 
operable theory of reconciliation. I argue that reconciliation is the first principle of 
justice. In this sense, the ideal of justice is enacted through the improvement and 
coordination of social-political relations, which requires the development of trust and 
institutions that facilitate the ever emergent demos.
This is not to suggest that alternative approaches to justice, such as distributive 
models, are useless or wrong. Rather, justice requires a consensus which cannot be 
realized when persons see their neighbors as enemies. In conflicts, activities that benefit 
the enemy Other, such as the redistribution of wealth, will be taken as an injustice by 
other embattled social groups. As I demonstrate through various cases, interpersonal and 
institutional responses, like redistribution, often escalate discord and rarely create a 
shared sense of justice. Thus, conflict becomes a cyclical and multilevel problem. I 
explore how we can better respond to the cycle of conflict at individual, social, and 
systemic levels, in order to realize a legitimate notion of justice.
I use an interdisciplinary approach to defend my arguments, drawing on 
iv
philosophy and Conflict Resolution (CR). CR is an emerging field that emphasizes 
practical responses to conflict, often with advocacy for reconciliation. However, more 
theoretical work needs to be done to explain the ideal of reconciliation that directs CR 
practices. Within philosophy, little work has been done on the topic of reconciliation. A 
vast literature exists on the topic of justice, but this literature offers few practical 
descriptions of how persons come to agree upon the terms of justice. Thus, theories of 
justice are often labeled as 'ideal' simply because they are disconnected from the 
fragmented and conflict-ridden reality most people experience. This dissertation, as a 
project in non-ideal political theory that is empirically informed by cases and concerns in 
CR, fills these gaps in both philosophy and CR. 
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CHAPTER I
WHY RECONCILIATION?
“The Nation has not yet found peace from its sins; the freedman has not yet found in
freedom his promised land.” - W.E.B. Du Bois1
“A Dutch innkeeper once put this satirical inscription (Perpetual Peace) on his
signboard, along with the picture of a graveyard. We shall not trouble to ask whether it
applies to men in general, or to heads of state (who can never have enough of war), or
only to the philosophers who blissfully dream of perpetual peace” - Immanuel Kant2
1.1. General Claims of Justice as Reconciliation
In Justice as Reconciliation: Political Theory in a World of Difference, I present a 
theory for post-conflict reconciliation and I defend reconciliation as the conditions of the 
possibility of justice. By conflict I mean a violent cyclical relation that ruptures and thus 
prevents stable social relations. By cyclical I mean that conflict fractures social relations 
1
Du Bois 2014: 4.
2 Kant 1970: 93.
1
and when such divisions are left unreconciled, they repeat themselves, compounding, 
lingering, and haunting throughout time. Indeed, history is often narrated in terms of 
perpetually repeating conflicts, a flat record caught on repeat. But historical description is 
not a future determination and we can free ourselves from the haunting past to reclaim 
our present and future. In this sense, reconciliation is a means of liberation. 
In more abstract terms, I take reconciliation to be a specific sort of enactive 
process that attempts to repair relations wherein the coordinating conditions that come 
prior to cooperative meaning making are absent or highly asymmetrical. Reconciliation is 
a means of liberating shared meaning or value. Along these same lines, conflicts are those 
social and political circumstances wherein the conditions for the possibility of 
cooperative meaning making are absent, highly asymmetrical, or damaged. The main 
conditions of cooperative meaning making or ethical social-political life are basic forms 
of trust and respect, or what Hegel calls recognition.3 In conflict, persons are left 
vulnerable because basic forms of trust and respect are absent, thus making violence and 
strategic action lingering facts of life, and cooperative meaning making a distant 
possibility. 
Thus, when asked 'why should persons reconcile?' I maintain that reconciliation is 
an ideal that cannot be seen as obligatory. War and conflict are like infection or disease, 
strikingly similar to addiction. The addict cannot be forced to recover and she may die 
before finding the resources and relations needed to survive. As the above quote from 
Kant's perpetual peace suggests, the alternative to peace is, like the alternative to 
recovery, death. For many, the dire alternative of perpetual conflict is a sufficient 
3 Hegel, Miller, and Findlay 1977; Hegel et al. 1979.
2
motivation to reconcile. Peace is always preferable to war. But peace requires more than a 
mere cessation of conflict because, as already noted, conflicts linger when unreconciled. 
Thus, we ought to reconcile in order to prevent the repetitions of conflict and in order to 
realize a lasting peace. Until we can engage cooperatively, discussions of alternative 
futures organized according to agreed upon principles of justice will remain vacuous or 
utopian. 
Hence, central to my analysis are philosophical issue of justice, specifically what 
have come to be called transitional and restorative justice. Political theory, especially 
theories of justice, often discuss transitional justice as a necessary step toward liberal 
democratization and thus as the achievement of a status which makes such societies 
worth discussing as normal, liberal, and democratic. This means that much of the political 
work done before and during the transition to a democracy is largely overlooked or 
discussed in terms of intervention.4 It is rarely suggested that liberal democracies or what 
Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir refer to as 'established' societies could learn from 
transitional societies.5 Subsequently, Kymlicka and Bashir rightfully point out, there is a 
gap between political theories for established societies—such as ideal-liberal theories, 
which half-heartedly address their own divisive conflicts through the Politics of 
Difference—and theories for transitional societies which address the politics of 
reconciliation.6  One broad goal of this dissertation is to bridge this gap. I maintain that 
4 See, e.g., Rawls 1999. 
5 Kymlicka and Bashir 2008. There are exceptions to the claim that established societies do not learn 
from transitional politics, such as the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation commission (Magarrell and 
Wesley 2008), but in general political theory ignores transitional societies and focuses on liberal theory, 
and institutions continue to operate uninfluenced. 
6 Ibid.
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there cannot be a sharp distinction between justice and the transitions which move us 
toward justice, because justice is not a static thing which is or is not realized. Justice is 
always in transition, demanding restoration and integration, and my claim is that a 
practical realization of justice must address the techniques of reconciliation which are 
presently operating throughout the world to overcome violent divisions. 
Social-political conflicts make it impossible to even discuss justice, and those 
discussions that do emerge fall flat as failed utterances, speech-acts that lack the total 
situation, the affirmation of an empowered demos, needed to guarantee their felicitous 
success. In this sense, we cannot legitimately speak of justice unless social relations are 
stable, social and political trust is present, and institutions are working to not merely 
represent the demos but also help the demos to find self-cohesion by providing a space 
for direct political participation. 
Justice As Reconciliation does not begin with an assumption about what Others 
would agree to as fair in imaginary and veiled circumstances; rather, it begins with our 
non-ideal war-torn reality and asks: How can we transform ourselves and our conditions 
such that agreement is actually possible, and how can we elevate our consensus into a 
legitimate politics? The first principle of a robust and useful conception of justice is 
reconciliation because it is only through reconciliation that we can begin to legitimately 
discuss Justice. Justice can only be legitimately understood through reconciliation, hence 
reconciliation makes justice possible.
1.2. The General Structure of Justice As Reconciliation
Justice As Reconciliation is comprised of 6 chapters including this introductory 
chapter: I) “Why Reconciliation?”; II) “Cyprus As Exemplar”; III) “Groundwork for a 
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Theory of Reconciliation: Coordinating the Terms of Agreement in Potential Societies”; 
IV) “The Will to Reconcile: Materiality and Co-experience As Motivational Strategies in 
Conflict Transformation”; V) “No Future Without Transition: A Critique of Liberal Peace 
and the US Prison System”; VI) “Reconciliation Politics and the Post-Domination 
Society: Legitimacy and Trust Through Explicit Consent.” Each of these chapters builds 
upon the previous, but each chapter also contains independent arguments engaging with 
relevant contemporary literature in ethics, social-political philosophy, conflict resolution, 
political-science, history, and criminology. 
In chapter II, “Cyprus As Exemplar,” I discuss the ongoing Greco-Turkic conflict 
and peace-process.  I work to answer two general questions: how do people end up in 
conflicts? And, how do conflicts get reconciled? I focus on Cyprus because it represents, 
as Allesandro Ferrera says, “what is as it should be.”7 The force of the Cyprus example is 
manifold. Cyprus is an ambiguously Middle-Eastern-European nation that is divided 
along a UN monitored green-line, and like most spaces that emerged from the West's 
dissection of the former Ottoman Empire, it is marked by violent conflict. Unlike other 
former Ottoman territories, however, Cyprus has embarked upon a slow but highly 
successful path toward peace that is focused on reconciling the division that separates 
north from south. Hence, Cyprus does not just exemplify the ethics, politics, and 
techniques of a successful grass-roots reconciliation effort; but, Cyprus also represents 
stability and peace in a region that has historically been categorized by Orientalists as 
backwards, irrational, naturally war-like, and thus in need of western 'guidance' as 
7 Ferrara 2008: 3.
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imperial-colonial domination.8 Contra reified notions of history and peoples, I treat 
Cyprus as exemplar because it can account for, as Ferrara argues, “much of the change 
undergone by our world over time, for the rise of new patterns and the opening of new 
paths.”9 Though imperfect, Cyprus remains an exemplar of reconciliation because it 
illuminates new possible modalities of life. The modalities illuminated by the Cyprus 
example stand in stark contrast to the mythical modalities of war that chicken-hawks 
would have us believe are normal and natural. Cyprus reveals that peaceful 
transformation is possible.
In chapter II, sections 2.1 and 2.2, I discuss Cypriot nationalist imaginings that are 
based in a blame which justifies conflict. Of course, the problem of ethnic nationalism 
perpetuating conflict is not unique to Cyprus; but, Cyprus is an interesting case because 
of its relation to the European Union and the Middle-East. The problem with nationalist 
interpretations of historical-political contexts is that such interpretations often exclude the 
narrative accounts of Others, but, at the same time, the hermeneutics of nationalism—
those interpretive frames that determine a world by closing it off to other possibilities—
also inform how one should understand and work with others. The transformation of 
conflict therefore requires a sensitive and inclusive approach to historical problems, 
especially in places like Cyprus, with deeply contested historical understandings of the 
present. In section 2.3 I show how, when approached with a different hermeneutic 
sensitivity, the Cyprus conflict has been transformed, divisions have been overcome, and 
reconciliation is being realized.
8 For in-depth discussions of this Orientalist attitude and its role in war-history, see e.g. Said 1978; 
Dabashi 2008.
9 Ibid. 
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In chapter III, “A Tiered Contract Theory: Hegel, Levinas, Marx, and 
Reconciliation,” I turn to the history of philosophy in order to appropriate scaffolding for 
a theoretical framework that explains reconciliation and opens it to application. When I 
first began exploring philosophical accounts of reconciliation, the only theorist I found to 
explicitly discuss the concept before the 20th century was G.W.F. Hegel. In retrospect, 
however, I now believe that Kant and many post-Kantian thinkers indirectly discuss 
reconciliation in part because the Kantian project is a rationalization of the Christian 
moral project, driven by a demand for universal moral principles based in agents 
negotiating their desires and actions according to reason, or the desires and actions of 
Others. It is no coincidence that the main formulations of the categorical imperative, 
which is often described as the negative golden rule, commands that persons “act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law without contradiction.”10 I do not root my theory in Kant, however, in part 
because the concept of reconciliation is not made explicitly central to his theory and, 
more importantly, because the categorical imperative and the deontological project in 
general is speculative, based in assumptions about what could and thus should be, 
without actually engaging Others directly. Hegel, on the other hand, explicitly bases his 
notion of reconciliation in the active encountering of and struggling with Others. 
Unfortunately, even Hegel's enactive project is not secular and remains beholden to a 
teleology that guides personal and political Geist to an absolute God's-eye-view of 
experience, the Absolute. It is through the lineage of Ludwig Feurbach, Karl Marx, Georg 
Lukács, Walter Benjamin, and most recently Jürgen Habermas, that the inherited notion 
10 Kant 2012: 34
7
of reconciliation divorces itself from invisible hands and is an entirely material, 
contextually emergent process. Hence, in this chapter I trace the concept's emergence 
through the Hegelian tradition, and I extrapolate a tiered theory of social-political 
experience that I blend with the liberal contract model in order to explain the spheres 
through which reconciliation differently operates. Chapter III separates out three spheres 
of experience—individual, social, and political—and thus forms the theoretical basis for 
the work I do in the remaining chapters, where I explore reconciliation in each of these 
spheres. 
In Chapter III section 3.1, I discuss Hegel's process theory of reconciliation that 
was adopted by Marx and many in the critical theory tradition under the rebranded label 
of revolution. Through this analysis I frame the ethics of reconciliation, or social 
reconciliation, through a discussion of recognition. In the second section I turn to 
Lévinas's critique of Hegel in order to discuss the experiential tension that exists between 
the self and the collective. Here, I position my view of recognition between Hegel's and 
Lévinas's, because I believe that human experience alternates between the individual and 
the collective, such that 'I' is an equally precarious ethical achievement as 'We'; thus, 
social reconciliation must take care and respect the primordial tension that always exists 
between the individual and collective.11 In this sense, social reconciliation must be open 
ended, creative, and not solely backwards looking. In the third section I discuss various 
elements of an institutional-systemic approach to reconciliation. Here, I emphasize the 
importance of truth-commissions in creating participatory opportunities for persons to 
both overcome a certain sort of political alienation and also to help bridge the gap 
11 Many thanks to Dr. Elena Clare Cuffari for, amongst many things, allowing me to borrow her term 
'primordial tension' to describe the fluid relation between self and Others.
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between the system and the social world. Truth-commissions also reveal that systemic 
recognition is not just about the granting of rights, but is also about repairing the 
historical damages and preventing future damages by coordinating meanings between the 
system and social world. Ultimately, the reconciliatory model I am defending contains 
within it an implicit notion of a social contract that is yet to come, which demands 
collective meaning coordination and political authorship in both micro and macro 
political spheres. The work in this chapter sets the stage for a closer analysis of each 
sphere of reconciliation in chapters IV-VI. 
Chapter IV, “The Will to Reconcile: Materiality and Co-experience As 
Motivational Strategies in Conflict Transformation,” is primarily focused on the ethics of 
reconciliation. By the ethics of reconciliation I mean the interpersonal and social 
conditions that afford reconciliation. In the previous chapter I suggest that the central 
problem of social reconciliation is motivating persons to reconcile. Thus, in this chapter I 
critique two explanatory models, the pathos model and the confessional-forgiveness 
model, which suggest that reconciliation is motivated by a limited range of moral 
attitudes. I work to open the range of motivating attitudes through which reconciliation 
can be achieved and I argue that the minimal conditions of the possibility of 
reconciliation are basic human respect and the willingness to risk reforming or repairing 
with the Other, in person, the social fabric of trust. Chapter IV develops the foregoing 
critique, regarding those notions of reconciliation found in various religious traditions, 
Kant's masked rationalization of certain of those traditions, and more recent iterations 
found in defenses of empathy; reconciliation may involve these various characteristics, 
but it cannot be reduced to their presence and it must privilege the material that allows 
9
the Other to speak for him or herself. 
In Chapter IV section 4.1, I discuss movements in contemporary moral 
psychology which focus on emotional reaction and motivation, rather than universally 
rational and applicable rules. I begin with motivation in order to critique popular models 
of reconciliation in section two, which predicate said motives on a limited range of 
attitudes and beliefs. In section 4.2, I focus on two alternative models of reconciliation: 
the confessional-forgiveness model, and then what I call the pathos model, which 
emphasizes sympathy or empathy in its different iterations. Although these models may 
capture attributes of some reconciliation processes, they are simultaneously too 
demanding in their narrow focus on certain attitudes, at the dismissal of others, and yet 
they are not robust enough to describe what is needed for parties to begin the 
reconciliation process. Rather than praising empathy and forgiveness, I suggest we focus 
on the underlying assessment and motivation driving interpersonal encounters such that 
reconciliation does or does not occur. Through this discussion, I argue that the minimum 
requirements for reconciliation to be possible are that persons be willing to risk engaging 
with Others, face to face. Here, I emphasize that the will to reconcile may sometimes 
appear as an empathetic or forgiving expression, but it may also emerge with anger, 
resentment, and a wide range of other moral emotions. The entire range of emotions must 
be respected by way of inclusion throughout conflict transformation processes if the ideal 
of a creative, trust forming reconciliation is our goal; that is, in section 4.3 I advocate for 
a model of reconciliation that emphasizes the development of trust and respect.
In chapter V, “No Future Without Transition: A Critique of Liberal Peace and the 
US Prison System,” I turn to the political sphere and critique the liberal tradition that 
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suggests the world will know peace when all states are representative liberal-
democracies. My main critique is not that liberal states tend to maintain war-like relations 
with non-liberal states, although they do; rather, I argue that liberalism lacks a legitimate 
means of maintaining internal stability and thus uses methods of war to maintain control 
over its own territory and populations. I focus on the US prison-industrial complex as a 
primary example of how the liberal war tendency is uncontrollable and ultimately 
undermines its own theoretical and practical ends. By imprisoning en mass, the 'liberal' 
ideal of liberty is nominal at best, while the practical end of a legitimate peace is shown 
to be equally farcical as the social world becomes increasingly violent and unstable with 
each violent police encounter. I close with a discussion of the restorative-justice 
movement as a functional alternative to mass-incarceration that appeals to practical 
principles of reconciliation: repair, reintegration, and stability through an inclusive peace 
not submission through war-like domination.
In section 5.1, I discuss the liberal peace model as it emerges through Kant's 
writings, and I suggest that without reconciliation the liberal-democratic system—as the 
sum of the complex legal-political and institutional parts—is at constant risk of what 
Jürgen Habermas calls a Legitimation Crisis. Expanding on Habermas's work, I argue 
that the legal-political response to social conflict in the United States maintains a certain 
state of crisis that causes a shared sense of justice to be lost in social conflict. The current 
state of social conflict in the United States is in part a result of systemic attempts to 
forcefully control the social-world, which prevents a stable and reciprocal-democratic 
base from emerging. Hence, in section 5.2 I discuss the ramifications of the police-
control state through an analysis of the US prison system. Here, I illuminate what liberal-
11
democracy looks like without reconciliation. By responding to instability with force, the 
US penal system increases social conflict by fragmenting communities and maintaining 
an individualistic order that is combative, rather than cooperative. I focus on the prison 
because it functions as the center of social control and is in many ways the starting point 
of US politics. In the final section, 5.3, I discuss alternative responses to instability that 
are practiced in the margins of the developed world under the banner of restorative 
justice. Here, I describe the practices that are attempting to bring about reconciliation in 
the developed world, while also emphasizing that there is still much work to be done. By 
juxtaposing the current state of politics with the emerging counter-politics of 
reconciliation, I argue that liberal-democracies need reconciliation as it is being practiced 
through the restorative and transitional justice movements because reconciliation affords 
a demos that agrees upon and thus co-creates its social-political conditions. Thus, 
reconciliation works to prevent instability by improving the relation between system and 
social-world, which affords legitimacy and makes a shared sense of justice possible.
In Chapter VI, “Reconciliation Politics and the Post-Domination Society: 
Legitimacy and Trust Through Explicit Consent,” I argue that a legitimate, stable, and 
peaceful politics requires explicit consent, and this overlapping consensus can be 
facilitated through tactics and technologies that are definitive of reconciliation politics. 
Following various critics of contract theory, I begin section 6.1 by suggesting that most 
political systems emerge not through consent, but through violent force and domination; 
thus, the claim that the legitimacy of political authority is granted via tacit consent 
includes within it an often overlooked reality of violent force that makes other forms of 
consent seem impossible, or illegal and thus revolutionary. Of course, real consent is 
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complicated by other competing goods and needs. I address the difficulty of competing 
public goods in section 6.2 through a discussion of legitimacy and representation. Here, I 
claim that reconciliation politics prioritizes a certain form of legitimacy that emerges 
through explicit consent. Further, I suggest that this higher order legitimacy facilitates the 
peaceful realization of other public goods, specifically group identity and economic 
redistribution. 
Insofar as I reject approaches to difference, transition, and conflict that advocate 
domination, in section 6.3 I explore one approach to alterity that has the potential to 
avoid the trappings of domination and strives to realize the legitimate consent described 
in sections one and two: Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs). Learning from 
truth-commissions, in the closing section I offer suggestions for a future reconciliation 
politics. Here, I defend certain aspects of the Occupy movement, which, despite being 
problematic for a range of reasons, was to a certain extent exemplary in its claiming of 
public spaces for democratic participation. Occupy's illumination of the ubiquitous Neo-
Agora represents an opportunity and a challenge to the global social-political world to 
risk engaging and transforming our conditions through peaceful collective meaning 
making, through a peaceful ethics and politics of reconciliation. Thus, I suggest that 
conditions of the possibility of reconciliation and a truly legitimate politics are present, 
despite state violence that attempts to crush the demos wherever it appears, and the 
question of actualization remains open.
Hence, these six chapters can be understood as operating together: Chapter II acts 
as the exemplary starting point that destabilizes popular notions of history and politics 
that claim war is natural and unavoidable, and Chapter III works to theorize this starting 
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point by taking a tactical approach to overcoming violence in our ordinary encounters, as 
well as in the system. Chapter IV expands on the ethics of reconciliation by discussing 
the conditions of its possibility. Chapter V and VI expand upon the politics of 
reconciliation by first describing why reconciliation is needed in all societies, including 
the United States, and then describing the means through which a politics of 
reconciliation can and already has begun to emerge, despite heavy resistance from 
ideologues and police forces, throughout the world. 
In each chapter I advocate an ongoing and participatory politics that works to 
maintain a reciprocal relation within the social world, as well as between the social and 
the system. A future oriented politics of reconciliation is an opportunity to rectify the 
failures of domination politics. Rather than being fearful and believing that humanity will 
always come back to war, in a morose eternal return, it is important to bravely and 
hopefully face the risky open future with Others and will a new possibility through 
creative cooperative efforts. Social-political relations will strengthen with each successful 
collaborative agreement and over time a 'We' can emerge through these reconciliatory 
experiences, allowing us to abandon hope because of trust, rather than broken 
desperation.
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CHAPTER II
CYPRUS AS EXEMPLAR
In describing the history of the Cyprus conflict, I am working to answer two 
crucial questions: how do people end up in violent conflict and how can conflicts be 
reconciled? Central to these questions are two assumptions: first, despite the jingoism 
human groups seem to generate, almost universally surrounding human nature and the 
repetitions of history, violent conflict is not a necessary occurrence; and thus, secondly, 
we can realize the world in different nonviolent ways.12 It is important to note these 
assumptions because there is a tendency amongst those who study global politics or 
history to become pessimistic and disregard the importance of possibility. Insofar as this 
pessimism is not unique to academics, however, it is worth stating these assumptions at 
the outset because they are also ethical decisions. Reflecting on hermeneutic approaches 
is crucial because it is through our interpretive starting points that we participate in co-
creating the world. I argue that it is this same sort of general ethical hermeneutics that 
make both conflict and reconciliation possible. In other words, we co-create the world 
through our beliefs and habits, and as Howard Zehr notes in a Hegelian fashion: “The 
12
See e.g. Machiavelli et al. 1995; Hobbes 1651/1968; Hume and Aiken 1948; Benjamin et al. 1996; 
Schmitt 2007; Agamben 2005.
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lens we look through determines how we frame both the problem and the “solution”.”13 
The problem of interpretation informs Ioannis Papadakis's recollection of the one 
question which captivates the minds of Greek Cypriots (GCs) and Turkish Cypriots (TCs) 
alike: “Who is to blame?.”14 Something tragic resonates throughout Papadakis's 
discussion of this question, insofar as blame, as the accusation and potential persecution 
of others, removes responsibility from the inquiring subject and places that responsibility 
on another. There is an inherent tension in blame: in conflict there are blameworthy actors 
and clear victims; but, blame, as the inability to see oneself as enmeshed in and therefore 
as a potential participant in the actualization of a problematic situation, is not effective in 
overcoming division and tends to catalyze the conflict cycle.
For example, in sections 2.1 and 2.2, I discuss Cypriot nationalist imaginings that 
are based in a blame which justifies conflict. Of course, the problem of ethnic nationalism 
perpetuating conflict is not unique to Cyprus; but, Cyprus is an interesting case because 
of its relation to the European Union and the Middle-East. The problem with nationalist 
interpretations of historical-political contexts is that such interpretations often exclude the 
narrative accounts of Others, but, at the same time, the hermeneutics of nationalism also 
inform how one should understand and work with others. The transformation of conflict 
therefore requires a sensitive and inclusive approach to historical problems, especially in 
places like Cyprus, with deeply contested historical understandings of the present. In 
section 2.3 I show how, when approached with a different hermeneutic sensitivity, the 
Cyprus conflict has been transformed, divisions have been overcome, and reconciliation 
13 Zehr 2007: 178.
14 Papadakis 2005: XIII.
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is being realized.
Unfortunately, for some the conflict must go on. The goal here is not to persuade 
the arbiters of violence, but rather to reclaim justice from those who would blame and 
impose harm in its name, giving violent retaliation its own conceptual space—as 
vengeance or spite. Another way of putting this is to say that although claims about 
justice have been misappropriated by the violent, justice is not based in violence. I am 
challenging given notions of justice by shifting our focus and elaborating the importance 
of inclusive and cooperative interpretation as an ethical-political activity. Through the 
case of Cyprus, it should be possible to establish a grounded sense of the force the 
hermeneutic problem has when approached with ethical sensitivity. Hence, I begin with a 
general historical overview of the Cyprus conflict in order to answer the first question—
how did the Cypriots find themselves in conflict? I address the second question—how 
can conflicts be reconciled?—by analyzing what is being done differently through the 
citizen based, grassroots peace movement.
2.1. A Historical Overview of the Cyprus Conflict 
Since 1974 the island of Cyprus has been divided along a green-line or geo-
political border that was drawn by Major-Peter Young of the British peace force in 1963 
to ameliorate the fighting that had displaced and claimed the lives of many Cypriots. The 
northern half of Cyprus or, since 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—a state 
that is only recognized by Turkey and cannot, therefore, trade with or receive aid from 
other states—is home to a mostly TC population, as well as Turkish nationals who settled 
in Cyprus after the 74 conflict, and expats of various origins. The southern Republic of 
Cyprus is home to a predominantly GC population and has been a member of the 
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European Union (EU) since 2004.15 In April of 2003, the unthinkable happened: the green 
line was opened allowing GCs and TCs from both sides of the divide to cross over for the 
first time in 30 years. The peaceful opening of the green-line marked a critical transition 
in the island's history of violent conflict. The present conditions in Cyprus are the 
emerging result of an extensive history, a collective identification with exclusive 
interpretations of this history which position the Other as enemy, and in recent years the 
reinterpretation of history in the formation of new identities which include the Other as 
friend and sibling.16
Ottoman and British Colonial rule are the most significant historical periods for 
understanding the present conflict. Ottoman Cyprus is of specific interest because it 
represents a time when the already thoroughly mixed population of Cyprus came under 
the control of the Ottoman Empire, but was allowed to maintain its intertwined pluralism. 
Various non-Islamic belief systems including Christianity and Judaism were not only 
protected, but were recognized, and to a certain extent empowered, through the millet 
system.17 The cosmopolitan pluralism of the Ottoman Empire was not unique to Cyprus 
and the majority of what we now understand as the Middle East, as well as other border 
spaces that are ambiguously both Middle Eastern and European, Asian, and African, were 
a part of the Ottoman Empire and shared in this pluralist existence. 
To put this in more concrete terms, consider that prior to the 1923 treaty of 
15 Other ethnic populations in Cyprus include Marronites, Armenians, and Latins.
16 Artifacts have been found on the island which trace human activity in Cyprus to the Neolithic period. 
Also, Cyprus has played a central role in various historical periods: Hellenistic, Roman, Frankish, 
Venetian, Saracen, and Ottoman, to name a few. 
17 This is not to suggest that certain political policies were not imposed on non-muslim groups. See 
Deringil 2012.
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Lausanne the states we now understand as Greece and Turkey—which were previously 
Ottoman territories comprised of Ottoman citizens of various religious types—did not 
really exist in their present forms. Only after extensive population exchanges in which 
pluralist communities were torn apart, were the Greek and Turkish states realized in their 
present form.18 In other words, the Ottoman Middle East enjoyed almost three hundred 
years of relative stability as a politically unified, pluralist cosmopolitan society. The 
reality of this pluralism is evident throughout Cyprus, even in the present atmosphere of 
conflict. So how did the pluralistic and stable Ottoman existence end up so brutally 
divided?
The Ottoman Empire began to collapse as western forces put pressure on its 
boundaries, and various ethno-nationalist groups, some of which were supported and 
armed by those same western forces, emerged and launched guerrilla campaigns under 
the banner of national liberation.19 For instance, in 1821, with the support of various 
Western nations, a collection of Greek nationalists sought to realize the Big Idea and 
declared the independence of the ‘Greek’ nation from Ottoman rule.20 Subsequently, 
Cypriot relations—between many Christians, some of whom came to be identified as 
Greeks, and Muslims, but who eventually identified as Turks—which may have been 
tense at various points but still remained relatively peaceful, began to crumble. Many of 
the genocides that predated the Holocaust, but were used as models for such 'ethnic 
18 Obviously many other conflicts followed 1923, but the pluralism of these middle eastern spaces was 
thoroughly damaged by these exchanges.  For an excellent account of this history, see Clark 2009.
19 For an extensive and detailed history of the rise and spread of nationalism, see Hobsbawm 1990.  For a 
concise and reader friendly history of the fall of the Ottoman Empire see Fromkin 1989; also, the 
biography of Kemal Ataturk by Mango 2002.  For a more extensive account see Shaw 1976.
20 See, e.g., Finlay 2001.
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cleansing,' occurred during this period, within this contested space.21 The nationalist 
revolts throughout the Ottoman had influences on the Greek-Christians and Turkic-
Muslims living outside of the areas where the revolt was initiated. Indeed, before the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Harry Anastasiou notes, “the primary identities 
of the people of Cyprus were Muslims and Christians” but, he adds, “these identities were 
superseded by the more exclusivist, ethnonationalist identities of Turks and Greeks.”22
Christians and Muslims who existed throughout Ottoman territories, such as 
Cyprus, continue to be influenced by the nationalist movement. Regardless of where one 
allied oneself, the identities of Christians and Muslims shifted because of the nationalist 
conflicts that fragmented the Ottoman. In this sense, the Greco-Turkic identities cannot 
be understood as separate, because they emerged as a pair of world-views that 
presupposes the other.
The Greco-Turkic national war slowed with the aforementioned treaty of 
Lausanne, which marked the end of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the present 
states of Turkey, Greece, and various other places claimed by the Ottoman. The treaty of 
Lausanne is critical for reasons beyond the aforementioned population exchanges which 
separated many peacefully coexisting Greeks and Turks on the mainland and effectively 
reified the present states of Greece and Turkey: This forced homogeneity and reification 
did not include Cyprus. When the treaty was signed, Cyprus was under British control—
it had been since 1878, when it was exchanged for British support in the Ottoman's war 
with Russia—and Cyprus's status as a crown colony was formalized in 1925.23 Rather 
21 For an introduction to this insufficiently discussed history, see Jones 2011.
22 Anastasiou 2008: 92.
23 For a record of British presence in Cyprus, see, e.g., Varnava et al. 2009; Georghallides 1979; Holland 
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than becoming an extension of Greece or Turkey, or an independent state, Cyprus 
remained plural, but was now colonized by the British. Subsequently, Cyprus became a 
concentrated war zone for the ongoing Greco-Turkic conflict, as well as a battle against 
colonialism. 
Under colonialism the Greek and Turkish nationalist identities became fully 
politicized. Maria Hadjipalou stresses this point: 
The division between Greeks and Turks and prevalence of a binational 
consciousness crystallized during the anti-colonial struggle against the 
British of 1955–59. The Greek population of Cyprus wanted union 
(enosis) with motherland Greece and, in the event of them achieving it, 
the leadership of the Turkish sector promoted partition (taksim) and union 
of their part of the island with motherland Turkey (2010: 78).
The unreconciled tensions which marked the island at the end of the Ottoman period were 
intensified by colonialism, and nationalism became entrenched through the formation of 
hardline political groups. Two main groups were formed: in 1955 GCs took up the banner 
of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters/Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων 
Αγωνιστών) in resistance to colonialism and with the ideal of unification (enosis) with 
Greece as the end toward which they were fighting—an idealism which had been 
outlawed in 1931, making the EOKA agitations illegal. Fearful that the GC nationalists 
would terrorize and harm the TC minority in Cyprus, TCs responded, with support from 
Britain and Turkey, around 1957 by forming the TMT (Turkish Resistance 
Organization/Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı). The TCs held the ideal of Taksim as the end 
toward which they were fighting.  “In other words,” Hadjipavlou says, “both main ethnic 
communities looked to outside parties to realize their visions. The absence of a common 
political culture or sense of Cypriotness created the ethnic nationalisms that led to a 
2006, 2012.
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culture of intolerance, mutual suspicion and fear.”24 The EOKA nationalist vision did not 
include the other inhabitants of the island—namely the largest minority population of 
Muslims who identify as TCs, as well as various other minority populations like the 
Maronites and Armenians. The British were skilled in suppressing uprisings and armed 
the TMT in order to resist EOKA. In other words, the British encouraged a horizontal 
conflict in order to prevent a vertical conflict from overthrowing the crown.25
In 1960, however, after five years of anti-colonial struggle, the British signed the 
London-Zurich agreements which effectively ended colonial rule and anti-colonial 
guerrilla tactics, thus shifting the conflict in Cyprus and abroad. Signatories included 
GCs, TCs, Britain, Greece, and Turkey. At the same time the Treaty of Guarantee was 
signed, allowing Britain, Greece, and Turkey to maintain a sort of paternalistic role in 
relation to the island in order to “reestablish the state of affairs.”26 The treaty was 
supposed to make Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom responsible for maintaining 
the Cyprus Republic, but it was eventually interpreted as a right to intervene to protect 
ethnic populations.27 Through these agreements, neither Enosis nor Taksim were realized. 
Instead, an independent bi-communal Reluctant Republic was formed which required a 
GC president, Archbishop Makarios III (born Michail Christodolou Mouskos) and a TC 
vice-president Fazıl Küçük.28 The agreements also allowed the British to keep two 
24 Hadjipavlou 2010: 78.
25 Similar techniques of divisive conflict fostering can be seen in India, Ireland, and in the US we see this 
in the prison where racial/ethnic gangs are 'allowed' to exist and be in tension with other gangs, so that 
the prison carries less risk of the population organizing and rising against the guards.
26 “Greece—Turkey—United Kingdom: Treaty of Guarantee of Cyprus” August 16 th, 1960 (1974).
27 Ibid. Anastasiou 2008: 100.
28 Xydis 1973.
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military bases on the island—a move which remains problematic for various reasons, but 
is underdiscussed.29 Unfortunately, the unreconciled instabilities rooted in nationalism 
caused the bi-communal government to be unstable and conflict escalated between the 
GCs and TCs.
Both communities also have internal divisions, specifically between right and left 
political ideologies. Of specific interest was the right-wing military leader of the EOKA 
movement, general Giorgios Grivas (Digenis), who was a retired colonel from the Greek 
army and was staunchly anti-communist. Grivas was known for targeting, torturing, or 
assassinating left-Marxists for being traitors, which, at the time, was a practice in 
mainland Greece that was in many ways legal and quite common.30 Grivas recruited 
young, easily manipulated, spirited men, and all EOKA members had to take an oath of 
blind obedience to the movement and its leader. Grivas's militant nationalism eventually 
led to his forming a second EOKA movement, EOKA B, in order to overthrow the left 
leaning president of Cyprus, archbishop Makarios, in 1974.  
Thus, in 1974, with U.S. support, right leaning coups took place in Greece and 
Cyprus. The confusion of this 1974 civil war between EOKA B and the Makarios 
leadership, as well as the coup in Greece, presented an opportunity for the TCs and 
Turkey. The Turkish military landed in the north of Cyprus, occupying or liberating the 
northern portion of the island and its TC inhabitants. Within days, the Turkish military 
had taken the northern portion of Cyprus and killed or displaced many GCs, as well as 
other Cypriot groups. Many TCs were also killed during this time. The UN, which was 
29 For one example of how UK military bases still pose a problem for Cyprus, see Jonathan Franzen's New 
Yorker piece on the problem of Songbird trapping in Cyprus (2010).
30 For an excellent analysis of the anti-left wing dogmatism of Greece, and the political techniques used to 
crush the left, see Panourgiá 2009.
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already present in Cyprus and working to ameliorate the growing tensions, had 
established a green line or a ceasefire line in 1963 when the intercommunal fighting had 
escalated, which, after the 74 coup and Turkish invasion/liberation became a fixed barrier 
that remains the dividing mark to this day. The north of Cyprus remains under Turkish 
military protection/control. 
For roughly thirty years no one was allowed to cross the buffer zone from the 
south to the north or north to south. Personal property, historical spaces, and persons, 
specifically the bodies of persons who are now generally assumed to be dead—though 
GC nationalism maintains that they are missing, in hopes of their return—are still lost on 
both sides of the divide; however, due to extensive grassroots peace efforts and the 
support of the U.N. (which I discuss in section 2.3) checkpoints were opened in 2003 
allowing movement and interaction between communities.
2.2. Identity Politics and the Heart of Reconciliation in Cyprus 
Various forces have influenced the Cyprus conflict. Economic conditions, coupled 
with a long history of being claimed by various imperial or colonial forces undoubtedly 
catalyzed instability. Though these elements are important factors in understanding 
conflict, they do not adequately address the intractable, persistent, and nonlinear quality 
of conflict.31 Rather, a focus on identity politics more fully addresses the root causes of 
conflict. On this point, Lederach criticizes the failure of cold-war statist approaches to 
conflict which emphasize ideology as the primary motivation for discord.32 The cold-war 
31 In other words, the situation in Cyprus is not exclusively an issue of nationalist identity, because as 
Hadjipavlou points out (Hadjipavlou 2010), there are deep economic issues and issues of power which 
influenced the emergence of the conflict. What is important about identity is that it cuts across class and 
status, uniting peoples for reasons that have not been thoroughly explained by analyses focusing 
exclusively on class or power.
32 Lederach 1997. Lederach says: “the post-Cold War era, which has seen the crumbling of animosities 
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assumption was that social-political actors function according to established hierarchies 
of power. Perhaps this analytic made sense in relation to the battling superpowers; but, in 
countries where the cold-war was hot, the conflicts extended beyond the historical 
bounds of the ideological era. Appealing to Mats Friberg, Lederach suggests that the 
identity focus is better suited for conflict analysis: “In situations of armed conflict, people 
seek security by identifying with something close to their experience and over which they 
have some control. In today's settings that unit of identity may be clan, ethnicity, religion, 
or geographic/regional affiliation, or a mix of these.”33 From the perspective of identity 
politics, we can understand conflict as emerging where persons feel they have no other 
means of securing those things which are central to who they are, the things they care 
about and will defend. In this section I address the implications of this focus on identity 
politics and historical narrative, specifically in Cypriot identities which are a mix of 
various identity units.
Once politicized, Greek and Turkish nationalism became the central world-
defining identities in Cyprus. The nationalist identities in Cyprus are based in selective 
and, as Benedict Anderson suggests, imagined historical ethnic lineages.34 Nationalism in 
Cyprus is, as Anastasiou points out, “a world- and life view deeply rooted in historical, 
sociological, and existential conditions, both as an antecedent and consequent”.35 
Nationalism originated almost purely in the minds of upper class intellectuals, tracing 
between former enemies [the U.S. and the Soviet], has witnessed neither a drastic reduction nor a 
dramatic increase in the numbers of wars suggests, however, that ideology was not an adequate 
explanation for the conflicts of the Cold War” (Ibid. 1997: 7-8).
33 Friberg 1992; Ibid. Lederach 1997: 13.
34 Anderson 1991.
35 Ibid. 2008: 17.
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back to the treaty of Westphalia and the French revolution.36 Hence, the nation was first 
imagined well beyond the material foundation in Cyprus, but was then taken up by the 
social world giving it a dynamically nominal reality.
The danger of nationalism is that it can become an all-encompassing identity with 
scripts or roles persons are expected to realize; that is, it can constrain persons in various 
ways. In some cases a failure to conform to given roles places one at risk of being at best 
ostracized, but also tortured or killed. When nationalist movements emerge they create a 
pressure to be dedicated to the good of the nation. In the case of Cyprus the good of the 
nation included liberation from the enemy. 
Hence, nationalism also risks creating binary social-political relations and 
excluding alternative positions as recreant or traitorous. The polarized identity is 
dangerous because it is intrinsically closed to alternative ways of relating to the world. 
Indeed, difference is a threat to the traditions of the imagined community. Difference is 
therefore excluded from contributing to the formation of the national identity; but, 
difference is required in the positive formation of the national identity because it acts as a 
negative foundation for determining what the identity is not. 
Therefore, the risk of the nationalist perspective is two-fold: on the one hand, one 
takes up an identity which has been determined from beyond oneself.37 On the other 
hand, one contributes to the reproduction of a collective mode of existence that is 
36 For a history of the discovery of Greece and the creation of Hellenic nationalism see Constantine 2011; 
Bernal 1991.
37 A move that enlightenment thinkers like Kant and Mill found to be immoral insofar as it is a rejection of 
one's freedom—which is ironic because both Kant and Mill were advocates for the expansion of and 
universalization of liberalism, which was frequently championed under the banner of nationalism (Kant 
1970; Mill 1975).
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opposed to difference which effectively limits one's own experience by closing off the 
rich variety of possible worlds that are available.  Hence, nationalism can actively and 
passively silence alternative views, which helps explain why little has been written about 
other minority populations in Cyprus.
Of course, it is difficult to choose a different identity because, as Hadjipavlou 
says, “the traditional right to choose a lifestyle that differs from the socially prescribed 
one is considered ‘out of line’.”38 The realization of the national identity is almost pre-
reflective insofar as one is merely living the life which has been made possible by one's 
conditions, avoiding going against norms out of a desire to remain on good terms with the 
rest of the social world. People generally do not want to be ostracized and the nation 
bolsters the benefits of staying in line by claiming to offer protection via exclusive 
membership. The protection of the nation is framed as a freedom from domination, which 
is presented as a likely outcome if one lacks commitment to the norms of the people. On 
this point Lederach notes that a common characteristic of conflict is that persons “seek 
security in increasingly smaller and narrower identity groups” and this is tied to an 
immediacy of experience, wherein one relates to those who share in a common 
experience which is often not recognized nor actively taken up by broader institutions 
such as the state.39 Similarly, when one is steeped in a local and narrow identity group, 
the ability to exit or see beyond the group is constrained; hence, communication between 
groups, especially those locked in opposition, becomes incredibly difficult because the 
Other is seen as enemy threat and because persons do not know how to see beyond their 
38 Ibid. Hadjipavlou 2010: 2.
39 Ibid. 1997: 13.
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own normative view of the world. Another way of putting this is to say that persons with 
rigid combative identities lack alternative interpretive models. 
The hermetic world of the combative identity is solidified through the 
appropriation of various spaces, symbols, and shared practices; that is, the world is 
epistemologically and physically transformed according to identity norms. For example, 
in Cyprus the epistemological transformation involved, Anastasiou notes, “an effort to 
revive the classical Greek and Byzantine cultures for the purpose of constructing a 
glorious, ethnonational Hellenic past.”40 In this glorification of the Byzantine Empire as a 
Greek empire, however, the abstract nationalist narrative ignores the fact that the empire 
itself was pluralistic and did not embody the ancient Hellenistic ideals in part because the 
Hellenistic world, which is also misconceived, was comprised of a collection of city 
states that were frequently at war and not a unified Greek nation. Anastasiou states:
The Grand Idea was in essence a nineteenth-century romantic vision of a 
greater Greece whose political agenda came to be the integration of all 
Greek people into the Greek nation-state.  Like so many other ethnically 
based visions of the time, it was founded on the nationalist assumption 
that the establishment of a single ethnonational state, composed of a 
homogeneous ethnic population, defined the quintessence of freedom.  As 
a mode of thought, revolution was conceived both as a value and as the 
legitimate means by which to attain such a state.41
Anastasiou captures two key aspects of nationalist ideology as domination: first, as noted 
earlier, the spaces within which the Big Idea (Μεγάλη Ιδέα) was to be deployed are not 
homogenous; thus, the Greek ideal violently rejected those who did not fit the category of 
the ideally described person. The violence of the national movement was excused for the 
sake of ‘freedom’ or ‘liberation,’ in this case from those who do not belong to the nation. 
40 Ibid. 2008: 76.
41 Ibid.
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Here, violence was masked by false ideals—freedom, liberation, or justice. In fact, none 
of these ideals could be realized in a stable sense through the method of exclusion. 
Secondly, and perhaps more insidiously, the national idea itself was not initially 
formulated by those upon whom it was taken up or imposed, meaning that the discourse 
which afforded the Grand Idea was violently intended even prior to its material 
implementation.  This sort of multi-level violence is the foundation of many ethnic-
national identities throughout the Middle-East.
In this case, the Greek nation emerged by way of appropriation and the national 
context was transformed in various ways for the sake of maintaining power over what 
was claimed. In this transformation, a palimpsest formed that worked to overwrite the 
island's extensive history as a meeting point of various peoples and cultures. The real 
pluralism of the island shines through the national imaginary, however, both in the people 
and their common habits, customs, and looks—you cannot tell a GC from a TC just by 
looking—as well as in the lingering remnants which mark the landscape, most obviously 
seen in religious spaces, mosques and churches, which were frequently built next to each 
other. 
Indeed, upon visiting Cyprus it is immediately apparent that the national problem 
is the central unresolved political issue. From popular news media to anonymous graffiti, 
all signs point toward the green-line which continues to divide the island. Entire 
museums are dedicated to the national struggle, on both sides of the divide, and it is 
mandatory for school children on both sides of the green-line to visit these monuments to 
the conflict. The presence of memorials in Cyprus is one example of how symbols and 
spaces are appropriated and used to help reproduce the nationalist narrative. These 
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symbols condition subjects to cultural and political norms. 
Consider death. Many GCs and TCs, as well as others, have died in the Cyprus 
conflict. It is difficult to say exactly how many people have died, in part because the 
Greek and Turkish nationalist views death in an abstract relation to the nation. The 
nationalist, Greek or Turkish, selectively glorifies, condemns, withholds, or emphasizes 
the number of people who have died and how they have died. Death is central to the 
nationalist identity on both sides of the Cypriot divide.42 Hence, the relation between 
history and sacrifice are central to nationalist identities in Cyprus, as a reminder of what 
is at stake, what has been lost, what the progress of the nation has required. To disrespect 
the sacrifice of the nation is to disrespect the nation itself; the dead become tools for 
maintaining and glorifying the nation.
For example, the GC national struggle museum emphasizes Ottoman domination, 
British colonialism, the EOKA resistance—especially the roles of General Grievas (the 
military leader of EOKA) and Archbishop Makarios (the political leader of EOKA)—the 
way in which Enosis has been prevented, forcefully keeping GCs separated from their 
Greek ‘mother’ country, and most importantly the sacrifice of those who fought for the 
nation, for freedom. Throughout the museum and the island one is more likely to see a 
Greek flag waving on the southern side of the island than a Cypriot flag, even though the 
island of Cyprus is a sovereign nation. The GC museum of national struggle progresses 
upward through several floors until one reaches the uppermost section of the exhibits, 
which is a walled memorial commemorating all of those who died for the Greek nation. 
42 Anastasiou extends this argument to include all forms of nationalism: “the reference to committing 
human life to the presumed sacred value of the nation is present in all nationalist movements and states” 
(Ibid. 2008: 66).
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The walls of the memorial surround an opening in the floor, above which hang three 
nooses—representative of the actual gallows in the British colonial prison, which is the 
only prison on the GC side, where many EOKA fighters were executed. The portion of 
the colonial prison where the revolutionary fighters were held and executed by the British 
is now a memorial museum that emphasizes the same historical narrative.  
The TC national struggle museum, on the other hand, is located within the 
confines of what seems to be a military complex. The initial exhibit acts to glorify and 
commemorate three periods—1571 or the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, the 1974 
conflict which solidified the present division of the islands population, and 1983, the year 
in which the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared itself an independent state. 
Various relics from the Ottoman period are included in this initial exhibit. Along with 
flags, northern Cyprus also has various murals and statues of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
founder of modern secular Turkey. The second aspect of the museum is marked by 
paintings and various narrative accounts of the struggle, but also various weapons which 
were used in the conflict—guns, bombs, knives, and various other instruments of death 
line the exhibit. Here, it became clear that the violent nationalist takes pride in the force 
used in the realization of his or her perspective. This second stage is the most extensive 
part of the museum and leads one into the third and final section, which is a massive 
monument commemorating all of the TC and Turkish people who were killed during the 
struggle. Just like the GC nationalist museum, the TC museum ends by relating back to 
those who have died trying to secure the TC nationalist project. In both museums the 
nationalist ideology clearly works to preserve the wounds left open from the conflict and 
simultaneously exploit these painful memories to justify itself.
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In visiting either the GC or TC national struggle museum, it becomes clear how 
both sides present one-sided accounts of history—the GC museum did not address the 
TCs who died or went missing throughout the conflict, and the TC museum was similarly 
guilty of overlooking or dismissing the ‘other side.’ Of course, it is not just the museums 
that work to reinforce and thus reproduce this one-sided world-view. While walking the 
streets on either side of the divide, one is constantly reminded of the conflict by way of 
posters, graffiti calling for enosis or taksim, bullet holes, armed military personnel, UN 
workers, the news, and the way in which a student’s history books address the issue 
depending on which side the authors and the students are on: The island is steeped in the 
conflict.
Another example of the relation between death and the national identity can be 
found in the GC Museum of the Missing, which is a church and memorial to those GCs 
who disappeared during the conflicts. The Eastern Orthodox Church has been deeply 
involved in the reinforcement and reproduction of nationalism on the Island and abroad. 
Consider that the church waves two flags: the Greek flag, symbolic of the motherland 
from which the GCs remain separated, and the flag of the Byzantine Empire which 
represents the romantic and mythological past through which the GCs and other Greek 
nationalists identify. The tour of the museum of the missing thus begins in the Church, 
which is small and decorated with traditional Orthodox icons; but, there is an additional 
set of icon-like objects in the back of the church: pictures of 1619 peoples who have been 
missing since the height of the conflict. After a brief explanation of what these photos 
represent and the present state of relations between GCs and TCs on the issue of the 
missing, the tour moves to a separate building which contains various sculptures and 
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murals that depict the national struggle in relation to the missing. One sculpture 
represented a mother reaching through a set of bars, symbolic of the dividing line, toward 
the other side where her child is supposedly lost. On the bars a young male is shackled 
above the mother, reminiscent of Jesus, and also symbolizing the continuous presence of 
the missing in the minds of the GCs. A striking mural depicts several men in a prison cell 
and etched on the walls of the prison are the words Kýπρος and Ελευθερία, Cyprus and 
Freedom—freedom being the first part of the Greek nationalist slogan, the second part 
being ‘death' which was written on the faces of the subjects in the mural, and Cyprus 
etched in Greek symbolizing return and the realization of the Hellenic state. The 
prisoners were waiting for all three events. The use and manipulation of symbols, 
specifically those symbols which are connected to trauma and death, are present 
everywhere on the island. These symbols act to constantly remind the Cypriots of their 
identities and the pain of their current situation.43
However, at various points while researching in Cyprus, Cypriots on both sides of 
the divide offered an explanation of their circumstances that was in direct opposition to 
the nationalist identity. For example, when the tour of the museum of the missing ended, 
the guide said that she holds no resentment towards the TCs. “We are siblings,” she said, 
and then admitted that both sides did terrible things—an admission neither side is fond of 
making. She said GCs and TCs were both guilty of violence, and that she wants 
reunification and an end to the conflict. She then went on to explain that she and her 
father were imprisoned by the TCs. After being released she was resentful of TCs, but she 
43 The presence of flags is just one obvious example, another is the presence of memorials and the 
placement of political propaganda which appeals to sentiment and a public memory based in loss and 
trauma, and the idea that the lives of loved ones will have been lost for nothing if the fight is not won.  I 
return to this problem of winning later in the dissertation in order to argue against liberal ideals such as 
competition, which I suggest is opposed to the ideal of reconciliation and thus justice.
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did not make this resentment public, especially near children, because she did not want 
her pain and anger to be shared by the next generation. In other words, despite the 
lingering and ubiquitous force of the nationalist identity, there is also a hopeful desire and 
movement toward recognition, reconciliation, peace, and a new identity framework, even 
in the most nationalist of spaces. Similarly, upon exiting the TC national struggle 
museum, a man affiliated with the museum, presumably the curator, who had been 
watching our group as our TC guide led us through the museum, stopped us and showed 
us a photograph of his son who was in Israel working in a similar peace movement. The 
gentleman was positive about what our group represented and our desire to learn about 
his home. “We are siblings,” is being whispered throughout Cyprus. 
In other words, the Cypriots are not simply blindly committed to the identity that 
afforded the conflict. National identities and a great deal of hostility remain, but 
something has shifted such that both sides are opening themselves to the Other and 
identifying in new ways. In speaking with the Cypriots, it becomes clear that the bind of 
the nationalist identity is absent or loosening in places where one would think it to be the 
strongest. There are many signs of hope. The next section offers a description of the 
politics of reconciliation that have transformed the conflict and opened the border that 
separated GCs, TCs, Greeks, and Turks. The focus of the politics of reconciliation in 
Cyprus has been on the creation of an alternative interpretative identity framework that 
replaces the violent norms of nationalism with a peaceful and cooperative way of being 
with others.
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2.3. The Peace Movements in Cyprus: Politics and Techniques
A central concern of the peace movement in Cyprus has been to demonstrate that 
the oppositional world view of the nationalist identity is neither natural nor necessary, 
and that GCs, TCs, Greeks, and Turks can coexist. Hence, perhaps the most important 
form of counter-conduct within those movements concerned with reconciliation, involves 
what Howard Gardner calls Changing Minds or what Adam Curle calls 
“conscientization.”44 The process of conscientization is based in critique and is not 
merely an analytic approach, but the beginning of a reimagined and transformed world. I 
will return to the notion of critique in Chapter III and IV, as it has an extensive 
philosophical history (one might see it as the motivation for philosophical thought) and is 
the first step toward reconciliation. In this section I will focus on the unique 
circumstances through which Cypriots, Greeks and Turks, have begun to change their 
minds, affording the dissolution of divisions.
The movement toward reconciliation is transitional. The ideal guiding this 
movement is a stable coexistence wherein historical problems are clearly recognized and 
addressed in open and safe public discourse.  By working to deflate the shaky nationalist 
identity, possibilities for new identity frameworks are opening and gaining support 
amongst Cypriots. These alternative frameworks have only begun to be realized, but they 
are significant beyond Cyprus insofar as the conflict exists in a direct relation with 
Greece, Turkey, and other spaces in the Middle-East and the European Union—
politically, legally, and in terms of identity. In other words, the changes in Cyprus are 
making new identities possible beyond the Island. 
44 Gardner 2006; Curle 1971.
35
Within Greek and Turkish identity is the assumption that both sides are naturally 
opposed; but, as indicated thus far, the nationalist view only accounts for select historical 
periods and completely overwrites the fact that those people who have come to identify 
as Greeks and Turks are only unrelated in a few ways, and have a long history of peaceful 
coexistence. The fact of shared pluralism is especially evident in Cyprus—there are still 
GCs and TCs on both sides of the divide who remember living in villages with the Other 
side, some of whom are bi-lingual. Regardless of whether the commonalities between 
GCs and TCs seem obvious now, to outsiders, posthoc, these are not so obvious when one 
is entrenched in conflict. Thus, the first step in transforming the conflict in Cyprus 
required that persons on both sides of the divide be willing to risk seeing the world from 
another perspective and open themselves to difference.
Those who first attempted to bridge the intractable divide were aided by third 
party organizations and experienced facilitators, mediators, and educators from the 
United States and the European Union. Lederach stresses that reconciliation requires a 
space, indeed reconciliation is itself a place on Lederach's view, and this has also been 
true for Cyprus.45 The third-party conflict and dispute resolution activists would meet 
with GCs and TCs both on the island in the U.N. buffer zone—the unclaimed space 
between north and south, which forms a literal border space—in the village of Pyla, 
which is the last bicommunal village on the island, as well as off of the island.46  
Anastasiou describes these first meetings, which took place throughout the early 1990s: 
Through appropriate methods of facilitation, the implementation of 
specially designed processes of controlled communication during the first 
45 Ibid. 1997: 27.
46 Ibid. 2008: 177-183.
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phases of all of these activities enabled the organizers to manage the 
conflict and render interethnic interactions constructive and sustainable...the 
bi-communal groups struggled through various critical aspects of the 
psychological, conceptual, historical, social, and political dimensions of the 
problem, some of which were not only complex and exceedingly difficult to 
deal with, but also extremely painful to encounter...As communication 
matured and bonds of friendship and trust gradually became established, 
GCs and TCs moved to the next level of joint development of conceptual 
structures by which a range of issues pertaining to the conflict were 
reframed in an expanded and more inclusive perspective.47
With a space wherein the bicommunal peace groups could meet and safely communicate, 
the movement began to transform the situation in Cyprus. These early meetings represent 
the beginnings of the dissolution of the preconceived binary scripts which accompany the 
nationalist identity through critical education about the conflict. The goal of these 
meetings was to dislodge persons from the entrenched mindset which assumes that GCs 
and TCs are naturally opposed, in order to facilitate empathy between former enemies. In 
other words, it is in these early meetings that GCs and TCs really began to change their 
minds.
As the bi-communal movement developed, other groups and projects emerged 
which put consistent pressure on all those who were involved in the conflict—Cyprus, 
Greece, and Turkey.  After much struggle to communicate and gain recognition, the bi-
communal movement gained some official traction when relations between Greece and 
Turkey shifted in 1997. Around this time many efforts were being made to change the 
relations between Greece and Turkey, such as an agreement at a NATO summit in Madrid 
which included promises that neither would use force against the other and that they 
would treat existing accords as legitimate.48 Greece seemed to take the lead in changing 
47 Ibid. 2008: 177-178.
48 Bohlen 1997.
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foreign policy strategies and began to engage Turkey politically, rather than militarily, 
which had been the norm as was made public only a year earlier in the Imia-Kardak 
dispute.49 In December of 1998 Greek and Cypriot officials decided not to have Russian 
missiles deployed in Cyprus, which had been a possibility prior to the 1997 NATO 
agreements, thus further easing tensions between both communities by standing firm on 
the previously made promises.50 Similarly, in 1999 Greece and Turkey engaged in what 
Nicholas Burns called “earthquake diplomacy,” as each side quickly offered support to 
the other after being struck by devastating earthquakes.51 Regular formal negotiations 
about the Cyprus conflict continued throughout the late 1990s into the early 2000s, but 
these peace talks consistently met a dead-end and many, including Boutros-Ghali, were 
skeptical that a solution could be found.52  
Though negotiations were still quite volatile and complex throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the dual pressure of the bi-communal peace movement and the softening 
of tensions between Greece and Turkey, coupled with the desire of both Turkey and 
Cyprus to enter into the European Union created a unique opportunity for the Cypriots 
interested in dissolving the green-line. In an effort to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation 
and also to aid Turkey's chance of entering into the EU system, the TC leader Rauf 
Denktash agreed to open the green-line in the capital city of Nicosia, allowing GCs and 
TCs to 'travel' provided that Cypriots from both sides return home the same day.53 Once 
49 Ap 1996.
50 “Cyprus Leader Cancels Plan To Deploy New Missiles” 1998.
51 “Earthquakes Help Warm Greek-Turkish Relations - New York Times” 2013.
52 For a macro-political analysis of the Cyprus transformation, see Hannay 2005.
53 “Emotion as Cyprus Border Opens” 2003.
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the flood gates were opened, however, the demand from citizens for more border 
openings and longer periods of stay rapidly increased.54 GCs and TCs were able to visit 
their former villages, important religious sites, and beyond travel, opening the border also 
opened new economic opportunities. Similarly, opening the border allowed these 
supposedly natural enemies to be in direct contact and thus afforded the possibility of an 
increase in peaceful communication. Though the green-line still stands and the north still 
declares its independence as a state that is only recognized by Turkey, the south is now 
part of the European Union and through various mediated peace talks, the identities of 
GCs and TCs have gone through a radical destabilization and transformation since the 
90s.  
The peace movement in Cyprus has been effective for various reasons. One is the 
multi-level approach to the conflict; that is, leading officials in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, 
and other EU countries, have been forced to respond to grassroots peace efforts. 
Similarly, Anastasiou points out, the reconciliation effort has been successful partly 
because it has redirected the focus on Greco-Turkic political relations from the big issues, 
namely the problem in Cyprus, to low level political issues: “Low-level politics signaled 
the beginning of a modest peace-building process that disclosed the historical possibility 
of changing interstate and intersocietal relationships between two traditional enemy 
countries”.55 Focusing on low-level political issues—tourism, economic development, 
combating terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, immigration, environmental 
protections, etc.—upon which both sides may be easily willing to agree, is important 
54 “Cyprus Contacts Gather Pace” 2003.
55 Ibid. 2008 (2): 32.
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because it builds confidence and trust. “Low level politics” Anastasiou says, 
give policy leaders the otherwise barred opportunity to become directly 
acquainted and familiar with their counterparts from the enemy camp, to 
work systematically together, to deepen understanding of each other, to 
become jointly focused and creative, to share successes, and to learn the 
merits and prospects of consensus-based cooperation.56
Through direct encounters and a focus on low level politics, each side becomes familiar 
with the ‘Other’ as a person rather than an abstract idea, thus allowing for a more 
empathetic understanding and a concrete experience that undermines the myth that 
Greeks and Turks are essentially opposed. By establishing a potentially stable foundation 
of real and trusting relations, future diplomatic approaches to high-level disputes become 
increasingly possible.
It must be emphasized, however, that the peace movement was initiated by TC 
and GC citizens who imagined a different world and took steps to realize this vision 
through interethnic dialogue and collaborative projects to bring about a peaceful society 
that emerged from the ground level. The peace movement in Cyprus was initially a 
citizen initiated grassroots movement that received support from outside organizations 
like the United Nations, eventually the European Union, and other NGOs. Though many 
external forces supported the peace movement, it is crucial that the movement was guided 
by “the long-term commitment and tireless determination of the local peace builders and 
their leaders in pursuing a peace-enhancing vision and peace-seeking options for Cyprus 
against much opposition”.57 In other words, the peace movement in Cyprus afforded a 
new and ‘organic’ identity that emerged in response to much opposition from the 
56 Ibid. 34.
57 Ibid. 37.
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nationalists on both sides of the divide. Despite heavy resistance, various citizen peace 
groups were formed and an alternative identity has begun to emerge.58 
The new identity is, Anastasiou suggests, based on two fundamental premises: 
first, the new identity disassociates citizen responsibility from the nationalist narrative 
that entrenches the Greco-Turkik people in opposition; secondly, the vision and future of 
the identity was left to the shared efforts of citizens from both sides, making it effectively 
their own and not an abstract concept that is violently imposed.59 In this sense, the 
overwriting imposed by nationalism is dissolved and replaced by a shared identity that 
emerges from the ground.
A major obstacle that the peace movement has been forced to navigate, besides 
the buffer zone which separates the people, is that the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus is not officially recognized as a state by any country other than Turkey. In some 
ways this obstacle is both a blessing and a curse: on the one hand, contemporary 
international relations and politics is based on an inter-state model; hence, because the 
north of Cyprus is not officially a state, UN support cannot be given on the macro-
political level and, in fact, the north in general is closed off from most political and 
economic relations with the exception of Turkey. On the other hand, however, the unique 
situation in Cyprus has made it possible for the micro-political or grass-roots level of 
politics to have more power than it might have otherwise had if macro-political 
institutions were functioning to block the ground level movements. In other conflict 
zones, where both sides of the divide are internationally recognized states, the grass-roots 
58 Ibid. 40—Here, Anastasiou presents an excellent account, which he originally wrote in 1996, of this 
‘new hope.’
59 Ibid. 2008: 41.
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movements are blocked by upper level political actors, ignored, or demonized; but, in 
Cyprus the peace movement and the UN development program (UNDP) circumnavigated 
the inter-state barrier by empowering TC and GC citizen movements directly, rather than 
trying to mediate the movement through official and oppositional institutions. This allows 
for a dual pressure to be placed on official institutions—internal pressure is generated by 
the peace movement, which effectively justifies external or international pressure from 
outside organizations—to shift in reconciliatory directions. One of the most striking 
examples of this is the UNDP’s relation with the youth movement in Cyprus.  
UNDP officials cite various projects they are working on with the citizens of both 
sides—such as the implementation of a standard emergency phone number, establishing a 
committee on Cyber ethics, and teacher training in regards to ‘global education’—as well 
as its specific interaction with the youth movement. The youth projects center around 
training young leaders and activists, as well as setting up workshops in schools that focus 
on ways the students can develop their own campaigns to promote peace and work 
toward the millennium development goals. This direct engagement with the youth is 
important because it gives the students a sense of power and community by focusing their 
efforts on shared problems or goals; thus, the UNDP effectively does away with the 
traditional ‘banking model’ of education and implements a problems based approach.60 
The empowering of young Cypriots through problem-focused education solidifies 
practical knowledge through experience and it further strengthens bonds in the social 
world. This model also coincides with the aforementioned two-part alternative identity 
framework.  
60 Freire 2000.
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An example of a project that was supported by the UNDP, but organized and 
deployed by the youth of Cyprus is the ‘One Streets Festival.’61 One Streets was a 
multicultural street festival which brought together and celebrated the diverse cultures 
that exist in Cyprus. Various performances occurred along the main street of Nicosia, 
Ledra or Lokmaci street.  This main street traverses the buffer zone and is separated by 
the main checkpoint in Nicosia. The divide has caused this main street to effectively 
become ‘two,’ much like the Cypriots themselves, and thus the goal of this festival—
which is implied in the title—was to demonstrate and remind the people of Cyprus that it 
is One Street, just as they are one people, despite their differences. In other words, the 
festival sought to celebrate a pluralist unity that is characteristic of the Middle East but 
has historically operated as a reason for conflict. Similarly, the One Streets Festival 
worked to reappropriate symbols that had previously been used to maintain an entrenched 
nationalist sentiment and refashion those very symbols as markers of peace and 
solidarity.
Another example of present grass-roots reconciliatory efforts can be seen in the 
work of Maria Hadjipavlou, who has been integral to the women's peace movement in 
Cyprus. Over several years Hadjipavlou has worked to give the plurality of women in 
Cyprus their own voice, specifically because women in spaces of conflict are dually 
oppressed. On the one hand, women are subjected to the consequences of the national 
conflict—being torn from their homes, losing husbands, children, being surrounded by 
nationalist violence; but, on the other hand, women are frequently subjected to a second 
level of oppressive violence in the home—a situation that is often ‘overshadowed’ by the 
61 “One StreetS Festival, Youth Power Cyprus” 2013.
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national issue. The extra complications which mark the female situation in Cyprus made 
Hadjipavlou’s research difficult, but by working to understand the various social histories 
of the communities in Cyprus she persisted and has successfully established new 
community networks and effectively helped give a voice to many women in Cyprus.62 
These are just a few examples of numerous grass-roots movements that have 
emerged and are successfully altering the identity of Cypriots. The pressure from the 
peace movement also afforded several systemic shifts in Cyprus: the obvious continuous 
erosion of the buffer zone; the restoration of Hala Sultan Tekke and Apostolos Andreas 
Monastery, as well as various other significant cultural sights such as Turkish Baths; 
attaining EU membership, and various other pivotal changes, all of which would not have 
happened if not for the peace movement. The force of the activities in Cyprus also have 
had a broader impact as has been witnessed in the continuous warming of relations 
between Greece and Turkey. Similarly, officials from both countries began to offer 
support—Greece began to support Turkey being accepted into the EU, both sides have 
offered aid in response to disaster, combating the war on terror and other international 
criminal activity; they continue to collaborate on issues of tourism, and they have, at 
various points, offered support for reconciliation in Cyprus. In other words, a shift in 
identity which started out very small has rapidly begun to alter the course of history.
The broad implications of this identity shift are crucial, not just for the relations 
between Greek, Turkish, GC, and TC persons. The broader middle-eastern identity, 
especially those peoples living in diaspora due to the very conflicts which need to be 
reconciled, can be reconceived in a similar fashion. The main problem, however, is that 
62 Ibid. Hadjipavlou 2010.
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these identities must be willingly adopted and spread—oppositional national groups 
cannot be forced to abandon their nationalist identities; but, those groups existing in 
conflict zones around the world which resist the nationalist vision and seek collaborative 
reconciliation—Palestine/Israel, Greece/Turkey/Cyprus, Kashmir, India/Pakistan, 
(Northern) Ireland, and the division between Mexico and the United States, to name a 
few—can be empowered, the same way GCs and TCs are being empowered by various 
international organizations inside and outside of Cyprus. Being steeped in the conflict 
makes this sort of shift difficult, which is why the example set by Cyprus is so important. 
The various diaspora communities who are seeking similar reconciliation are of equal 
importance. Outside of the direct violent nationalist struggle which continues to mark the 
Middle East, many groups are working together to overcome these fissures and 
demonstrating not only that historically opposed peoples can come together, but that there 
is an alternative identity already forming through this reconciliation. Beyond the 
emergence of peace groups, however, there is the lingering problem of other nationalist 
forces. This problem is seen most clearly in the U.S., where Middle-Eastern peoples are 
constantly brought under the gaze of suspicion. In other words, the need for 
reconciliation in the Middle Eastern identity extends beyond imagined geographical 
boundaries. It is the recognition of a common history and a common desire for this 
recognition and the peace which comes with it. Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Israelis, 
Palestinians, Lebanese Christians and Muslims, Baha’is and Persians, etc. all emerged 
from a shared history and culture. These identities depend on each other, in various ways, 
and have much more in common than not; thus, as I have worked to demonstrate 
throughout this section with the case of Cyprus, reconciliation requires a deeper shift. It 
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requires altering the way we understand ourselves and our relation to the world. Cyprus is 
a shining example of what this shift looks like, how difficult it is, how long it can take, 
and why it is so important.
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CHAPTER III
GROUNDWORK FOR A THEORY OF RECONCILIATION:
COORDINATING THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT IN
POTENTIAL SOCIETIES
3.1. Finding a Theory in Precarious Circumstances
In accounts of post-conflict peace building, the term reconciliation is often 
deployed with little explanation or with an explanation that only makes sense within the 
specific context being discussed. There at least two reasons why there is resistance to 
offering a universal account of reconciliation. First, as we learn through Hegel, our 
concepts and ideals transform as we strive towards their realization and thus the concept 
of reconciliation is not easily defined. In the collective struggle for reconciliation, we will 
not know what we are looking for until it has been found. Secondly, insofar as 
reconciliation relies on various tactics to achieve the end of peaceful coexistence and 
solidarity, the concept should not be fixed in a strict sense because it is a pragmatic 
pursuit.63 When persons agree to enter into a reconciliation process, the engagement must 
be open to a range of creative possibilities and the means are sufficient when they are 
63
Hegel and Sibree 1944. Hegel, Miller, and Findlay 1977. Hegel, Wood, and Nisbet 1991. Also see e.g. 
Sen 2011.
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agreed to by the interlocutors. In this sense, reconciliation is an ongoing process that will 
emerge in various ways depending on the material conditions of its activities and the 
demands of the reconciling actors.
Yet, some theorists of transitional justice also suggest that reconciliation can only 
be understood as a process of transcending or overcoming a particular set of problems 
with the normative end of closure (e.g. forgiveness) and, at the level of politics, the 
creation of a liberal-democratic society.64 Others would do away with normative ends 
entirely.65 Some, like Judith Renner, argue that reconciliation is valuable because it is a 
“flexible and interpretable discursive device which can be embraced by politicians and 
society and adjusted to the requirements of the particular transitional situation.”66 Renner 
is accurate in terms of how the rhetoric of reconciliation sometimes works amongst 
politicians, but behind these utterances is a genuine conflict which makes those 
utterances more or less rational in relation to the goal of reconciliation if they do or do 
not secure certain ends, specifically realizing peace through the stabilization of social-
political relations. In order to be more than just a process, reconciliation requires, is 
defined by, and demands the realization of certain normative criteria, but at the same time 
those criteria must be sufficiently minimal in order to be useful and consistent across 
cases. Hence, reconciliation processes work to illuminate the terms of agreement within 
and between social-political environments.
In this chapter, I argue that reconciliation is a tiered process of coordinating 
64 Verdeja 2009; Murphy 2010; De Greiff 2012. Also, Kant and those who advocate for neo-Kantian 
liberal expansionism.
65 Dewey 2008.
66 Renner 2010: 23-40.
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meaning, occurring in the social-ethical sphere and the political-systemic sphere, that 
works to improve an imperfect and volatile situation through the development of trusting 
and creative relations within the social world, as well as between the social world and 
the system. At both levels, reconciliation involves the development of reciprocal relations 
between participating subjects, as well as between the social and the systemic spheres, 
such that a new possible self-world relation becomes possible. On the one-hand, the 
process of reconciliation must be rooted in the interpersonal-ethical social sphere with 
persons who are able and willing to find common ground such that they can transform 
themselves and thus their world. Although reconciliation is a virtue, it has a non-
obligatory character insofar as it cannot be forced. Hence, the central problem of Justice 
as Reconciliation is figuring out how to get persons to actually engage the Other in a 
transformative reconciliation activity. 
Insofar as the starting point of reconciliation is an ethical reciprocal-recognition, 
the processes of reconciliation are those tactical efforts which work to strengthen the 
relation between conflicting parties. Thus, on the other hand, the process of reconciliation 
must be facilitated by and realized through institutional systemic practices. Institutions 
that fail to facilitate reconciliatory relations are doomed to a repeatedly conflicted social 
world, an illegitimate status in relation to that social world, and thus a laughably nominal 
sense of justice.
I expand on this tiered emergent view of reconciliation by first discussing Hegel's 
process theory that was adopted by Marx and many in the critical theory tradition. 
Through this analysis I frame the ethics of reconciliation, or social reconciliation, through 
a discussion of recognition. In the second section I turn to Lévinas's critique of Hegel in 
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order to discuss the experiential tension that exists between the self and the collective. 
Here, I position my view of recognition between Hegel's and Lévinas's because I believe 
that human experience alternates between the individual and the collective, such that 'I' is 
as equally precarious of an ethical achievement as 'We'; thus, social reconciliation must 
take care and respect the potential individual and collective. In this sense, social 
reconciliation must be open ended, creative, and not solely backwards looking. In the 
third section I discuss various elements of an institutional-systemic approach to 
reconciliation. Here, I emphasize the importance of truth-commissions in creating 
participatory opportunities for persons to both overcome a certain sort of political 
alienation and also to help bridge the gap between the system and the social world. Truth-
commissions also reveal that systemic recognition is not just about the granting of rights, 
but is also about repairing the historical damages and preventing future damages by 
coordinating meanings between the system and social world. Ultimately, the 
reconciliatory model I am defending contains within it an implicit notion of a social 
contract that is yet to come, which demands collective meaning coordination and political 
authorship in both micro and macro political spheres. The work in this chapter sets the 
stage for a closer analysis of each sphere of reconciliation in chapters IV-VI. 
3.2. Groundwork for a Theory of Social Reconciliation
Before the rise of the present discourse on reconciliation, philosophical discussion 
of the concept was limited to Hegel and the Critical-Theory tradition.67 Indeed, Hegel is 
one of the only philosophers to discuss reconciliation (die Versöhnung) explicitly or to 
67 Reconciliation has an even longer history of recorded practice dating back to early Judeo-Christian 
communities.  I am starting with Hegel because he offers a systematic explanation of reconciliation that 
still operates in critical-theory.
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place it as the heart of his project.68 I appeal to Hegel, not just because he was the first 
modern theorist to discuss reconciliation, but because he was critically responding to the 
rise of liberalism from within the eye of the storm, where the nation, capitalism, 
individualism, and empiricism converged. Hegel acts as a rooted precedent from which 
criticism of our present continues to draw. He is an important precedent because he 
believed the developed world needed to take seriously the notion of reconciliation and, 
insofar as the present is only now thinking about reconciliation, Hegel remains valuable 
even if his legacy is problematic. Hegel and his followers are particularly useful insofar 
as they implicitly critique liberal contract theory by demonstrating that the terms of our 
social order are neither explicit, nor agreed upon; rather, as I argue throughout this 
chapter, the social contract is often (mis)taken as given, while the political contract is 
established through force. I will hold on to the contract model for critical purposes, but 
the contract I am discussing is a future agreement that requires the work of reconciliation.
3.2.1. Mutual Recognition As the Ethical Starting Point of Reconciliation
Hegel was concerned with the relation between persons and institutions in a world 
where relations were becoming increasingly alienated. In the modern-liberal world, 
people feel split and powerless in relation to the system of social and political institutions 
which have increasingly come to represent them, creating a sense of hostility between the 
institutions and the people, but also between peoples. Hegel's response to the problem of 
alienation is a theory of reconciliation.
Hegel describes alienation through his critique of social relations and the division 
of labor. He says that the individual has become dependent upon the “social 
68 Hyppolite 1969, 1974; Hardimon 1994; Williams 1997.
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environment” which, Hyppolite clarifies, replaced “the natural environment.”69 Persons 
are dependent upon social arrangements for the satisfaction of needs—the social order 
also creates needs— but as a community all persons become dependent on the structures 
they co-create, allowing the structures to have power over persons.70 The sublimation of 
habituated norms creates the opportunity for individuals to be objectified and estranged 
from themselves as well as their circumstances. In situations where systemic processes 
become divorced from the needs and values of individuals, the individual may feel 
powerless in relation to the system they tacitly participate in maintaining. Alienation is 
later taken up by Marx in his critique of labor, but Hegel argues that it is not just life 
under capitalism, but life as such, that is alienated. The alienated subjects thus feel 
estranged from themselves, others, and the system. Hence, Hegel responds to the problem 
of alienation by discussing reconciliation as an ethical and a political remedy to the ill of 
alienation.
For example, in writing about the “Unhappy Conscious” Hegel focuses on how 
one is confronted by the experiential wall of alienation in the realization that one is, 
contra Cartesianism, unable to truly conceive of oneself as an isolated cogito:
This unhappy, inwardly disputed consciousness, since its essentially 
contradictory nature is for it a single consciousness, must forever 
69 Ibid. Hyppolite, 1969: 79. Here, Hyppolite reads Hegel as believing in a 'state of nature' or pre-social 
situation that was the natural starting point of human existence. I remain skeptical of pre-social 
mythology, but it is worth noting because Hegel does not claim that sociality emerged out of a need to 
end all war; rather, Hegel suggests that we are social creatures from the beginning and that the current 
state of civilization is merely a unique emergence in our history. Marx maintains this sort of epochal 
view of sociality. See the first chapter of Honneth's struggle for recognition for a description of how 
Hegel parts with other theorists on the origins of society (Honneth 1995). As I will suggest in a moment, 
I think this first level of sociality is the non-propositional trusting relation that we establish with our 
fellow persons when said persons participate in ways that do not violate that trust (e.g. they do not act 
hostile or war like).
70 For an analysis of how systems create needs, see Marcuse's “The End of Utopia” (1970: 62-82). Also 
see Graeber 2011.
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have present in the one consciousness the other also; and thus it is 
driven out of each in turn in the very moment when it imagines it 
has successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the other.71
The subject recognizes and forms itself through Others. This potentially objectifying and 
alienating recognition through Others is a process wherein one simultaneously realizes 
oneself while shedding the skin of one's former self. In the System of Ethical Life and the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (PdG) it is clear that life, specifically the intellectual and 
philosophical life, is marked by this ongoing struggle with the ephemeral self that is 
alienated and eventually transformed through the world of others; hence, transformative 
contemplation is, according to Hegel, “the way of despair.”72 The way we understand 
ourselves, specifically through the recognition (or misrecognition) of others, largely 
determines the way we engage with and thus (co)author the world because the world is 
this activity of co-created meaning making.73 
The PdG begins with this problem of contested truth precisely because Hegel is 
concerned with how the world is shaped by our understanding or perception. He frames 
this problem by first addressing cognition metaphorically, noting that if cognition is an 
instrument then its use “sets out to reshape and alter” the very thing it attempts to grasp 
and understand.74 But, he also points out that if cognition is a medium “through which the 
light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as 
it exists through and in this medium.”75 The problematization Hegel sets out in this dual 
71 Ibid. Hegel 1977: 126.
72 Ibid. 49. Also, Hegel's System of Ethical Life...***For a more complete discussion of this problem, see 
Warum Denken Traurig Macht? (Steiner 2008).
73 Hegel's notion of recognition is coming out of Fichte. See Williams 1997.
74 Ibid. Hegel 1977: 46.
75 Ibid.
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metaphor does not merely challenge the project of securing truth and thus knowledge, but 
also sets the stage for his unique phenomenological method which treats both truth and 
knowledge as a shared experience.
The constant struggle to know and be known, only to have what appears 
evaporate in the process and thus give way to a different experience, is what moves 
Hegel's phenomenology through its various stages. More importantly, Hegel believes that 
this continuous activity of grasping what appears as known, specifically ourselves, only 
to have the known object taken away, negated, and transformed through experience, is 
what makes life alienated. It makes sense that one would feel powerless, uncertain, and 
alienated when one's self and thus one's world of meaning are constantly transformed 
through various experiences. Hence, the central problem we face is not one of objectivity, 
for objectivity is not really possible; instead, we must determine how we can best 
navigate in this ephemeral world of competing value and truth claims. In other words, 
Hegel is concerned with how it is that we deal with the problem of interpretative 
difference: How do we reconcile ourselves with others who have different experiences, 
different views of the world, and thus different claims to knowledge that challenge our 
world-being?
One historically popular option discussed in PdG is seen in a master-slave 
relation. A master-slave relation emerges as persons undermine or dominate one another 
for the sake of affirming their own self realization, their own claim to truth, meaning, and 
value.76 The master-slave relation is problematic insofar as agents dominate Others and 
attempt to negate their freedom, but, insofar as Others remain agents, they defend 
76 Ibid. Hegel 1977: 111-119. Also, Williams 1997: 2.
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themselves thus affording conflict. When agents objectify Others through domination, an 
asymmetrical and unstable relation emerges. In other words, the master-slave relation is a 
description of conflict.77 A master-slave relation is asymmetrical and alienated, and 
contains a risk of war, which is the logical outcome of a situation involving domination. 
In a master-slave situation, neither side is ethically realized and the world too is lacking 
in the richness of possibility that would exist were all parties realizing themselves 
together; thus, a new relation must be formed.
Indeed, contra Kojéve and the French reading of PdG, Hegel advocates an 
alternative form of recognition wherein both parties affirm each other mutually and 
freely.78 Here, Robert R. Williams's suggests that we can understand Hegel's notion of 
recognition as a threshold that “is reached when the other comes to count.”79 In this sense, 
the master-slave relation is based in an ethical choice to relate to the Other as an object 
and not as a mutual interlocutor with whom one should engage through a reciprocal 
77 When asked 'what is conflict?' persons frequently emphasize that conflict can be positive. The positive 
view of conflict emphasizes how it can lead to creativity and growth, etc. I am sympathetic with this 
move, but I think it is important to not conflate conflict with those things we see as positive which may 
or may not be a response to conflict. That is, I think we should understand conflict as always being 
problematic and the creative form of agonistic interaction should be understood as struggle. Conflicts, 
and those who are arbiters of conflict, tend to exclude persons and indeed seek to crush others who do 
not support their side/view/identity. Here, I find Habermas's notion of rationality helpful. Habermas 
discusses rationality as an openness to reasons, learning, and growth. Irrationality, which is the nature of 
conflict as I understand it, is closed to possibility and is not itself creative. Struggle, on the other hand, 
can be inclusive and collective. We can struggle together and though there may be tension in our 
struggle, we continue to move toward some end which we can potentially agree upon. When the 
struggle collapses, we find ourselves in conflict. It is in this struggle to find meaning and value with 
others while, at the same time, not crushing or closing off others as valuable possibilities, that we 
creatively realize ourselves. Conflict, especially in a historical sense, is destructive and though great 
things can come out of destruction, those things are not conflict — they are efforts to overcome and 
move beyond the raw destructiveness of conflict. In other words, Hegel's master-slave relation and 
reciprocal recognition capture this distinction between conflict and struggle.
78 Kojève and Queneau 1969. Sartre 1956. Hegel's other view of recognition is most clearly stated in the 
Philosophy of Right 1991.
79 Ibid. Williams 1997: 7.
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exchange that effectively transforms and liberates those involved. Axel Honneth grounds 
these forms of recognition in more concrete terms: The objectification of the Other is a 
disrespect, whereas the reciprocal way of relating to Others is a granting of a certain base 
level ethical status or a respect of the Other.80
These two modes of engagement are not contradictory; rather, they are 
descriptions of how persons interact, interpret, and thus co-create the world.81 These two 
modes can also be seen as points of distinction in Hegel's theory of reconciliation. For 
example, Michael Hardimon's discussion of reconciliation in Hegel appeals to a 
distinction between the meaning of the German term Versöhnung, which translates as 
reconciliation, from reconciliation as it is sometimes understood in common English 
usage.82
Frequently the term reconciliation, when used in English, evokes a sense of 
submission or resignation. One reconciles to something and thus bows to the will or 
ideals of another. Here, the act is mono-directional and the individual more or less 
accepts something about which she may have been hesitant. This initial, more common 
understanding of reconciliation as submission captures the master-slave relation in a way 
that most people experience it, wherein one party dominates another though not 
necessarily through the use of chains. Of course, it is also common that persons are 
actually enslaved, with chains, and so the master-slave relation functions along a self-
80 Honneth 1995.
81 The split between mutual recognition and recognition as dominance is later taken up by Habermas as 
the foundation for his distinction between strategic action and communicative action.
82 Ibid. Hardimon 1994: 85-87.
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reinforcing continuum.83 
Hegel does not associate the term Versöhnung with the master-slave relation because 
being submitted to another is not reconciliation. I think it is likely a result of our social-
political circumstances—which encourages and condones a master-slave relation through 
ideals like competition and the necessity of war, specifically defeating or claiming victory 
over the enemy-Other—that the English speaking world understands reconciliation as 
being more akin to submission or resignation.84 
Hegel's understanding of reconciliation emphasizes an intersubjective relation and 
deploys the pronoun with. In this later case, which is closest to Hegel's Versöhnung, the 
emphasis of the activity is on both parties, the problem is reconciled together, and in this 
reconciliation, both parties are transformed in specific ways. The emotional tension 
between persons may be ameliorated when they reconcile together, and how they 
understand themselves may also shift in new directions allowing for new habits to form. 
What is central to this level of reconciliation is the recognition between both parties as 
co-contributing to an experiential situation. The emotions experienced emerge along with 
and are a reaction to certain behaviors. More negative emotions may not immediately 
disappear and in fact they might at some point intensify, but interaction is recognized as a 
problematic relation, which at the very least transforms the way persons relate to their 
own experiences in the situation. Here Hardimon notes: 
83 The significance of this self-reinforcing character that defines domination is captured in Hanah 
Arrendt's discussion of the banality of evil. See Arendt 1951, 2006.
84 Indeed, Hegel stresses that the domination of another leads to a false and enslaved existence: “This 
earlier and false appearance [Erscheinung] is associated with the spirit which has not yet gone beyond 
the point of view of it consciousness; the dialectic of the concept and of the as yet only immediate 
consciousness of freedom gives rise at this stage to the struggle for recognition and the relationship of 
lord-ship and servitude” (Hegel, Wood, and Nisbet 1991: 139).
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Versöhnung is different from resignation. To be versohnt to the 
social world is to view it in a positive light. Versohnung involves 
something like complete and wholehearted acceptance. In contrast 
to 'resignation', Versohnung contains a very strong element of 
affirmation. Thus Hegel speaks of "das versohnende Ja" (the 
reconciling yea; PhG, 494/409). One is versohnt only when one is in 
a position to say yes to one's situation, and one becomes versohnt, in 
part, by saying yes to it.85  
To accept, affirm, or say yes to one's social world, does not mean that one then proceeds 
to defend the social world as righteous. The positive affirmation is an honesty, a 
recognition of how one's conditions are problematic and could be otherwise. The critical 
affirmation that is the starting point of reconciliation is a moment wherein involved 
parties critique their situation and agree to work to transform their problems together. 
There is a radical shift in one's identity when one moves toward reconciliation in its early 
stages of recognition because it involves an intense vulnerability, a risk to trust the Other 
and cooperate in transformative activities. In this vulnerability, one becomes open to the 
dormant possibilities in the world that become more apparent as one attempts to 
understand the perspective of others.86 
Reconciliation does not imply that conflict will disappear. Central to Hegel's 
concept of reconciliation, the concept which has evolved through the critical-theory 
tradition, is the starting point of this imperfection that we are historically responsible for 
creating and reproducing. Reconciliation begins with the recognition that the social world 
85 Hardimon 1994: 87.
86 This critical view or openness to possibility is not unique to Hegel. Plato's parable of the cave is in 
many ways a story about this critical view of the world as possibility, and the importance of critique is 
taken up by Horkheimer, Adorno, Honneth, Habermas, and others under the banner of critical theory 
(Plato, Hamilton, and Cairns 1961). This may seem like a small shift for the philosophically inclined, 
but for those who understand reality through a fixed or reified perspective (Honneth 2008; Lukács 
1971), such as the nationalist, for example, the world is not open to reinterpretation (McKim and 
McMahan 1997) and is a fixed and ahistorical or reified object.
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is imperfect and problem ridden, that we are responsible for co-producing it, and that it is 
something which we can transform by transforming our relations with others. Following 
this approach, a theory of reconciliation must not begin by assuming that persons already 
agree to the terms of their existence; rather, the meaning of our circumstances, the terms 
of our social-political co-existence, must be coordinated through peaceful and collective 
tactics.
In the case of Cyprus, Versöhnung began the moment Cypriots on both sides of 
the green-line looked back at their histories and decided it could and indeed should be 
otherwise, and thus began to adjust their habits, together, for the sake of that 'otherwise.'87
Note that a ceasefire was not the start of reconciliation, though reconciliation would have 
been much more difficult were it not for the ceasefire; rather, reconciliation began with 
the Cypriots changing their minds, thinking of the other as a being worthy of respect, and 
seeking the other in order to work through the problems marking the island. The central 
problem of reconciliation at this ethical level is learning how it is that we arrive at this 
starting point where we openly respect the Other and are willing to work together toward 
a new possible world.
3.2.2. Holism v Individualism, a False Dichotomy
Emmanuel Lévinas's critique of Hegel is a useful catalyst for further developing 
an account of reconciliation.88 At the social level, Lévinas claims that Hegel's ethics of 
recognition reduce individuals to the absolute or the collective understanding that is 
holism, which effectively levels difference by making all beings the same. In conflicts 
87 For an example of mutual recognition see chapter II. Also, Anastasiou 2008; Hadjipavlou 2007.
88 Lévinas 2012.
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this reduction to the collective seems to take away individual agency which is really 
problematic, especially in conflict situations, because it is sometimes necessary that 
individuals be culpable; thus, the ethical assuming of the We over the individual requires 
a clause regarding the role of the individual within the collective. At the political level, 
Lévinas's critique points to particularly serious problems because it suggests that Hegel's 
politics lead to totalitarianism and the active dissolution of difference. In this section I 
will address the holism individualism problem. I will address the political aspects of 
Hegelian thought in the next section as I transition into a more complete discussion of 
systemic reconciliation.
If one is only able to realize oneself through Others, then Others are not truly 
Other, according to Lévinas, but are actually the same. Lévinas states:
Other with an alterity that does not limit the same, for in limiting the same 
the other would not be rigorously other: by virtue of the common frontier 
the other, within the system, would yet be the same...The absolutely other 
is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I 
say "you" or "we" is not a plural of the "I." I, you-these are not individuals 
of a common concept.89 
Here, Lévinas emphasizes that there is a real difference between persons that cannot be 
disregarded, and thus there is a tension between the individual and the Other precisely 
because of the insurmountable experiential meaning gap that separates persons. The most 
radical expression of this uncertain difference is seen in Descartes solipsism, where, 
through sufficient isolation, one comes to experience an alienation so intense that one can 
only be certain that one is a thinking thing.90 Lévinas's claim seems to stand in stark 
contrast to the Hegelian position which suggests that the individual forms in relation with 
89 Ibid. 39.
90 Descartes 1984.
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Others, such that the line between I and We is often blurry. These two extreme positions
—the holism Lévinas attributes to Hegel which seems to leave no room for the 
individual, and the radical alterity he defends, which leaves persons in a self-contained 
bubble of difference—are misleading for at least two reasons. 
First, if reciprocal recognition is read as respect, then Lévinas's interpretation of 
Hegel is suspect because respect is a relation to Others, which takes them as they are on 
their own terms. That is, respect is the acceptance of and relating to difference without 
attempting to submit that difference to one's will through tactics of domination. Perhaps 
the suggestion is that mutual recognition begins with the respect of alterity, but through 
the collective reconciliatory struggle that difference is once again dissolved into sameness 
insofar as both parties participate in forming themselves together; but, this version of 
Lévinas's critique misunderstands the continuous nature of self-formation. Even if 
commonality were established in a reconciliatory engagement that begins through the 
respecting relation, that commonality will not be an absolute or consistent experience 
insofar as persons would still interpret their experiences differently, perhaps even in 
disagreement, and then they would move on to other relations and other hermeneutic 
experiences. 
One does not remain locked in a struggle for meaning with the same beings 
throughout the entirety of one's existence. Even within a common relation, over time both 
parties will experience different degrees of respect. One might respect the basic rights of 
Others as persons, but not recognize their activities as persons. In this sense, there are 
degrees of recognition. More importantly, as one gains experience through a range of 
encounters with difference, one's self not only transforms, but also becomes increasingly 
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foreign such that one can reflect on a time past and wonder how one ever existed as said 
person in the first place.
Secondly, all of this is to say that the distinction between 'we' - 'I' is ambiguous 
and that the demands of metaphysics are too rigid. Indeed, the idea that we must begin 
with one specific metaphysical view of human experience and meaning making is 
problematic because it denies the reality of ambiguous life. In other words, the holism-
individualism binary is misleading because it directs attention away from the variable 
gradient of lived experience. Neither the collective nor the individual are given as already 
formed and determined things. The individual is an achievement just as much as the 
collective is an achievement, and even when realized either may quickly fade back into 
ambiguity. In fact, I think it is fairly normal for one to experience both solipsistic 
moments where all that seems real is the self, as well as intensely collective moments 
where the individual is lost to the spirit of the whole, depending on the circumstances of 
one's life. Although, even in the moments where the self seems lost the individual 
remains as an alterity that cannot be intuitively known. Thus, difference should be 
recognized and respected, while 'we' should be assumed as a goal, but for ethical-political 
reasons and not metaphysical ones. Indeed, I take this to be Hegel's point as well as 
Lévinas's: that our descriptions and judgments are always already ethical-political 
because they inform the way we think of and therefore relate with other persons. The 
assumption that this ethical starting point must either be based in a theory of collectivity 
or a theory of individualism is misleading.
Therefore, in reconciliation the ethical relation with Others must be based in the 
respect of the individual, even if all involved parties are very similar; but, the relation 
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must also be permeated by the awareness that selves and sociality are distinctly 
collective, relational emergences. The theory of reconciliation I am advocating is one that 
respects and depends on alterity, but with a We that is yet to come and always in view. In 
other words, reconciliation processes address individual subjects but with the goal of 
agreeing to and coordinating meaning such that a We can be properly spoken about. It is 
not just for the sake of properly coordinating meaning that a We should be ideal. We 
should be held as ideal for the purposes of overcoming the powerlessness that occurs 
within a world where collectivity is dismissed, and the individual is overly burdened in 
alienated isolation.
3.3. Negotiating Contracts: Trust, Sociality, and the Coming Political System
The individual must be taken seriously, especially when one violates the most 
basic normative expectations that organize the activities of the social world. These 
primary expectations are a non-propositional and non-reflective trust that persons within 
the social world often take as granted; that is, basic trust can be understood as the tacit 
form of the social contract. As one walks down the street, one assumes or trusts that one 
will not be assaulted in various ways; that is, it is believed that our individual embodied 
existence will be respected. If these primary structured relations are missing then so is the 
social world. In discussing this basic level trust relation, J.M. Bernstein says, 
Trust is trust in others before whom we are unconditionally vulnerable 
that they will not take advantage of our vulnerability. Given the 
exorbitance of this requirement—the forbearance of trust as the 
acknowledgment proper to our existential helplessness before one 
another—trust turns out to be most effective or most fully actual when it 
remains unnoticed: trust ideally occurs as the invisibility of trust.91
Thus, when one violates this most basic of social structures, the minimal requirement for 
91 Bernstein J.M 2011: 395.
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a situation to be properly called societal, then one has created a new situation that is not 
based in a reciprocal meaning making; rather, by violating this most basic of trusts, one 
has entered into a state of conflict by not respecting the other and thus damaging the 
possibility of collectivity. Similarly, when one's trust has been violated or when one exists 
in a world where the basic relations are not present, then meaning and possibility 
collapse, making survival the only possible objective. In this sense, reconciliation 
attempts to bring the individual and the Other back into sociality by first demanding that 
the individual be held responsible for the damage done in the initial disrespect. 
The person who violates basic social expectations and the person who is violated 
exist in extreme states of individuality, and that individuality must be respected because it 
contains within it a perspective that cannot be intuitively known because it is beyond the 
social. But, reestablishing the most basic terms of our possible collective existence is 
crucial for helping the victim survive the trauma of having said trust violated, and also 
reintegrating offenders to prevent individuals from being anti-social pariahs. Thus, social 
reconciliation or an ethic of reconciliation is concerned with maintaining or 
reestablishing this basic form of trust such that meaning can be coordinated in a way that 
includes individuals. Social reconciliation is also the means by which higher forms of 
trusting sociality or a shared meaning can be achieved, specifically a common sense of 
justice, which requires a careful navigation of the collective/individual dynamic.
Thus, there is a second possible form of social arrangement, a higher level of trust 
that is also possible beyond the most basic of social contracts that persons non-
reflectively assume in their encounters; but, so long as persons remain unable to maintain 
even the most basic forms of collectivity, that higher form of agreement will remain 
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beyond reach. Historically, this second level of social relation has been imposed rather 
than agreed upon because it is beneficial to whoever happens to be on top. It is in this 
sense of collectivity that the second aspect of Lévinas's critique of Hegel becomes a dire 
concern. That is, the 'We' that directs our encounters can be problematic if it is not open 
and inclusive. Indeed, Hegel's theory at the institutional level is problematic because he 
was attempting to reconcile the alienated peoples of nineteenth century western Europe, 
specifically the German-speaking peoples, with the changes that we now understand as 
comprising modernity. Here, Hegel's 'We' is clearly not including most of the people who 
did the work of bringing modern western Europe into being. Thus, institutional 
recognition, as the granting of rights and protections, is highly limited on Hegel's nation-
state model in part because it remains both top-down and closed to those who are beyond 
the gaze of recognition.
Hegel's political reconciliation is top-down insofar as it emerges when one 
understands the rationality behind the social and political world, and thus finds one's 
place in its operations through a struggle with others as institutions, such as the family or 
the state.92 In Hegel's modern society, persons learn to embrace the norms and roles 
which are made available to them by historical tradition, and it is therefore rational that 
the good of the state be the good of its peoples.93 Ideally, there would be a reciprocal 
relation between state and peoples such that the state actually embodies the good of its 
92 Ibid. Hardimon.
93 Hegel claims that collective Geist or spirit is the absolute and only “real being”, all other “shapes of 
consciousness are abstract forms of [the absolute]” (Hegel 1977: 264, bracketed text not in original). He 
goes on to say that Geist “is the ethical life of a nation in so far as it is the immediate truth—the 
individual that is a world” (ibid. 265); hence, it is through others as the institutional state that one gains 
meaning, purpose, and freedom, and Geist or the collective institutional mind is the end toward which 
we reconcile ourselves. 
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peoples. But, for Hegel there is an underlying rational and end guiding social progress—
the absolute Geist which is often interpreted as God or the force of history—and the 
norms of the time he was writing were seemingly fixed.94 In other words Hegel's project 
is teleological and presented as a universal account of the definitive structures of history, 
and it is thus top-down insofar as history, as well as the roles of individuals within that 
history, is predetermined. 
Hegel's normative political imposition is problematic because, like other top-
down teleological political contracts, it leads to political instability and conflict as it is 
not prepared to integrate differences in opposing views of the world. That is, top-down 
political models are infallible and hermetic, and thus unstable. Similarly, a top-down 
teleological model seems to take some responsibility away from the social-world in the 
play of politics and places it in a more grand historical movement. If teleological, Hegel's 
political-historical model also seems to be in tension with his ethical model insofar as 
world-formation beyond the social world is not a co-authored project but is actually an 
already determined emergence. I do not think it necessary to defend Hegel here, because 
even if he was not explicitly defending fascism, as Marcuse suggests, the directedness of 
his historical perspective is shared by the nationalist and fascist alike, and is rooted in a 
conflict driven pre-determined world-forming relation.95
Along with Lévinas, Marx's “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right” criticizes Hegel's theory, revealing the nationalist or closed mind as being 
rooted in a type of religious mind, which sees the world in terms of fixed, predetermined, 
94 For a religious interpretation of Hegel, see Taylor 1975. The view that Hegel understood the norms of 
his time as fixed is defended by Blasche in Pippin et al. 2004: 183-207.
95 Marcuse 1941. 
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and reified absolutes.96 The closed mind of the nationalist sees the nation-state as real and 
necessary, endorsing violence as the only real option to protect from the enemy. 
Questioning and challenging the reified and fetishized norms of the ideologically 
committed can be extremely dangerous, especially in a delicate post-conflict society. As 
long as persons maintain their rigid and closed understanding of the world, however, they 
also choose to maintain a world of conflict and alienation. Again, how we choose to see 
and thus engage in the world is the focus of ethics and politics. In this sense, Lévinas 
rightly notes the risk in Hegel's ethical-political theory of being closed and therefore not 
respectful of difference.
3.4. The Reconciliatory System: Institutional Recognition and the Left 
Hegelian Legacy
Marx and the critical-theory tradition were also concerned with the problem of 
alienation and the conflicts which accompanies this experience, but many post-Hegelian 
theorists part with his view of institutional reconciliation. They do, however, maintain 
certain key features of Hegel's project; namely, the overcoming of alienation and conflict 
(class conflict) through a collective struggle which transforms all involved and therefore 
the world. In other words, the systemic model I will more fully defend in chapters V and 
VI is an open ended or grassroots model that demands participation.
Contra Hegel, and through the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx argues that 
an unalienated life is possible.97 He argues that the alienation Feuerbach attributes to 
96 Marx 1978: 53-65.
97 In The Essence of Christianity (Feuerbach 1957) Feuerbach argues that persons create their own 
alienation by attempting to describe and understand their relation in the world through abstraction. 
Unlike Hegel, Feuerbach thinks we can escape our alienation if we simply overcome over our tendency 
to abstract meaning outside of ourselves. Feuerbach is specifically critical of religious abstraction or the 
fetishization of symbols which direct one's focus beyond the richness of lived experience into an object 
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religion is really the result of alienation in one's material labors, but Feuerbach was not 
able to realize this because his positive solution was to merely see the world with a higher 
perception through critical philosophical eyes, thus 'relapsing into idealism.'98 The 
critique of Feuerbach is seen throughout Marx's theses on Feuerbach and emphasized in 
his famous eleventh thesis.99 Seeing religious alienation as symptomatic of real material 
conditions which prevent persons from realizing themselves through their labors, Marx 
directs his focus at how human working conditions can be transformed such that persons 
are no longer alienated as such. The problem of religious alienation is dealt with by 
dealing with its root cause, alienated labor.
Marx's response to the problem of alienation, insofar as he offered a positive 
theory of what the world should look like, is for persons (workers) to transform their 
living and working conditions and thus themselves, which implies a revolution in the way 
or being that is not connected to the reality of lived experience. The value of things in themselves, of 
experience as it is experienced, becomes diminished because the value is placed outside of the 
experience. For example, Feuerbach enjoys the example of food and says that we should view the 
objects which sustain our existence—water, plants, meat, etc.—as being sacred because they allow 
humans to thrive, not because an abstract being deems said things as valuable. Marx also takes up the 
problem of Fetishization, specifically the fetishization of capital, with similar concern. Marx suggests 
that when labor is mediated by capital, persons become equivalent to the machines with which they are 
working; that is, persons become objectified and the value of their efforts is determined by an object 
(capital) that is independent of the labor itself. Further, the worker becomes alienated because she is 
laboring for the fetishized capital and not for her own self-development. The worker is not able to 
realize herself and others fail to recognize her as she is because she is presented as capital, not as a 
person who pursues her own projects and develop herself through her labor. Hence, Marx parts ways 
with Hegel through the influence of Feuerbach on the problem of alienation, but he also parts ways with 
Feuerbach insofar as he thinks Feuerbach does not complete his own project. Marx argues that 
Feuerbach does not offer us a real escape from alienation beyond “embryos capable of development” 
(“German ideology” Marx, Engels, and Tucker 1978: 169). 
98 Feuerbach, Marx says, “never manages to conceive the sensuous world as the total living sensuous 
activity of the individuals composing it; and therefore when, for example, he sees instead of healthy 
men a crowd of scrofulous, overworked and consumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in 
the 'higher perception' and in the ideal 'compensation in the species,' and thus to relapse into idealism” 
(ibid. 171.)
99  “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” 
(Marx 1978: 145).
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that persons interact and the way the system relates to the newly forming social world. In 
other words, Marx advocates for a ground up or participatory political model.
For example, if we look at the (only) writings where Marx seems to glorify a 
certain way of life, we see a world where persons are interacting communally for the sake 
of each other. Specifically, in his address to the General Council of the International 
Working Men's Association on The Civil War in France, Marx discusses the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and describes it as the Paris Commune.100 In Marx's description of the 
Paris Commune we see a society where all persons are participating, helping to shape 
themselves and thus the world: 
The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune...they 
know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along 
with it that higher form to which present society is irresistibly 
tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass 
through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, 
transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realise, 
but to set free the elements of the new society with which old 
collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.101
Here, we see that Marx's ideal society is one where persons struggle together in the face 
of their problems for the sake of an undetermined world—undetermined because, in this 
cooperative struggle, all involved, and thus the world itself, are transformed. 
Unfortunately, Marx does not offer much in terms of tactical details as to how we arrive 
at a society where persons recognize each other as mutually valuable and worthwhile 
interlocutors who engage in the co-authoring activity that is reconciliation; that is, 
beyond a pseudo teleological theory of history that he also inherits from Hegel which 
maintains that said transformation is inevitable. Even more unfortunate, many have 
100 Ibid. Marx 1978.
101 Ibid. 235-236.
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interpreted Marx's claims about struggle through militant lenses, leading his work to be 
more commonly interpreted as a call to violence—it is easy to see why this direction is 
taken, given that Marx emphasizes class struggle and praises the outcome of violent 
struggle in The Civil War in France.102 However, Marx's historical view and his view of 
institutions are important in that they diverge from Hegel's top down model, demanding a 
society that is formed and informed by the people from the ground up. In other words, 
Marx advocates for a radical form of democracy: A political contract that emerges 
through collective participation.
Within the critical theory tradition, a two-front critique emerges out of Marx's 
thought: One line of critique is concerned with overcoming the forces that reproduce 
alienation within the fragmented social world, and the other line is concerned with 
critiquing the means by which the top-down system maintains a situation wherein persons 
are continuously exploited to the benefit of a few.103 In History and Class Consciousness, 
Georg Lukács argues that both problems are rooted in different ways of thinking across 
class groups.104 The working class and the bourgeois each maintain a certain perspective 
on the social-political world, and these perspectives are not merely dismissive of the 
Others, but are outwardly hostile toward alternative world views. In other words, class 
consciousness has an ideological character that is similar to the mindset of a group that is 
102 Ibid. 618-652.
103 The most important writing that captures this split is Walter Benjamin's “Critique of Violence” 
(Benjamin et al. 1996). This essay, which I address more fully in chapter VI, really sets the stage for the 
two sphere split with which critical theory continues to wrestle: on the one hand, violence as a problem 
of ordinary language or everyday interactions; on the other hand, violence as a military and state 
controlled force. The violence of both spheres cooperate and rely on each other to persist throughout 
social-political time. Reconciliation efforts must address both in order to be total. Here I focus on 
Lukács because of his emphasis on class-consciousness or the overcoming of the oppositional mentality 
in the social world that allows for systems of domination to be maintained.
104 Lukács 1971.
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at war with a sweepingly produced image of the Other as enemy. Each group maintains a 
reified view of Others and thus of history, reification being the solidification or 
objectification of a relation that transforms it from a point of interpretation and 
possibility, to a fixed and absolute fact. Hence, the system perpetuates itself because the 
social world is locked in a conflict that prevents a collective co-authoring of political 
terms.
Thus, a great deal of work has been done to undermine these reified and hostile 
social relations in the hopes of cooperative systemic transformation. Some, like Lukács, 
have attempted to reveal the various contradictions contained within reified world 
perspectives. Others have worked to show how incredibly complicated history is such 
that the ascription of meaning to said events is difficult, but also to reveal how historical 
emergences bind us in various ways beyond those judgments of which we are actively 
aware.105 Habermas's discourse ethics are a theoretical attempt to address this tactical 
vacuum in the left-Hegelian tradition, and the activities of the transitional and restorative 
justice movements are a practical attempt. 
Hence, it is not just within the critical theory tradition that this problem of 
collective identity through participatory narrative formation has been taken up as a 
central task for systemic political organization. Indeed, the problem of narrativity is one 
of the key points of overlap between much of contemporary political philosophy and 
other philosophical traditions (specifically hermeneutics and philosophy of 
mind/language). 
Even within the analytic tradition, Rawls begins his political construction by 
105 Foucault, for example, is good on this point: see, e.g., Foucault 1972; 1979; 2010.
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sidestepping the problems of historicity and interpretation.106 The notion of reflective 
equilibrium helps Rawls escape the problem of radical (e.g. ideological) disagreement 
insofar as it starts persons with a capacity and a willingness—reason—to understand 
Others and cooperate. Thus, Rawls's theory begins with a social situation wherein 
meaning and value have already been sorted out in a mostly agreeable way, such that 
future agreement is more or less given. It is crucial that persons already agree to the terms 
of their society because when agreement is not present, then systemic action becomes 
impossible or illegitimate insofar as those actions do not align with the values and beliefs 
of the social world. 
Habermas also formulates his discourse ethics as an ideal representation of how 
communication ought to occur; but, a key difference between Habermas and Rawls is that 
Habermas does not assume that persons are already present at the ethically discursive 
table. Hence, Habermas offers tactics for effective meaning coordination once persons 
have arrived at a place where said coordination is possible.107 Neither Rawls nor 
Habermas, however, offer enough of a story about how persons arrive at the discursive 
table. A just-reconciliatory system must facilitate this movement toward a situation 
wherein persons can form a collective narrative account of their historical circumstances 
through a range of creative means that simultaneously alleviate the persistent experience 
of alienation. The most popular and successful systemic method of bringing persons to 
the discursive table and working to combat alienation by creating a participatory 
mechanism can be seen in truth commissions. 
106 See, e.g., Rawls 1971, 1993. I expand on this critique in the following chapters.
107 See, e.g., Habermas 1984; Habermas 1990.
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Many post-conflict societies, and occasionally in the developed world, a central 
systemic apparatus in transitioning towards justice has been the use of truth commissions 
which bring persons together to participate in the formation of a new collective 
identity.108 In other words, in cases where truth-commissions operate with the system, the 
concern is not just about coordinating narrative, but is also about actually bringing 
persons together in a situation where they can realize themselves collectively—that is, the 
system is working to combat alienation.
A truth-commission generally aims to establish the most accurate story possible 
about a range of crimes that are all too frequently committed by systemic actors—war 
crimes, genocide, human rights violations, torture, enforced disappearances, and 
extrajudicial executions. In some cases, such as the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), truth-commissions have been used to address a specific event, while 
in other cases, like South-Africa's famous TRC, commissions have been used to address a 
long history of violence and wrongs committed.109 Much like the politics of each space, 
the structure, goals, and influence of a truth-commission varies depending on the context 
of their deployment. There are, therefore, various attributes of truth-commissions which 
are more or less consistent, the most important of which is a need for participation and an 
explicit focus on addressing and reconciling the past, for the sake of a better future.
Truth-telling has the potential to be cathartic, radically democratic in terms of 
representation, and acts as an example of the type of local level problem-solving politics 
through which a group can establish trust and gain cohesion. In other words, by 
108 See, e.g., Hayner 2010.
109 Magarrell and Wesley 2008.
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attempting to get the story straight, by seeking truth collectively, those involved are 
changing themselves and thus their circumstances through peaceful dialogue. When this 
practice is taken up as a truth-commission, that is, as a formal institutional practice, the 
aim extends beyond mending relations between persons and also seeks to repair the 
system which failed said persons and in some ways caused or allowed for the atrocities 
which make conflicts generally so terrible. In other words, the truth-telling of truth-
commissions has the added goal and motivation of changing the macro-political system 
so that it better accommodates and works for the demos of which it is supposed to be an 
extension, while at the same time helping that very demos to find a cohesive voice.
These events are crucial because they represent an opportunity for ordinary 
persons to be active in the formation of a social identity and in the formation of political 
activities. In other words, truth commissions act as a bridge between the social world and 
the system, and also act to help unite the social world. Truth commissions are too basic, 
however, to meet the demands of a truly just political system. In other words, there are 
other means of facilitating, integrating, and synchronizing social-political meaning 
beyond truth commissions, and explore these alternative technologies in chapter V. 
Similarly, truth commissions are not perfect. In some cases the realization of 'truth' may 
not be the ideal end of reconciliatory politics. Various factors are required for truth 
commissions to be successful. As I will more fully explore in the next chapter, a central 
factor influencing a system's ability to unite a demos through collective participatory 
action is the presence of a material-identity base; that is, a group of people who are 
willing to work together and reconcile themselves, as well as the system. In chapters V 
and VI I will more fully address the implications of a reconciliatory approach to legal-
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political systems, specifically its intergenerational relation to human rights.
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CHAPTER IV
THE WILL TO RECONCILE: MATERIALITY, TRUST,
AND CO-EXPERIENCE AS MOTIVATION STRATEGIES
IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 
“Dr. King's policy was, if you are non-violent, if you suffer, your opponent will see your
suffering and will be moved to change his heart. That's very good. He only made one
fallacious assumption: In order for nonviolence to work, your opponent has to have a
conscience” — Stokely Carmichael.110 
In this chapter, I explore the conditions of the possibility of reconciliation. In 
section 4.1 I discuss movements in contemporary moral psychology which focus on 
emotional reaction and motivation, rather than universally rational and applicable rules. I 
begin with motivation in order to critique popular models of reconciliation in section 4.2, 
which predicate said motives on a limited range of attitudes and beliefs. I focus on two 
alternative models of reconciliation: the confessional-forgiveness model, and then what I 
call the pathos model, which emphasizes sympathy or empathy in its different iterations. 
110
Olsson 2011.
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Although these models may capture attributes of some reconciliation processes, they are 
simultaneously too demanding in their narrow focus on certain attitudes, at the dismissal 
of others, and yet they are not robust enough to describe what is needed for parties to 
begin the reconciliation process. Rather than praising empathy and forgiveness, I suggest 
we focus on the underlying assessment and motivation driving interpersonal encounters 
such that reconciliation does or does not occur. Through this discussion, I argue that the 
minimum requirements for reconciliation to be possible are that persons be willing to risk 
engaging with Others, face to face. I emphasize that the will to reconcile may sometimes 
appear as an empathetic or forgiving expression, but it may also emerge with anger, 
resentment, and a wide range of other moral emotions. The entire range of emotions must 
be respected by way of inclusion throughout conflict transformation processes if the ideal 
of a creative, trust forming reconciliation is our goal. In section 4.3, I therefore advocate 
for a model of reconciliation that emphasizes the development of trust and respect.
4.1. Achieving Meaning: Motivation, Assessment, and Emotion in Reconciliation 
Processes
Worried by prescriptive claims regarding what persons ought to do and thus in 
what ways persons can be responsible, G.E.M. Anscombe argued that we must step back 
and develop “an account at least of what a human action is at all, and how its description 
as "doing such-and-such" is affected by its motive and by the intention or intentions in 
it.”111 For the purposes of understanding reconciliation, Anscombe's focus on motivation 
and human action is important for at least two reasons: First, the primary concern of 
applied reconciliation efforts is to get conflicting parties to engage with one another in 
111 Anscombe 1958: 5.
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creative and non-violent ways. Therefore, working toward reconciliation requires an 
understanding of the precarious asymmetrical dynamics which sometimes move persons 
toward transformation and sometimes move persons away from it. In other words, 
problems of reconciliation might ultimately be problems of motivation. Secondly, 
Anscombe's claim is important because it is a move away from an ethics that is imagined 
as a universally rational process, to an approach that does not presume and instead seeks 
to understand what it is that guides (re)actions. 
In this sense, problems of motivation are rooted in emotive judgments that are not 
universally rational. Harry Frankfurt emphasizes this point in his writings on love: “Love 
is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons” Frankfurt says, “[it] creates the reasons by 
which his acts of loving concern and devotion are inspired.”112 For Frankfurt, the reasons 
of love, especially unconditional love, function beyond a universal rationality. It is not 
easy to explain why a child might continue to support an alcoholic or abusive parent, or 
vise versa, simply by appealing to reason. Frankfurt states:
I can declare with unequivocal confidence that I do not love my children 
because I am aware of some value that inheres in them independent of my 
love for them. The fact is that I loved them even before they were born—
before I had any especially relevant information about their personal 
characteristics or their particular merits and virtues. Furthermore, I do not 
believe that the valuable qualities they do happen to possess, strictly in 
their own rights, would really provide me with a very compelling basis 
for regarding them as having greater worth than many other possible 
objects of love that in fact I love much less. It is quite clear to me that I do 
not love them more than other children because I believe they are better.113
Love is not reasonable and yet love is a reason, which is why poets struggle to capture the 
feelings, even the madness, that permeate such relations. Indeed, there are not universal 
112 Frankfurt 2004: 37. See also, e.g., Frankfurt 1988, 1999.
113 Ibid. 39.
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rules of love and its reasons are internal to its operation such that they can only be known 
through experience.
Yet, enlightenment rationality informs the way we think about our relations and 
the meaning that is created between persons, such that a certain sort of universal truth is 
taken as granted in our daily encounters. Of course, this assumed commonality within 
human experience acts as the fabric of the social world. Following Annette Baier, J.M. 
Bernstein suggests that this unreflective base level of common experience is a trust 
relation that “provides the ethical substance of everyday living.”114 By recognizing 
persons as reciprocal interlocutors in ordinary encounters, rationality emerges as a total 
situation that requires a respecting relation that allows Others to speak and be heard. 
Under ideal circumstances, the non-propositional base level of rationality—the trust that 
the world of relations will operate in the just mentioned ways—allows for higher levels 
of meaning-making to occur. In this sense, the co-achievement of a rational exchange 
requires first that persons trust and respect the Other enough to engage in collaborative 
meaning-making, a giving and asking for reasons that would lead to a mutual 
understanding. But, assuming beforehand that the common respect and trust is operating 
under most circumstances turns out to be problematic, because in many cases, and 
especially in conflict situations, the basic levels of trust and respect that are required for 
cooperative meaning-making are simply not present. 
In this sense, a shared understanding or rationality is not a priori; rather, 
understanding in all situations, and especially in conflict situations, is an achievement 
that demands a sensitive awareness, respect, and requires a great deal of interpersonal 
114 Bernstein, J.M. 2011.
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work.115 There are at least two general levels on which this achievement can fail: The first 
is when the basic level of trust is violated; the second is when the basic level of trust is 
present, but more complex meaning-making is hindered by its presence because the 
trusting rationality is taken as granted.
For an example of how the first level of trust may be violated, consider the 
following: If one attempts to operate in a language that is not one's native idiom, it 
becomes apparent that situations wherein the native interlocutor is noticeably unwilling 
to tolerate the imperfect speech of the non-native actor result in an increase in difficulties 
for the non-native speaker and a general failure to establish meaning. The non-native 
speaker is left feeling stupid, ashamed, and disrespected; the native speaker is allowed to 
maintain the belief that foreigners are stupid and not worthy of respect.116 The failure in 
this example reproduces an experience of mistrust and is harmful to the social world. In 
more extreme cases the foreigner might be assaulted and kidnapped or arrested, 
potentially traumatizing the foreigner as actor and creating a long term sense of mistrust 
that fully undermines the most basic requirement for meaningful engagements. In some 
situations, however, one engages with a native speaker who is willing to listen, act 
friendly, and tolerate one's imperfect expressions. In this relation, the utterances of both 
parties emerge more coherently precisely because the meaning-making process is not 
merely a matter of properly utilizing a language, the terms of which cannot be completely 
fixed in advance, but is about persons working together to create meaning. Here, trust in 
Others and trust in oneself is affirmed through the social encounter. The willingness of 
115 For extensive discussions about how meaning-making is an embodied achievement in everyday 
encounters, see Habermas 1984, 1990; Brandom 1994; Goodwin 1981; Streeck 1993, 1994.
116 See, e.g., Linell, 2009.
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persons to work together can be seen as the affirmation or negation of the basic 
requirement for shared meaning.
More local examples reveal how higher level meaning-making can be impeded by 
assumption. Consider situations wherein persons are coming out of common experiential 
circumstances. Here, the symptoms of assuming a shared sense of meaning are well 
known: Persons talk past each other; make universal claims about experience that are 
really only based in personal experiences; fail to understand why certain behaviors might 
enrage, because it is assumed that the behavior is normal and fine. When meaning is 
assumed before hand, persons often feel they must scream or act violently, to break down 
the assumption, to be heard. Knowledge of Others operates along a spectrum such that 
what one is equipped to understand is connected to the concentric spheres of one's 
relations; but, even within close relations there can be a failure to establish meaning if the 
dynamics of the relation are not actively coordinated. Meaning-making can be impeded 
when one assumes that rational beliefs and shared meaning are already operating in social 
situations. Assuming that one's experience is the universal ends up being a problematic 
source of conflict insofar as it allows norms to be imposed on and thus fails to respect the 
unique experiences of Others. In fact, attempts to establish meaning are often the most 
difficult when persons are involved who assume to know one's character and motivations 
best (e.g. familial relations).
The previous examples also work to demonstrate that the creation of shared 
meaning is a dynamic process and largely depends on the context, as well as the motives 
and attitudes of those persons comprising the situation. One's inability to reconcile 
differences may be rooted in a distinct evaluation and emotional response. P.F. Strawson 
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describes these emotional responses as reactive attitudes.117 He says,
We should think of the many different kinds of relationship which we can 
have with other people – as sharers of a common interest; as members of 
the same family; as colleagues; as friends; as lovers; as chance parties to 
an enormous range of transactions and encounters. Then we should think, 
in each of these connections in turn, and in others, of the kind of 
importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of those 
who stand in these relationships to us, and of the kinds of reactive 
attitudes and feelings to which we ourselves are prone. In general, we 
demand some degree of goodwill or regard on the part of those who stand 
in these relationships to us, though the forms we require it to take vary 
widely in different connections.118
Contained within reactive attitudes are embodied moral judgments that are connected to 
our normative expectations; thus, reactive attitudes as assessments are rational within 
one's own context, but not universal nor obvious to Others. We evaluate, feel, and 
respond, often unreflectively and with righteous confidence, to the actions of another, 
depending on our expectations regarding the status of the Other—which might include 
judgments about age, class, race/ethnicity, gender, religion, education, linguistic capacity
—and our beliefs about how the world should be. In other words, normative values are 
projected through reactive expressions and their projection is largely based on snap 
judgments and assumptions.119 Often, reactions elicit further reactions that can lead to a 
shut down in communication, or a conflict that may escalate to violence. Resentment, for 
example, can cause persons to become avoidant or hostile and potentially block the 
meaning-making reconciliation process. These conflicts, though morally laden, are not 
merely a matter of discordant beliefs; they are felt with an intensity that, when expressed, 
117 Strawson 1974.
118 Ibid. 7.
119 Recent research in moral psychology and neuroscience backs this claim that our reactions and feelings 
begin with an often unreflective assessment. See, for example, the work of Antonio Damasio (1999). 
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can seem irrational (and lead to seemingly irrational actions).120
It is important to understand the influence emotions and motivating attitudes have 
in our interpersonal encounters because various theorists have responded to the problems 
of social-political conflict by advocating for a limited range of motivating attitudes and 
emotional states as necessary starting points for reconciliation: Forgiveness, sympathy, 
and empathy. In long standing political conflicts, for example, sympathy and empathy are 
advocated because both sides have participated in violence against the Other and they 
remain embattled because the Other is imagined as subhuman, as a being with which one 
cannot relate.121 It is believed that by learning how it is that persons develop a sense of 
empathy, and encouraging behavior that would bring about empathetic experiences, 
persons can be trained to overcome negative reactive attitudes, or a lack of reaction as is 
sometimes the case when discussing strangers who ought to be of moral concern. Further, 
it is believed that empathy will bring about forgiveness. More radically, it is believed that 
reconciliation requires forgiveness and that forgiveness is itself a motivating attitude.122 
Desmond Tutu's aptly titled No Future Without Forgiveness captures the spirit of this 
position: We cannot coexist, we cannot move forward as a society, and we will not stop 
120 Returning to the positive reactive attitudes, consider again Frankfurt's writings on love: “it is a 
necessary feature of love that it is not under our direct and immediate voluntary control...a person may 
discover that he cannot affect whether or how much he cares about them merely by his own decision. 
The issue is not up to him at all...What people cannot help caring about, on the other hand, is not 
mandated by logic. It is not primarily a constraint upon belief. It is a volitional necessity, which consists 
essentially in a limitation of the will” (ibid. 44-46). 
121 See, e.g., Eisikovits 2010; Rifkin 2009; Waal 2009; Baron-Cohen 2012; indeed, there is an extensive 
literature on sympathy/empathy and their multiple positive uses in conflict transformation. Here, I 
problematize the pathos model but I do not fully reject the significance of pathos.
122 This position is most commonly witnessed in religious defenses of forgiveness and reconciliation, 
which place reconciliation as the result of the confessional-forgiveness process. 
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killing each other, if we do not forgive.123 
Of course, empathy and forgiveness may be important to reconciliation processes. 
Beyond reconciliation, a better understanding of empathy and the demand for forgiveness 
may be useful for understanding human development, as well as psychological disorders 
(e.g. anti-social personality disorder). But, it is quite a leap to claim that sympathy, 
empathy, and forgiveness act as the groundwork and motivation for reconciliation. 
Perhaps more importantly, in rigorously defending pathos and forgiveness as necessary to 
reconciliation, other important moral attitudes, like resentment, have been largely 
dismissed as hindering reconciliation processes because it is assumed that such attitudes 
are motivated by anti-social desires. I am skeptical of these models at least in part 
because they dismiss a wide range of moral emotions while defending forgiveness, 
sympathy, and empathy as the ground and primary motivation in reconciliatory meaning-
making processes. I agree, however, that with a better understanding of interpersonal 
dynamics, and the motives underlying those dynamics, persons might be more inclined to 
cooperate and agree; but, this understanding cannot exclude the less optimistic among us.
4.2. Insufficient Grounds for Reconciliation: Forgiveness, Sympathy, and Empathy
In this section I argue that the forgiveness and pathos models are not fully suited 
to explain the basic requirements of reconciliation because they start with an overly 
demanding assumption of what motivates the movement toward reconciliation and thus 
exclude other possible attitudes like resentment or anger. I show that the pathos model is 
particularly problematic insofar as it relies on a preconception that reduces the 
experiences of Others to a common rationality and motivation, a common truth of 
123 Tutu 1999.
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experience.124 I will begin by discussing forgiveness because it is the most popular model 
of reconciliation. I will then discuss sympathy and empathy—which represent two 
versions of the pathos model—primarily because each is seen as coming before and 
therefore functioning as the motivation behind reconciliation, even on the forgiveness 
model. I then offer a plea for resentment as I transition into a defense of the respect-trust 
model of reconciliation.
4.2.1. The Confession-Forgiveness Model
Reconciliation is commonly understood as being connected with truth-telling, or 
confession, and forgiveness. The truth-forgiveness model is popular because of its 
religious/spiritual roots. Reconciliation has a long history in various religious traditions 
and what seems to be a short history in academic traditions, specifically the liberal 
tradition.125 For example, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
was, in many ways, an institutionalized confessional. Desmond Tutu, who led South 
Africa's TRC, added to this movement a call for forgiveness.126 Despite being rooted in 
Christian practice, however, even South Africa's reconciliation movement shifted toward 
secularism. After all, the TRC was not an attempt to create right relations with God; 
rather, the TRC attempted to form stable relations between persons within the social 
world, and it also attempted to stabilize and synchronize relations between the social 
world and the legal-political-institutional system, by offering a seven volume historical 
124 Indeed, the push for reconciliation in the 20th century was largely inspired by Gandhi's writings on Truth 
(Satyagraha). See Gandhi and Shriman Narayan 1968.
125 I say the academic history seems short because despite rigorous attempts to table comprehensive 
doctrines, these discursive spheres overlap such that the new is indebted to the old, in various ways, and 
defenders of the new are often working to dislodge reconciliation from religious tradition for secular 
purposes.
126 Ibid. Tutu 1999.
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account of what happened, what went wrong, and how the system could be changed in 
order to prevent repetition and to improve on the current situation.127 Central to the TRC 
was a belief in the cathartic effects of collective truth-telling and forgiveness. 
Unfortunately, many have taken South Africa to be a universal model of reconciliation, 
thus further anchoring the concept in forgiveness and truth-telling.128
South Africa's TRC gained a global popularity that overshadows other 
reconciliation movements around the world. The global buzz about South Africa was not 
just due to the size of its TRC, which was massive. South Africa, whose politics are 
similar to those in the United States and other developed liberal societies, appealed to an 
alternative way of responding to mass atrocity, civil war, dictatorship, and oppression, 
and the appeal overlapped with many religious traditions. In this sense, the South African 
case shares a basic commonality with all reconciliation processes: a divergence from 
cyclical patterns of conflict and violence. While many post-colonial struggles of the 20 th 
century remain stuck in intractable standoffs, South Africa went in a different direction, 
away from the language of winning and losing, and toward the language of peace across 
generations. South Africa's TRC stands in stark contrast to the retributive models of 
politics and punishment that are considered the normal response to violations of the 
social contract in most societies. Rather than replicate the Nuremberg Trials, which took 
place around the same time that white nationalism and Apartheid gained formal systemic 
power in South Africa, Mandela, Tutu, and many others realized that a legitimate peace 
would require the emergence of an inclusive social-political situation, wherein historical 
127 For an extensive historical and philosophical analysis of truth commissions, see Hayner 2010.
128 For various defenses of the forgiveness-reconciliation model in South-Africa, see, e.g., Rotberg and 
Thompson 2000.
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wounds were not allowed to remain open and festering.
Germany did a great deal of soul searching and reconciliatory work in the post 
war period; but, the violent response of the Nuremberg trials and the subsequent 
transformations of the state were unprecedented and viewed as a victor's justice.129 The 
Nuremberg trials and the Marshall Plan exemplify arguments suggesting that the state is 
formed through suspensions of norms, exceptions, and they ultimately reproduced 
warlike tactics through other means (i.e. police force and repression).
Hence, South Africa's reconciliation is important because it is a break with 
conflict and violence. However, although South Africa's alternative to the post World War 
II victors' response is sensible, it would be a mistake to think that all reconciliations will 
be guided by the same ideals of confession and forgiveness.130 Forgiveness and truth-
telling of the South African variety may not always be useful or even necessary to 
reconcile post-conflict situations. Differently diverse societies may not understand 
forgiveness or confession and may appeal to other activities and attitudes as they 
reconcile. In the United States, for example, reconciliatory demands have been driven by 
a call for formal legal equality.131 Besides lacking universal import, however, the 
confessional-forgiveness model that was popularized by South Africa is also problematic 
for conceptual reasons. 
There are many competing accounts of forgiveness such that it is unclear which 
129 Arendt expressed a similar concern about victor's justice during the trial of Adolf Eichmann: “In sum, 
the failure of the Jerusalem court consisted in its not coming to grips with three fundamental issues, all 
of which have been sufficiently well known and widely discussed since the establishment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal: the problem of impaired justice in the court of the victors; a valid definition of the 
“crime against humanity”; and a clear recognition of the new criminal who commits this crime” (Arendt 
1994: 251).
130 Braithwaite et al. 2010. 
131 See, e.g., Catsam 2009.
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version would best act as a motivation for or end point to reconciliation. First, 
forgiveness could be understood as a speech-act, a formal declaration that the problems 
of the past will not cause further conflict. The view of forgiveness that stands alone, 
without empathy as motivation, becomes important because it is supposed to absolve the 
harm done through a contracted utterance and not an appeal to empathy. If someone 
bumps into me on the bus, causing me to fall over, and they apologize, I accept their 
apology, and in this forgiving acceptance I demonstrate that (a) I understand it was an 
accident and (b) I will not retaliate. Persons stand witness to the scene, all of us aware of 
the potential consequences of not forgiving and reacting with hostility. In some cases, the 
law may be forced to intervene, but, I think, many reasonable people would forgive and 
continue with their day. Forgiveness as a speech-act captures a certain social dynamic 
wherein offenses are let go. Ordinary people are perfectly willing to forgive ordinary 
errors, perhaps sometimes too willing, but this is not the forgiveness we are talking about 
in most conflict cases. This sort of speech-act forgiveness might be called excusing or 
pardoning if it is legal-political.132 
Secondly, in the case of South Africa's TRC, confession and forgiveness were 
advocated as a cathartic means of overcoming resentment, the assumption being that 
resentment was itself a moral wrong that would lead to further conflict: The truth will 
heal all wounds. As Thomas Brudholm illuminates, commissioners often praised those 
who revealed forgiving characteristics while more or less disregarding those who were 
resistant to the ideal.133 Brudholm offers much evidence showing that the cathartic effects 
132 For a philosophical discussion of the various distinctions between terms like excuse and forgiveness, 
see Austin, Urmson, and Warnock 1979, “A Plea For Excuses”: 175-204. 
133 Brudholm 2008.
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of truth-telling and forgiveness are suspect. “For example,” he says, “according to the 
Trauma Center for Victims of Violence and Torture in Cape Town, some 60 percent of 
those who testified in the TRC felt worse after testifying.”134 The TRC unintentionally 
intensified negative feelings by pushing for an experience that cannot be forcefully nor 
instrumentally brought about in the name of another end—reconciliation. 
A third notion posits forgiveness as a personality trait rather than an interaction.135 
Here, one can be forgiving or endorse forgiveness as a centrally organizing virtue in 
relation to oneself. “We do forgiving alone inside our hearts and minds” Lewis Smedes 
says, “what happens to the people we forgive depends on them.’’136 The personal model is 
able to account for many of the shortcomings that other models of forgiveness cannot—
for example, it explains how one can forgive the dead—but it also happens to be the 
furthest from reconciliation insofar as the reconciliation I am discussing is always a 
relational process. 
I am not suggesting that forgiveness and truth-telling are not crucial aspects of 
reconciliation processes; but, I am arguing that forgiveness and the catharsis that is 
wrongly assumed to accompany the confessional are not equivalent to or predicative of 
reconciliation. Forgiveness may occur within reconciliation processes. In some cases 
persons might be motivated to reconcile because of a belief in forgiveness. Perhaps a 
forgiving person will respond to atrocity with a reactive attitude of forgiveness. But it is 
also likely that persons will not want to forgive in reconciliation processes. I will return 
134 Ibid. 22.
135 Michael McCullough advocates for the personality theory of forgiveness. See, e.g., McCullough, 
Worthington, and Everett L 1999; McCullough 2001. Also, see Berry et al. 2005.
136 Smedes 1996: 177.
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to these claims against forgiveness in a moment.
4.2.2. The Pathos Model
Others argue that reconciliation is motivated by an experience of sympathy or 
empathy.137 On this model, it is believed that one will be moved to reconcile by imagining 
what it would be like if one were to take on the role of the Other. I will first say a bit 
about the distinctions between sympathy and empathy—that is, I will discuss the 
difficulty in distinguishing the two—because there is a lot of disagreement about what 
the terms designate. I will then present reasons as to why the pathos model is not a 
sufficient explanation for the motivation underlying the reconciliatory movement.
Sympathy and empathy share a common Hellenic root: pathos or the suffering 
that accompanies experience. As gathered from a rough sketch of Aristotle, pathos is 
most frequently described in composition and rhetoric courses, alongside ethos and logos, 
as a means of persuading one's audience by appealing to a common emotional 
experience.138 That common experience can have a range of emotive qualities, but the 
point of this appeal is to get persons to relate with and agree to a certain feeling within 
various situations. The common metaphor that captures the experience of pathos demands 
that you, the audience, put yourself in my shoes. Thus, the appeal of pathos is that it 
directs persons' attention to themselves and asks them to imagine how they would feel.
Beyond being oriented by one's own self imagining, pathos demands that a 
different perspective be taken which includes the feeling of the experience itself. To stand 
in the shoes of another is to attempt to know the feeling, in a precise moment, which is 
137 See, e.g., Eisikovits 2010; Rifkin 2009; Waal 2009; Baron-Cohen 2012
138 See Aristotle's “Rhetoric” in Aristotle and Barnes 1984.
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supposed to reveal something about the Other, as well as why events played out as they 
did. Thus, pathos is also supposed to illuminate a common truth that informs experience 
such that one can relate to and understand the experiences of Others by imagining the 
specifics of their circumstances.
The English derivative of pathos, sympathy, is found throughout the writings of 
David Hume and Adam Smith.139 Here, sympathy is concerned with all of the above 
mentioned factors. Over time, however, certain defenders of the term have focused on the 
illumination of the truth, as information about the Other's experience. For example, Nir 
Eisikovits defends sympathy as the basis for political reconciliation and as the means for 
establishing a cessation of conflict.140 He tells us that sympathy “does not concern the 
psychological capacity we have to feel what other people feel...Sympathy requires 
specific, detailed knowledge about the lives of others. To project myself into the 
circumstances in which somebody else operates, I need to know as much as possible 
about those circumstances.”141 In this quote Eisikovits is specifically concerned with 
distinguishing his view from Hume's and the psychological perspective that includes 
feelings, which is closer to what many now describe as empathy.142 
The derivative term empathy has been predominantly discussed within the 
phenomenological tradition, although recently literature on empathy has emerged from 
139 See, e.g., Hume and Aiken 1948; Smith 1976.
140 Eisikovits 2010. In later chapters Eisikovits claims that generosity also motivates reconciliation, but he 
does not elaborate on the distinction between sympathy and generosity, nor does he suggest a broader 
range of attitudes as possibly contributing to reconciliation processes. 
141 Ibid. 11.
142 Smith and Hume used the term sympathy in part because the term empathy had not emerged within the 
English language when they were writing. For an etymological analysis of the emergence of empathy in 
the English language, see Jahoda 2005.
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various academic and non-academic spheres. Subsequently, there is ambiguity and 
disagreement as to what is meant when we discuss empathy. Here, I will focus on the 
phenomenological concept, beginning with Husserl.
Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity attempts to describe how there is a relation 
between persons insofar as persons are self-contained, ego monads; that is, Husserl is 
responding to the problem of solipsism that haunts the skeptical reduction.143 That is, 
Husserl, like Descartes, maintains that experience of the objective world is mediated by 
our understanding, such that persons do not perceive the world directly; rather, it is 
experience that is perceived and known (cogitationes). In this sense, the world is reduced 
to or contained within the ego. Within the world, however, Other egos present themselves 
as both intentional and object-like beings. For Husserl, the experience of Others as more 
than mere objects is rooted in the ability to perceive and attribute intentionality to their 
activities. This ability, which Husserl and his followers label empathy [Einfühlung], 
involves a particular sort of co-presence or “appresentation” that is unique to subjective 
beings.144 Unlike an object, which, when perceived, can be examined from various sides 
and known in its various ways, the perspective of the Other ego cannot be known except 
by imagining what it would be like to be in their position. Husserl says: 
since the other body there enters into a pairing association with my body 
here and, being given perceptually, becomes the core of an 
appresentation, the core of my experience of a coexisting ego, that ego, 
according to the whole sense-giving course of the association, must be 
appresented as an ego now coexisting in the mode There, “such as I 
should be if I were there”. My own ego however, the ego given in 
constant self-perception, is actual now with the content belonging to his 
143 Husserl 1999.
144 Ibid. 109.
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Here. Therefore an ego is appresented, as other than mine.145
Here, Husserl is describing the empathetic experience as an expectation that Others, who 
seem sufficiently similar to the perceiving ego, will also perceive and experience the 
world from an egocentric perspective 'such as I should be if I were there.' Hence, 
Husserl's notion of empathy is primarily concerned with perspective taking and the 
epistemological question, How do we know Others? But, the starting point of this 
perspective taking is the self and not the Other. In the empathetic imagining, the ego 
projects itself onto the Other, such that the Other can only be known through the self. 
Husserl's students expanded on the intersubjective theory of empathy. For example, 
Scheler famously explains: 
For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another 
person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his 
shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his 
love in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of his teeth, 
with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his 
thoughts in the sound of his words.146
In this quote, Scheler illuminates empathy as being more than a mere perspectival 
imagining, wherein the ego repositions according to the spatial situation of the Other. 
Indeed, empathy is about a shared feeling and involves knowing Others by knowing 
certain experiences—joy, sorrow, anger, and the range of other bodily experiences that 
accompany a full life. 
Amy Coplan's work expands on and clarifies claims made within the 
145 Ibid. 119
146 Scheler, Stark, and Heath 1954: 260. See also Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 183. Here, Shaun Gallagher 
and Dan Zahavi offer a phenomenological description: “Empathy is defined as a form of intentionality 
in which one is directed towards the other’s lived experiences...in empathy, we experience the other 
directly as a person, as an intentional being whose bodily gestures and actions are expressive of his or 
her experiences or states of mind” (ibid.).
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phenomenological tradition by distinguishing at least three essential features of empathy: 
“affective matching, other-oriented perspective taking, and clear self–other 
differentiation.”147 Affective matching is closest to what is described by Scheler, insofar 
as Coplan describes this aspect of empathy as involving the catching of emotions. “To 
catch the emotion of another,” she says, “we must be able to directly perceive the other 
and the other’s emotion either through visual or aural observation.”148 Affective empathy 
appeals to research on mirror neurons and mimesis in young children, suggesting that at 
least certain forms of empathy require no imaginative or perspectival-taking exercises 
and are, for the most part, almost reflexive and thus non-reflective.149 Similarly, 
witnessing the joy or sorrow of another seems to immediately and directly elicit an 
emotional response in the audience. 
According to Shamay-Tsoory et al., cognitive empathy or perspective taking is a 
unique cognitive process system, independent from lower-level affective processes.150 
Perspective taking is similar to what Husserl describes. The third feature of empathy that 
Coplan describes is a variation of the cognitive perspective-taking form that works to 
overcome the problem of projecting oneself onto the Other, by suggesting that sometimes 
we are able to imagine experience as the Other. In other-oriented perspective taking, 
Coplan says, “I imagine that I am you in your situation, which is to say, I attempt to 
simulate your experiences from your point of view.”151 But, she adds that this is an 
147 Coplan 2011: 44.
148 Ibid. 46.
149 Regarding mirror neurons and mimesis see, e.g.,  Gallese 2007, 2001; Hurley and Chater 2005; Van 
Slyke 2010; Astell 2004.
150 Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz 2009.
151 Ibid. Coplan 55.
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incredibly difficult act that requires a clear self-other differentiation: “The effort and 
regulation involved in other-oriented perspective taking suggests that empathy is a 
motivated and controlled process, which is neither automatic nor involuntary and 
demands that the observer attend to relevant differences between self and other.”152
The higher-level processes involved in both forms of cognitive empathy are closer 
to what Husserl and John Rawls discuss. For example, Susan Okin's reading of Rawls's 
original position suggests that to think as another in the original position “requires, at the 
very least, both strong empathy and preparedness to listen carefully,” because one must 
“think from the point of view of everybody, or every “concrete other” whom one might 
turn out to be.”153 In cognitive empathy, others are taken to be persons with complex 
values and aspirations who experience and suffer 'like us,' such that we can imagine 
either how we would feel in their position or, on Coplan's view, how the Other feels in 
their position, when we imagine ourselves as the Other.
Cognitive empathy is connected with compassion because in recognizing that 
another experiences the world much like oneself, it is then assumed that one will be more 
understanding and forgiving of others, as well as oneself. Hence, sympathy and empathy 
are both supposed to work upon, but also make available, the truth of the experiences of 
Others, such that, when that truth is accessible, persons can understand and potentially 
relate to Others in more ethical ways. Eisikovits's sympathy specifically emphasizes 
having information about the Other, such that one's imagination has something to work 
on in making judgments about the Other. 
152 Ibid. 58-59
153 Okin 1989: 245-248.
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Eisikovits says that “most Israelis are supportive of the wall their government has 
built in the West Bank in spite of never having seen it.”154 He then explains how support 
for this wall is largely based in an oversimplified imagining of what the wall will do, 
namely, protect Israelis by preventing suicide bombers from entering Israel. “The realities 
are rather more complex,” Eisikovits explains—the wall is unsightly, separates neighbors 
via roadblock checkpoints, and involves the “extra-judicial expropriation of Palestinian 
land”; he argues that without actually knowing these circumstances it is impossible to 
imagine what it is like to be directly influenced by them.155 On this view, the truth of 
experience is a matter of fact that comes prior to the empathetic imagining and change of 
heart needed for reconciliation to occur. I imagine that defenders of empathy would not 
disagree with Eisikovits, given that the previously described perspectives discuss 
empathy in epistemic terms. The idea of affective empathy adds, however, that knowing 
the facts is not necessarily enough to change persons' hearts and minds about the Other 
and that witnessing the Other is equally important. Thus, co-presence acts as a condition 
for the psychological version of empathy, but in many conflict situations this co-presence 
is not given in everyday encounters.
More importantly, if co-presence is achieved in (post)conflict situations, it is not 
necessarily accompanied by sympathy or empathy. One could have quite a bit of 
information about the Other and not feel any differently toward them. It is not hard to 
imagine that one could refine a sensitivity to the experiences of Others while, 
simultaneously, remaining resentful toward those who have harmed or are imagined to 
154 Ibid. 2010: 12.
155 Ibid.
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have caused harm. Victims, persons who have been clearly harmed by another, are often 
of this latter type: able to empathize with most people and especially other victims, while 
carrying an intense and potentially justifiable rage toward the person who caused their 
harm. In other words, it is not merely the case that there is a lot of ambiguity within the 
pathos model and what its various forms are supposed to achieve, but that even if 
empathy or sympathy are sometimes good, it is not clear how they bring about 
reconciliation. Hence, by itself the pathos model does not fully account for reconciliation, 
although it may emerge and be central to reconciliation processes, depending on what is 
meant by sympathy or empathy.
4.2.3. A Plea for Resentment
The common belief undergirding the aforementioned conceptions of 
reconciliation is that persons will change their relations and overcome their negative 
attitudes by learning about the Other and sympathizing, empathizing, and perhaps even 
forgiving. Hence, both the truth-forgiveness model and the pathos model are motivated 
by the very things they attempt to realize and there is no clear explanation as to how 
conflicting persons arrive at the moment wherein the idealized reconciliation will 
commence. In other words, on both models the truth of the experiences of Others is 
supposed to drive reconciliation, but it remains unclear why the conflicting parties would 
be receptive to the truth of the Other in the first place.
Furthermore, in cases where the relation between conflicting parties is 
asymmetrical, such as victim-offender relations, it is unfair to ask those who have been 
clearly harmed to empathize with and eventually forgive their perpetrators. Empathy and 
forgiveness cannot be forced, and in some cases they should not be recommended. When 
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a victim is struggling to deal with moral and physical injury, it is unclear how empathy 
will address the wrongs that have been committed. In his discussion of forgiveness 
transactions, Paul Ricoeur illuminates the asymmetry of victim-offender relations as an 
obstacle for reconciliation: 
The problematical character of the presumed transaction results from the 
asymmetry, which can be termed vertical, tending to mask the reciprocity 
of the exchange: in truth, forgiveness spans an interval between the high 
and the low, between the great height of the spirit of forgiveness and the 
abyss of guilt.156
The victim is found staring into this abyss, haunted by the empty space left behind by the 
offender. The reactive attitude of the victim is based in the intense feeling she carries with 
her. Her expectations, security, and the basic trust that makes sociality possible were 
shattered by another. How can she forgive? Should we ask her to sympathize or 
empathize with the source of her harm? Perhaps it makes sense to demand that offenders 
understand the experience of the victim, but this too leaves us with the insurmountable 
abyss of harm that separates the victim from the violator. 
It is not merely the case that empathy does not address the abyss separating 
persons. Appealing to empathy as the foundation for reconciliation risks overwriting the 
differences between persons and the uniqueness of personal experience. As Emmanuel 
Lévinas suggests, by taking the perspective of the Other without actually knowing the 
perspective of the Other we are only able to project our own normative experience of the 
world onto the Other, thus consuming the world of the Other and replacing it with our 
own perspective.157 Jan Slaby adds to this critique by pointing out that persons operate 
156 Ricoeur 2004: 483.
157 Levinas 1979.
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with a range of background traits that are not always obvious to themselves or others, for 
example, being nervous, low energy, shy, friendly. And, secondly, even if we could know 
these background experiences, empathy does not tell us how the Other would interpret 
those experiences.158 This second point is crucial because, as Slaby adds, “we have a say 
about what it is that we think, feel, or want.”159 That is, by overwriting the Other via 
empathetic assumptions, one ultimately is undermining the Other's agency. Indeed, for 
Lévinas, this sort of disregarding of difference acts as the social foundation for 
totalitarianism. 
Many critiques of Rawls's ideal political starting point are based in this same 
concern: The outcome of the original position, which is based in an empathy that relies 
on a self-interested view of human nature, disregards the reality of difference and projects 
liberal masculine values onto the world, thus effectively denying others the opportunity 
to speak for themselves.160 Reflective equilibrium and empathy may be useful concepts 
and political ideals, but reconciliation requires that all involved parties participate in 
addressing the complexity of our non-ideal circumstances and the various differences that 
lead to our asynchronous relations.
It is possible that forgiveness and pathos may sometimes bring persons together in 
158 Slaby, forthcoming. 
159 Ibid. 13.
160 See, e.g., Susan Okin's “John Rawls: Justice As Fairness—For Whom?” in Pateman and Shanley 1991; 
also, Pateman and Mills 2007 describe this overwriting as the Domination Contract, which relies on 
imagined representations of Others that silences and permits domination. On this point, Mills states: “as 
various theorists of race and imperialism have pointed out, once one examines the representations 
("savages," "barbarians") and the experiences of people of color in the modern period--expropriated and 
exterminated Native Americans and Australians, enslaved and later Jim-Crowed blacks, colonized non-
Europeans--it becomes clear that both in theory and in practice, only white men were equal. Not merely 
as a matter of fact, but as a matter of proclaimed moral and legal norms, nonwhites had an inferior to 
non-existent schedule of rights--and were thus non-citizens or at best second-class citizens” (ibid. 98).
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the reconciliation process. I do not want to rule out forgiveness and empathy as 
sometimes being motivating factors in getting persons to the reconciliation table. More 
often, empathy and forgiveness are specific outcomes of reconciliation. As definitive 
standards of reconciliation, however, they are too demanding and do not tell us what is 
needed for parties to begin the reconciliation process. In other words, basing a theory of 
reconciliation in forgiveness or empathy limits the spheres of reconciliation too 
drastically. The conditions of the possibility of reconciliation are much less drastic and 
merely require that persons be willing to engage in the reconciliation process .
Again, I am not denying the possible importance of empathy, sympathy, and 
forgiveness in reconciliation processes. I am arguing that it is problematic to claim these 
attitudes form the foundation for reconciliation or will be involved in all reconciliation 
processes. Further, I am claiming that the dismissal of other attitudes is deeply 
problematic. Let's consider, in this regard, the reactive attitude of resentment, as 
described by Jean Améry, which too often gets discussed as opposed to reconciliation.
Jean Améry tells us that his “resentments are there in order that the crime become 
a moral reality for the criminal, in order that he be swept into the truth of his atrocity.” 161 
Brudholm rightly notes that Améry “evokes the authority of the eyewitness to an 
unprecedented catastrophe,” when discussing his experiences of being tortured and taken 
to the mind's limit in the German death camps.162 However, Améry is not just responding 
to those who dismiss resentment as a strange form of spite (for example, Nietzsche). He 
is also responding to the advocates of empathy (specifically Max Scheler) by bluntly 
161 Améry 1980: 70.
162 Ibid, Brudholm: 91.
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stating that others do not somehow naturally know his experience and therefore should 
not simply dismiss his anger. Améry's appeal to his experience is not unusual. Many 
victims of atrocity feel that only others who have experienced similar trauma can really 
know what it is that they are describing when they relive their experiences and make 
claims about those experiences. On this view, empathy cannot reveal to us what Améry 
experienced and it would be insulting to claim that we can know his pain. Only through 
Améry's resentment can the world begin to know what he experienced and, more 
importantly, what that resentment demands.
Unfortunately, there is a strong movement against negativity, such that 
expressions of anger or other similar reactions are often silenced or dismissed in various 
ways. On this point, Slaby is worth quoting at length: 
Instead of letting affectivity be a field of resonance for a wide range of 
human experiences, including those that reflect potentially problematic, 
pathological aspects of today’s conditions of living, a strict policy is 
imposed towards a thin range of mind-numbing positive emotions and 
ways of ‘positive thinking’. It is a mixture of optimism, cheerfulness, 
sympathetic politeness and composed self-possession which restricts and 
controls the range of affects on display in everyday life. Thereby, the 
potential for critique and resistance is drowned effectively already on the 
level of sentiment, interpersonal style and emotional conduct...Our 
emotions shape what seems natural to us. Because of this, it will be 
increasingly hard for individuals to even see and appreciate the potential 
value of alternatives to the dominant affective regime.163
Theorists and activists should be highly skeptical of purely positive theories because they 
overwrite and thus make incomprehensible a wide range of other meaningful emotive 
experiences that might illuminate critical flaws in our social-political world, as well as 
creative possibilities that would otherwise be lost to politeness or over-reaching 
optimism.
163 Ibid. Slaby (forthcoming): 26.
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Hence, what is also interesting about Améry's writing is that his resentment 
motivated him to respond to post war norms (e.g. the Marshall Plan). Even though Améry 
was critical of public intellectuals like Martin Buber, who advocated reconciliation in the 
post war period, perhaps we should consider that Améry was contributing to a 
reconciliation process by bringing his resentment to a public forum. Améry's 
reconciliation process, however, is not one that persons are often excited about, because it 
requires that we listen to the angry voices alongside those who wish to forgive and love 
the enemy Other.164 Therefore, Améry's work remains important, not only as a testament 
to the evils of World War Germany, but because it reveals that the will to engage the 
enemy Other can be initiated by a wider range of motivating attitudes than open-hearted 
forgiveness.
4.3. Rethinking Motivation: A Defense of the Respect-Trust Model
In most cases, persons are willing to reconcile because they are tired of fighting; 
but, the material identity base of those persons who are willing to reconcile can also be 
motivated by love or fear, or a demand to have one's loved ones protected. Persons who 
are ambiguously caught between conflicting parties can also be understood as having a 
natural potential to be motivated to reconcile—here we might think of mixed-race 
persons in the United States, persons of Catholic and Protestant families in Northern 
Ireland, and so on. And, something like resentment might have its place in the range of 
relevant motivations. In other words, we should not shy away from anger if, beneath that 
164 And, in fact, Améry even makes demands as to what would be required for reconciliation between the 
Germans and their victims. He says “How this shall come about in actual practice, every German may 
picture for himself. This writer is not a German and it is not for him to give advice to this people. At 
best, he is able to imagine vaguely a national community that would reject everything, but absolutely 
everything, that it accomplished in the days of its own deepest degradation, and what here and there 
may appear to be as harmless as the Autobahns” (ibid. 78).
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anger, is a recognition and thus an expectation of others as mutual interlocutors. Thus, the 
minimal requirement for reconciliation is this willingness to recognize and engage with 
Others in the formation of our historically laden reality: A mutual recognition. 
This motivating recognition rests beneath the reconciliatory resentment, as well as 
empathy and forgiveness, and includes within it a range of expectations, the most basic of 
which is that all persons deserve a basic level of respect. As Axel Honneth points out, 
most conflicts share a narrative account of an enemy Other that defines the relation 
according to a history of disrespect.165 ““Feelings of having been disrespected,” Honneth 
says,
form the core of moral experiences that are part of the structure of social 
interaction because human subjects encounter one another with 
expectations for recognition, expectations on which their psychological 
integrity turns. Feelings of having been unjustly treated can lead to 
collective actions to the extent to which they come to be experienced by an 
entire circle of subjects as typical for their social situation.166
When conflicting parties enter into dialogue, each has a story about how the other has 
caused harm. 'What about' becomes the common call and response when trying to 
understand histories of conflict. For those who do not recognize the Other as a being who 
understands the importance of respect and dignity, reconciliation is not possible. Améry 
was angry precisely because the German people knew the importance of human dignity 
and had the capacity for respect, but murdered and enslaved anyway. 
The notion of recognition I am working with derives and diverges from Hegel's 
concept. For Hegel, the way we understand ourselves, specifically through the 
recognition (or misrecognition) of others, largely determines the way we engage with and 
165 Honneth 1995.
166 Ibid. 165.
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thus (co)author the world, because the world is this activity of co-created meaning-
making. At the heart of conflict is misrecognition, which is an active denying of the role 
of others in world formation. In social conflict, misrecognition is, in its most basic form, 
a disrespect. For Hegel, the master-slave relation epitomizes the problem of 
misrecognition because the slave is subject to the reality of the master and mediated by 
the world view of the master. The slave is denied the respect that should be basic to all 
beings.167
Mutual recognition, on the other hand, which is often only discussed in terms of 
institutional representation, is, as Robert R. Williams says, “the threshold of the 
ethical.”168 It is a relation wherein persons recognize that Others are also important to 
maintaining the ongoing social-political world wherein we reside. In accepting that the 
Other matters—not just as an object to be known or dominated in relation to the 
foundational cogito, but as a being that in fact matters more than the cogito, precisely 
because one's self is formed through one's relations with Others, making Others, not the 
self, the foundation of truth—our questions and problems become fully permeated by 
social, political, and ethical concerns. This is precisely why mutual recognition comes 
along with a certain ethical sensitivity, because it includes within it the trusting 
expectation that the respectful world relation be reciprocated by other self-aware beings; 
thus, it is not surprising then, that when recognition is not reciprocated and our most 
basic trust is violated, the ethical subject becomes, like Améry, resentful and angry.
167  “recognizing the other, both in her (partial) agentive autonomy and in her exposedness as a vulnerable, 
needy being (Butler 2001). With this, we come to let her be in what ultimately remains an inevitable 
alterity. This might actually be what Descartes, of all people, had in mind when he spoke of générosité
—the generous stance of transcending one’s own partial, enclosed perspective in order to open oneself 
up and let oneself be ‘conditioned’ by the other (see Ricoeur 1966 [1950], p. 62).” (Slaby p. 18).
168 Ibid. Williams: 7.
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A model of reconciliation that is rooted in mutual or reciprocal recognition is 
preferable to the others I have discussed because it captures the conditions for the 
possibility of reconciliation at both the social and the systemic levels. What makes 
reconciliation possible, however, is still not itself reconciliation and only represents the 
very minimal requirements for reconciliation to occur. The problem of transitioning from 
possibility to actuality is central to most enlightenment thought. Hegel both describes this 
problem, understanding how the transition from possible to actual occurs, and attempts to 
resolve it through his Logic. “With the transition from being to nothingness and from 
nothingness to being,” Alain Manville tells us, “the understanding can no longer function. 
It is confronted with an unknown universe that offers no fixed point where it can ground 
its judgment. Now, everything is in transition.”169 The problem Hegel lays out is that 
being is ambiguous, the possibility that is not yet actual, and the idea that being, as we 
attempt to categorize and define it through our understanding, is unfixed, is beyond our 
understanding precisely because our understanding is based in the fixation of judgments, 
but the world is always in transformation.170 
Instead of following Hegel's Logic and offering an ontology of transition in order 
to describe how it is that reconciliation is realized, I want to offer a social-ethical and 
political account. The inability to fully grasp the ambiguity that defines our 
transformative world represents a limit to human knowledge. This shortcoming cannot be 
supplemented by a new logical system, as Hegel suggests; rather, it is precisely because 
169 Manville 1979: 114.
170 This problem of ambiguity in being is also addressed by Kant, which is why he was concerned not with 
our grasp on concepts (which are judgments), but with the grasp that concepts have on us. Simone de 
Beauvoir also addressed it, but from a different perspective that attempted to include rather than speak 
on behalf of the voices of Others.
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our understanding is limited that we must embrace trust and faithfully leap toward the 
unknown possible. In other words, the transition from reconciliation as a possibility to its 
actualization involves a great risk because we do not know whether we can actually trust 
the other or what will happen within the encounter.171
So, returning to the problem of reconciliation, I am suggesting that recognition is 
the starting point of reconciliation, but the transition from a cessation of conflict to a 
reconciliation process involves a distinct risk, a vulnerable opening to the Other that is a 
trusting engagement. The leap of faith may fail and it may intensify the oppositional 
relation. Most importantly, the risk of reconciliation is not committed in abstraction. For 
example, when telling the story of his Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela does not offer 
reasons for why he was willing to engage with his enemy, P.W. Botha, or why Botha was 
willing to engage with Mandela. But, when they did meet in person, in July of 1989, 
Mandela describes the event as the threshold at which the peace process began: “While 
the meeting was not a breakthrough in terms of negotiations, it was one in another sense. 
Mr. Botha had long talked about the need to cross the Rubicon, but he never did it 
himself until that morning...Now, I felt, there was no turning back”172
Here, it is useful to consider John Paul Lederach's description of reconciliation. 
Lederach tells us that reconciliation is “a place, the point of encounter where concerns 
about both the past and the future can meet.”173 The place that Lederach describes is 
similar to Hegel's ethical threshold, the place of common ethical concern and experience 
that is respect; but, it is also literally a place, a space where persons engage and work 
171 See, e.g., Christodoulidis 2000.
172 Mandela 1994: 480.
173 Lederach 1997: 27.
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together. In other words, reconciliation requires co-presence because, contra Hegel and 
some advocates of empathy, we cannot simply imagine the Other and project our 
imagining onto them—such projecting or Othering is no different than the movement 
which sparks conflict in the first place. Reconciliation requires actual engagement so that 
the Other does not get overwritten and lost in abstraction, so that involved parties can 
learn from one another, listen to each other, and develop an understanding that is based in 
experience and that validates the initial risk-based trusting leap of faith. If trust is not 
validated and cultivated, reconciliation processes will collapse.
Hence, the reconciliation experience is a creative process because, often without 
knowing it, by engaging the enemy Other in a peaceful and dialogical encounter, 
involved parties are transforming themselves, as well as their social-political conditions, 
simply by defying the norms of conflict which tell us that we must only defeat our 
enemies. “In a dialogue,” David Bohm says, “each person does not attempt to make 
common certain ideas or items of information that are already known to him. Rather, it 
may be said that the two people are making something in common, i.e., creating 
something new together.”174
Legal-political systems can contribute to this process and make it possible beyond 
local or interpersonal cases by providing and mediating the reconciliation place. The 
system that facilitates reconciliation must first claim a space where concerned parties can 
meet. The space ought to be neutral and the system must guarantee the safety of those 
involved. Hence, systems can facilitate the mutual encounter by establishing a base level 
of trust, a place where trust can be cooperatively built; but, the system requires that 
174 Bohm and Nichol 2004: 3.
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involved parties be willing to take the risk, the leap of faith that is reconciliation, and 
meet, face to face, to begin the process.175
175 Of the many common features shared by presently existing theories of reconciliation is an underlying 
demand for the development of trust. The need for trust is made evident in the explicit demands of these 
theories. Consider the following statements: reconciliation requires “faith in the possibility of 
community” that “enables a collective reckoning with the past” (Schaap 2005: 8.); reconciliation 
requires “mutual respect” (Verdeja 2009: 24, 28-65.); reconciliation requires the “rebuilding” of 
“damaged political relationships” (Murphy 2010.); reconciliation requires the development of “right 
relationships within or between political communities” (Philpott 2012: 16.). Beneath these claims, is the 
necessary goal of repairing sociality which, I am arguing, requires the development of a basic trust 
between former enemies or conflicting parties, so that they will not relapse into further conflict and so 
that future engagements will be stable, as well as productive. Trudy Govier stresses that building trust is 
necessary if a society seeks “sufficient sustainable cooperation” (2006: 144.). The time after conflicting 
persons agree to at least minimally imagine the other as mattering and engaging with the Other, is a 
crucial period where, if trust does not begin to develop, conflict is likely to return and reconciliation 
will have died in its infancy. At all levels, trust is the foundation of a healthy and ethical relationship.
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CHAPTER V
NO FUTURE WITHOUT TRANSITION: A CRITIQUE OF
LIBERAL PEACE AND THE US PRISON SYSTEM
In discussing developing societies, it is commonly held that their transitional 
activities should be directed toward a liberal-democratic order—fair and free elections, 
rule of law governance, and constitutionally defined rights enjoyed by all citizens.176 
Contained within this belief is the assumption that once a society is sufficiently liberal 
and democratic, it will also be sufficiently peaceful and just, insofar as shared political 
176
The claim that developing societies should move toward liberalism and democracy occurs within two 
general spheres of discourse: at the level of political discourse and at the level of academic discourse. 
Regarding political discourse, Michael W. Doyle captures the spirit in reference to public utterances: 
"We have often been told that promoting freedom produces peace. At the US Republican Convention in 
2004, President George W. Bush told 'young men and women' in the Middle East and '…reformers and 
political prisoners and exiles 'everywhere'…that their dream of freedom cannot be denied forever…as 
freedom advances, heart by heart, and nation by nation, America will be more secure and the world 
more peaceful.' He was not the first Republican to make these grandiloquent claims. In a speech before 
the British parliament in June of 1982, President Reagan proclaimed that governments founded on a 
respect for individual liberty exercise 'restraint' and 'peaceful intentions' in their foreign policy. He then 
(perhaps ironically) announced a 'crusade for freedom' and a 'capping for democratic development.' And 
not just Republicans. President Clinton made 'Democratic Enlargement' the doctrinal centerpiece of his 
administration's foreign policy in the 1990s. And, of course, these ideas were the hallmark of Woodrow 
Wilson's foreign policy and of the foreign policies of many other liberals" (Doyle 2011: 1). At the level 
of academic discourse, the claim that liberalism and democracy are the ends toward which all societies 
should be directed can be found throughout the political writings of Enlightenment thinkers and it has 
been inherited by much of contemporary political theory. The most famous example of this is Immanuel 
Kant's “Perpetual Peace” (Kant 1970: 93-130).
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ideals take on a fixed character through the rule of law.177 Thus, with a few exceptions, 
discussions of reconciliation and transitional justice are reserved for the developing 
world.178 Yet, liberal-democratic societies are often marked by violence and intense 
disagreement as to what counts as justice, suggesting that societies require something 
more than a liberal-democratic order to maintain their stability and a sense of justice. As a 
liberal-democracy, the United States is uniquely volatile and lacking in a shared sense of 
justice, and although most societies attempt to maintain stability through policing and 
disciplinary force, the United States sets the standard when it comes to penal 
domination.179 Unfortunately, this militant relation to the social-world, which 
masquerades as justice, perpetuates social conflict and ultimately prevents a shared 
experience of justice. Here, I argue that the legitimacy and stability of liberal-
democracies requires a movement away from police action and toward reconciliation. 
That is, the developed world needs reconciliation as much as, if not more than, 
177 For example, without a critical defense of the claim, Doyle simply notes: “Liberal states are different. 
They are indeed peaceful—among themselves” (Doyle 2011: 2). It may be that liberal states do not 
often go to war with other liberal states, but peace is not merely the absence of war. More importantly, 
the US is far from peaceful within its own national boundaries. The critical theorists largely disagree 
with the assumptions of liberal peace. See, for example, Benjamin's “Critique of Violence (Benjamin et 
al. 1996 v1: 236-252) or Agamben's State of Exception (Agamben 2005) for arguments regarding the 
ongoing and cyclical nature of conflict within the liberal state.
178 The exception I have in mind is the restorative justice movement. The restorative justice movement 
explicitly calls for reconciliation in the developed world. There is a lack of unity in the reconciliation 
discourse, however, and this is a result of it being a relatively new topic. For an interesting discussion of 
the disconnectedness of reconciliation literature and work, see the introduction to Bashir and 
Kymlicka's The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Kymlicka and Bashir 2008: 1-24).
179 According to the International Center for Prison Studies, the US has the highest rate of incarceration in 
the world with 716 of every 100,000 people being locked up (“International Centre for Prison Studies” 
2013). At roughly 2.4 million persons in prison as of 2008 (Sabol, West, and Cooper 2009), the US 
houses at least a quarter of the world's prison population (Talvi 2007; Liptak 2008). Here, I appeal to the 
record as of 2008 because after 2008, the bureau of justice statistics changed its method of calculation 
and subsequent reports do not reflect “all inmates held in state or federal public prison facilities, local 
jails, US territories, military facilities, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) owned and 
contracted facilities, jails in Indian country, and juvenile facilities” (Sabol, West, and Cooper 2009: 8). 
Interestingly, around the time of this shift in data analysis and presentation, the bureau of justice 
statistics began reporting decreasing numbers of persons incarcerated in the US.
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transitional societies, if we hope to realize a shared sense of justice.
In the first section, I discuss the liberal peace model as it emerges through Kant's 
writings, and I suggest that without reconciliation the liberal-democratic system—as the 
sum of the complex legal-political and institutional parts—is at constant risk of what 
Jürgen Habermas calls a Legitimation Crisis. Expanding on Habermas's work, I argue 
that the legal-political response to social conflict in the United States maintains a certain 
state of crisis that causes a shared sense of justice to be lost in social conflict. The current 
state of social conflict in the United States is in part a result of systemic attempts to 
forcefully control the social-world, which prevents a stable and reciprocal-democratic 
base from emerging. Hence, in the second section I discuss the ramifications of the 
police-control state through an analysis of the US prison system.180 Here, I illuminate 
what liberal-democracy looks like without reconciliation. By responding to instability 
with force, the US penal system increases social conflict by fragmenting communities 
and maintaining an individualistic order that is combative, rather than cooperative. I 
focus on the prison because it functions as the center of social control and is in many 
ways the starting point of US politics. In the final section, I discuss alternative responses 
to instability that are practiced in the margins of the developed world under the banner of 
restorative justice. Here, I describe the practices that are attempting to bring about 
reconciliation in the developed world, while also emphasizing that there is still much 
work to be done. By juxtaposing the current state of politics with the emerging counter-
politics of reconciliation, I argue that liberal-democracies need reconciliation as it is 
being practiced through the restorative and transitional justice movements because 
180 Habermas 1975.
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reconciliation affords a demos that agrees upon, and thus co-creates, its social-political 
conditions. Thus, reconciliation works to prevent instability by improving the relation 
between system and social-world, which affords legitimacy and makes a shared sense of 
justice possible.
5.1. Beyond Liberal Peace: Crisis, Conflict, and Coordination
In “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Kant suggests that humanity will 
either establish peace or obliterate itself in the course of war.181 Given that the latter form 
of peace is self-evident, though not preferable, Kant's essay is a defense of liberal 
republican-democracy as the ideal form of political relation and thus the conditions of the 
possibility of global perpetual peace. Kant specifies two sets of articles which represent 
standards that must be met in the realization of a perpetual peace between liberal states: 
The preliminary articles for peace among nations and the definitive articles. According to 
Kant's definitive articles, the constitution of a state which makes peace possible is 
republican, its rights are based on a federation of free states, and its cosmopolitan rights, 
or how the non-citizen is treated, is limited to hospitality. The interactions of Kant’s 
republican states are outlined in his preliminary articles, which are supposed to be 
reinforced by his federation of free states or what we now call the United Nations. The 
first preliminary article deals with peace treaties and the fidelity of such agreements. It 
stresses that states must go beyond a mere suspension of hostilities in order to establish 
peace. The second preliminary article, fueled by the categorical imperative, argues that 
people should be treated as ends and not means. The third article claims that “standing 
181 Ibid. 1970.
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armies shall be gradually abolished.”182 Maintaining an active military suggests that 
future conflict is possible, thus making peace treaties seem strategic and nominal. The 
fourth preliminary article claims national debt cannot be connected to the foreign affairs 
of the nation. The fifth article says that nations will not forcibly meddle with the 
constitutions and governments of other nations. The sixth article deals with the use of 
tactics—assassination, poison, breach of surrender, spying—that hinder trust in a future 
state of peace. These laws afford peace on an international level, but only when every 
state is abiding by the same standards. If a state is not republican, and does not abide by 
these laws, then war is likely. Therefore, it would seem that any state which is not 
republican is a threat to peace and must be assimilated into the liberal system through 
war. In other words, Kant argues that peace is only possible in and between republican 
states that adhere to the aforementioned standards.
Beyond its colonial tendencies, Kant's model of peace is problematic because it 
does not adequately address how or even why peace would be maintained within the 
republican state. Part of this shortcoming is Kant's purely rational and atomistic approach 
to morality and politics, most fully illuminated in his essay “What is Enlightenment?” 183 
Here, Kant also fails to recognize the transitional nature of human coexistence that makes 
any fixed system problematic insofar as it lacks the capacity to accommodate new and 
unforeseen problems, needs, and demands. In other words, Kant's Perpetual Peace 
describes most western foreign relations, but it fails to describe why a liberal republican 
democracy would remain internally stable over time. Following Kant's rational method, 
182 Ibid. 94.
183 Ibid. 54-60.
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John Rawls attempts to account for these shortcomings with A Theory of Justice, but 
Rawls's model falls short for similar reasons as Kant's, which leaves both theories in need 
of amendment.184
For example, Rawls famously argues that justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions and thus, “laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged 
must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.”185 Diverging from Rawls's 
arrangement-focused theory, Amartya Sen appeals to a realization-focused understanding 
of justice that concentrates “on actual realizations in the societies involved, rather than 
only on institutions and rule.”186 Sen is not alone in the concern that, regardless of the 
ideal arrangement of a society, the way we relate to justice and thus what is required for 
peaceful social coexistence, as well as legitimate political order, is a contested issue 
because the idea of justice is unfixed or transitional, especially as new problems emerge. 
The realization of the ideal of justice, therefore, requires coordination between both the 
social and systemic levels of society.187
184 Rawls 1971.
185 Rawls 1971: 3.
186 Sen 2011: 9.
187 Sen 2011: 9-10. Here Sen makes a distinction between the Rawlsian approach to justice as being 
arrangement-focused or seeking the ideal institutional circumstances wherein justice is realized, versus 
a more pragmatic realization-focused approach that is largely a response to the question: “Should we 
not also have to examine what emerges in the society, including the kind of lives that people can 
actually lead, given the institutions and rules, but also other influences, including actual behaviour, that 
would inescapably affect human lives?” (ibid. 10). Following a similar line, one of Habermas's 
responses to Rawls was largely concerned with the problem of intergeneration justice; that is, even if we 
grant the outcomes of the original position, we cannot possibly maintain that those outcomes will be 
just for the second or third generations subsequent to those who contracted the ideal society (Habermas 
and Lawrence 1995). In The Public and Its Problems (Dewey 2008), John Dewey takes the problem of 
the instability of justice to an extreme and advocates a purely emergent concept, wherein justice is 
always a result of those activities within a given community and therefore lacks a normative end (e.g., 
peace). Dewey's model lacks a normative end because he maintains that social-political ideals are 
supposed to emerge solely through communal activities, meaning the ideals could form at the exclusion 
of Others, reproducing already present and problematic norms of conflict; thus, Dewey's model risks 
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The fact that we lack a shared sense of justice is obvious given the ongoing 
debates over how we should respond to injustice.188 The United States contains many 
views of justice and most of these views are not represented by the political system, 
meaning that justice is not being realized or even fairly represented. Indeed, for those 
living in the United States, the political system seems to operate independently and well 
beyond the influence of ordinary people, which leaves persons feeling alienated, 
powerless, and vulnerable. The Occupy Movement, for example, attempted to articulate 
this problem of the social-world feeling powerless in relation to the system, insofar as 
legal-political and economic activities seem to empower only the wealthiest minority of 
the population.189 The ongoing debate over gun rights is another example of a common 
experience of powerlessness and alienation manifesting as social unrest in relation to a 
top-down system which, in not functioning for the people, seems a disassociated threat to 
everyday existence.190 In terms of crime and punishment, this abstract relation between 
the system and the social-world manifests as a state-offender binary, such that justice is 
about punishing individual offenders as transgressing against the state, rather than 
being highly conservative and maintains the status quo.
188 For an interesting theoretical account of this disagreement see After Virtue (MacIntyre 1984). For 
contemporary political accounts, one might simply consider the titles of the following texts: Red And 
Blue Nation?: Characteristics And Causes of America's Polarized Politics (Nivola, Brady, and Hoover 
Institution on War 2006); or the problematic text, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (Huntington 2011). Here, it is not being suggested that the normative claims in these texts are 
correct, nor that the descriptive accounts are entirely accurate; rather, what is common to these texts, 
and many more, is a consensus that the United States is polarized and intensely opposed on many 
issues.
189 See, for example, Graeber 2012; Gitlin 2012.
190 For a recent history of this debate, see Winkler 2013. A common complaint of those supporting the right 
to bear arms is that the constitution was written so that the people can protect themselves from tyranny. 
People cling to this argument in large part because they understand the state as being tyrannical, which 
means that the system is not working in an agreeable way. On the other side, people often have guns for 
the purposes of self defense, meaning that persons do not feel they can trust the system for defense nor 
can they trust other people (who are also armed).
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supporting those who were harmed and repairing the social-world so as to prevent future 
instability.191
These examples illuminate a common feeling of alienation that is rooted in an 
experience of the system disregarding or, in some cases, actively working against the 
social-world. Hence, the system is not legitimate throughout the social-world; however, 
the reasons offered for its illegitimacy do vary. Adding to this complex situation is a lack 
of cohesion within the social-world, which is exacerbated by the system insofar as it does 
not assist in the formation of a common democratic voice. More insidiously, the system 
discourages social solidarity by encouraging individualistic competition, wherein, as the 
title and content of Jeffrey Reiman's book puts it, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get 
Prison.192 Thus, the US is marked by a dual conflict: within the social-world, but also 
between the social-world and the system. 
From both a Senian perspective-focus, that looks to the social-world, and a 
Rawlsian arrangement-focus that is concerned with institutions, justice is not being 
realized. On the one hand, the system is failing in the minimal sense of identifying and 
realizing its first virtue, justice, in a legitimate way. The social-world, on the other hand, 
is unable to make a coherent claim to justice insofar as it is fragmented and volatile. 
Hence, the system which is supposed to work for the people, and claims to do so, fails to 
support and empower its people by maintaining a mostly mono-directional power 
relation, often seeming responsive only to the will of the egregiously wealthy. Lacking a 
cohesive social body, the system operates without democratic oversight and, at least 
191 The state bringing charges against offenders in criminal cases is a regular practice throughout the world. 
But, the point I am arguing is that abstracting away from the concrete social-world while pretending to 
act on its behalf, whether realized through a legal norm or rhetoric, is illegitimate and causes instability.
192 Reiman and Leighton 2013.
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rhetorically, on behalf of an imaginary people with imagined needs: the imagined demos, 
the disembodied We, is instrumentally represented for ends that include going to war and 
protecting the wealthy. In this failure, problems of the social-world take on a repetitive 
character and the response pattern of the system functions in an equally repetitive way. 
Thus, problems tend to be treated as isolated incidents and not events that are themselves 
afforded by a history of compounding unreconciled events. The activity of repetitive and 
compounding problem avoidance has been thoroughly analyzed under the general 
category of crisis.193 Habermas's discussion of crisis is particularly interesting.
As Hugh Baxter points out, Habermas's Legitimation Crisis moves away from 
traditional Marxist critiques of economic crisis based in the labor theory of value and 
instead takes a broader critical focus “toward 'legitimation crisis' (the inability of an 
expertocratic and planned state to secure the conditions of its own legitimacy).”194 
Habermas focuses on the complexities through which crises afflict social-systemic 
relations. He argues that unresolved problems, when allowed to fester, ultimately 
undermine the legitimacy of the system. Habermas develops his claim by first noting that 
subjects are characterized through goal-directedness, which is mostly consistent over the 
course of a life, and limited in those ways typical to organic beings.195 The social-world, 
193 See, for example, Harvey 2010; Althusser 2014.
194 Baxter 2011: 3. Ibid. Habermas 1975.
195 Habermas uses the language of Sollwerte, not goal directedness, which Thomas McCarthy translates as 
goal values (see translators note, endnote nine, page 147 of Legitimation Crisis 1975). I prefer goal 
directedness because of the shift Habermas makes in his later works, specifically The Theory of 
Communicative Action (Habermas 1984), wherein speech-act theory is introduced to distinguish the 
ethics of communicative encounters and directedness more fully accounts for these distinctions. 
Specifically, the directedness of one's goals—whether strategic or communicative—does not necessarily 
correlate to one's values and, frequently, is more directly related to not knowing how to realize one's 
values outside of a combative system. Hence, one could have values that are not necessarily reflected in 
one's strategic actions, but the purpose of those strategic actions is to attain a certain end. The system 
conforms to a similar logic and, as I show throughout this chapter, the values of the system do not 
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as the intertwined identity frameworks of everyday persons, is therefore characterized by 
shifts in both systemic elements, as well as goal values and the means by which those 
values are realized. There exists a looping effect, as Ian Hacking notes, between the 
various levels of society, such that the system informs the social-world, and, under ideal 
circumstances, the social-world influences the system.196 Habermas works, throughout all 
of his writing, to illuminate and strengthen the connection between the system and the 
social-world.197 However, the illumination of the relation between system and social-
world requires more than just a discursive analysis. That is, the relation reveals itself 
when the system democratically cooperates with the social-world, making Habermas's 
goals and methods not merely theoretical analyses, but also ethical-political ends.
Hence, there is an implicit tension between the social-world and the system 
insofar as systemic changes risk being experienced as illegitimate and even oppressive if 
the social-world is not acclimated to said changes. Systemic boundaries are more flexible 
insofar as they are constructed, while persons are immanently bound—we are limited as 
physical beings in a partially determinate relation with others—but both systems and 
persons operate in relation to ideal goals. When a system asserts itself by changing both 
its bounds and goal values, its identity becomes unclear. This is not unique to systems, as 
subject identities also become ambiguous in times of transformation and Habermas is 
describing a characteristic of change. These changes become crises, Habermas argues, 
“only when members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for 
coincide with its activities.
196 Hacking, in Sperber, Premack, and Premack 1995: 351-394.
197 Habermas 1975: 4.
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continued existence and feel their social identity threatened.”198 Insofar as systems are 
supposed to support persons and social-worlds in their limitations, when systems become 
unsynchronized with the goals of life-worlds they become counter-operational, further 
limiting or constraining social-life rather than supporting its functioning by stabilizing 
social relations and enabling individuals to realize their various potentials. In this 
movement away from the needs and desires of the social-world, the system runs the risk 
of becoming illegitimate insofar as it does not sufficiently represent and thus empower 
the world for which it is supposed to work. Of course, political institutions must 
sometimes shift and take on a paternalistic character precisely because the character of 
the social-world is problematic and the source of conflict.199 But, it is when paternalism 
lacks a mechanism of care, when the system transforms and does not work with the 
social-world through this transformation, that a crisis emerges.
The stability and function of a social-political system is deeply tied to the 
identities of those operating within its bounds, and crisis, as well as conflict, can both be 
understood through Habermas's work as emerging from dissonance between the system 
and the life-world or social-world.  He notes, however, that crises do not occur merely 
because members of a society identify the situation as such; rather, crises are generally 
experienced by a constituent body through the second order or symptomatic results of a 
larger unresolved systematic steering problem which hinders social integration.200 The 
198 Ibid. 3.
199 There is an extensive philosophical literature on the role of paternalism in society. Valuable 
contributions to the debate include: Feinberg 1986; Mill and Collini 1995; Sartorius 1983; Dworkin 
1972 and 2005. The desegregation of public schools in the US throughout the 1950s and 1960s is a 
clear example of how systems can transform and act paternalistically on behalf of the social-world, but 
with much resistance from the social-world.
200 Habermas states: “Crisis occurrences owe their objectivity to the fact that they issue from unresolved 
steering problems. Identity crises are connected with steering problems. Although the subjects are not 
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second order effects of unresolved crisis in the United States, which ultimately prevent 
social integration, can be seen in the failure of forceful control tactics, specifically the 
prison system, to stabilize social-systemic relations. Indeed, crisis societies tend to have 
lingering problems rooted in a history of unreconciled transitional events, which people 
may not see as being obviously connected to systemic failures.201 The historical response 
to the problems of the social-world has been an attempt to control, rather than reconcile, 
and so the social-world has not been acclimated with the system.202 The tendency toward 
control is problematic because the system, which requires legitimacy in order to be stable 
and just, does not work with the social-world during transitions, such that the 
transformation is negatively experienced and the legitimation crisis is never transcended.
Under these conditions, the second order effects of the unreconciled US social 
world manifest in two broad ways. The first characteristic is an everyday cyclical 
violence that is often wrongly framed as arbitrary or a problem of human nature. 
Everyday violence in the United States consistently leaves various spaces damaged. The 
generally conscious of them, these steering problems create secondary problems that do affect 
consciousness in a specific way—precisely in such a way as to endanger social integration” (ibid. 4, 
italics not in original text).
201 Marxists's discuss these unreconciled histories in terms of contradictions that are inherent to the 
capitalism. Here, I am discussing these specters in a broader sense that includes historical conflicts 
which are not solely reducible to capitalism. Some historical conflicts are deeper than capitalism and are 
the source from which the capitalist system emerged, making the turn to capitalism itself, in most cases, 
an unreconciled and unstable transformation. Of course, how pre-capitalist conflicts are described 
depends on how capitalism is understood, but, the history of east-west relations that gave rise to the 
capitalist era is the general pre-capitalist conflict that I have in mind. Indeed, the drive to reclaim 
eastern territories—specifically the Holy Lands—re-open the far east to trade, and thus bring an end to 
the medieval crisis can be understood as a primary historical force that afforded the emergence of 
capitalism as a means of power. Enrique Dussel's The Invention of the Americas details this conflict as it 
spread to the Americas (Dussel 1995); Ella Shohat's writing details a turning point of this conflict in the 
Middle-East (Shohat 1992). From the perspective of war, capitalism is just one more tactic in a long 
history of tactics of domination.
202 Though Zehr shows there is a long standing tradition of community justice that the current 
reconciliation movements have taken up as a historical basis for its practices (Zehr 2007: 97-157).
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people who reside in or around those spaces are fearful, suspicious in various ways, 
armed, and afflicted with a sense that they must defend themselves because the system 
will not. The second characteristic of conflict in the US social-world is a general 
blockage, a deadlock, which is frequently based in this same fear that exists because 
persons within the United States see their nearby neighbors as hostile threats and 
enemies; that is, we are not willing to communicate in part because we do not know how 
to engage one another. Hence, the US lacks the minimal sense of cohesion that is needed 
for democratic action, and the system, caught in a crisis of legitimacy, does not facilitate 
democratic action although it simultaneously operates as if there is a democratic base 
being appropriately represented.
In the United States a chasm exists between the system and the social-world. 
Rather than address and work to bridge this gap, the system functions as if the division 
does not exist or, on the occasion that it is noted, it is treated as a natural state that cannot 
be changed and can only be controlled through force.203 Politicians, bureaucrats, law-
makers, and various other political actors subsequently maintain a business-as-usual 
attitude, claiming to work for the people while simultaneously disregarding the actual 
needs of the struggling and combative social-world. Under these fragmented 
circumstances, social problems are insufficiently addressed, precisely because they are 
being overlooked even though the system claims to be including them, leaving the real 
issues of alienation and fear-based animosity unchecked. An agreed upon sense of justice 
remains lost in this ever-present and compounding social conflict, and the systemic 
response to this problem has historically been an increase in forceful control, which 
203 Defenders of capitalism like claiming that humans are naturally selfish/greedy—as a talking point it is 
nearly ideological.
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escalates tensions and further delegitimizes the system.
5.2. The State-Offender Dilemma: Penality in the US and Retributive Failings
The instability which marks the United States is perpetuated by various forces: a 
reality of violence, a media apparatus that profits on exploiting fears by emphasizing this 
violence, a lack of legitimate opportunities to participate in community formation, 
politics, and self-development, and a controlling disciplinary system that focuses on 
punishing the demonized individual criminal as one who has offended against the abstract 
state, rather than a community of real people, leaving the community and the victims that 
have actually been harmed to struggle on their own.204 As many critics have 
demonstrated, there is a cyclical relation between those damaged communities where 
crimes happen and repair is consistently lacking, and the penal system that punishes 
persons from those same communities.205 These cyclical and unstable conditions 
ultimately pit the general population against itself and a horizontal conflict is maintained 
in the social-world insofar as peoples fear for their well-being, cannot trust others, and 
feel that violent force is the only way to solve problems. In other words, the control 
society, with its fearful heart in the prison, works to separate persons according to various 
differences, encouraging a society where cooperation is rejected in favor of competition, 
and spiteful punishment is the response to human error. Again, if our concern is with 
justice as the first virtue of our social-political institutions, then the system ultimately 
disables itself from identifying its first virtue by discouraging social collectivity and 
204 It is not just the media that profits and many refer to the system as a prison-industrial complex (PIC). 
Usage of the term emerged in the late 1990s with the work of Angela Davis and the critical resistance 
movement (“Critical Resistance” 2013), as well as Eric Schlosser's famous article “The Prison 
Industrial Complex” in the Atlantic (Schlosser 1998).
205 See Reiman and Leighton 2013; Wacquant 2001A, 2001B; Alexander 2012.
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encouraging violence as the response to problems. The legal-political system that appeals 
to force as the primary response to social-political instability allows for that instability to 
linger and reproduce itself, and, in the case of the United States, the system exploits these 
ongoing conflicts. 
Michel Foucault elucidates how disciplinary power in general, as a mechanized 
attempt to control, permeates the social-world through various institutions and ultimately 
influences all persons, not just the condemned prisoner.206 For most, the control system is 
first experienced in the school. Schools are spaces where our tabula rasa selves are 
formed through reward and punishment, observation, and testing. The school works to 
transform us into predictable, classifiable, and controllable characters.207 And through the 
formative power of institutions like the school, persons become a series of documents 
that determine what parts of the world should be made available to them. Some persons 
are prepared for a life of middle-class stability. Some persons are prepared for a life in 
prison.208 The system subsequently works against its self-proclaimed ends—liberty and 
democracy—by creating populations that are at odds with others and actively seek to be 
at odds for their own self-interested pursuits. There is an inherent contradiction here, in 
that the system simultaneously encourages combative individualism, while also speaking 
on behalf of a collective that does not exist, and in the name of a freedom that requires 
others be condemned.
206 Foucault 1979.
207 Ibid. 135-194.
208 This is not to suggest that Foucault ignored the role of the subject. Foucault, following Kant, spent his 
career illuminating the bounds of possibility, showing what can be done, given that certain strategic care 
is taken. Foucault's ethics, for example, discusses counter disciplinary activity rooted in self care 
(Foucault 1998).
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In this sense, the incubator wherein violent tendencies are able to be reproduced 
and normalized is the school system. Of course, schools ought to help our young people 
to develop themselves in meaningful ways so that they can create a better life for 
themselves and others. Our schools ought to teach peaceful means of communication and 
cooperation. But, the school system is merely a technology that can be used to normalize 
a range of behavioral relations, and in the United States the norm is violent and 
narcissistic. 
As Foucault suggests, in the school all behavior that does not conform to the norm 
is punishable. Normality is therefore dependent on a reflective abnormality through 
which individuals relate themselves. The penal mechanism in the school creates a 
hierarchy of normality and a foundation of abnormality upon which individuals can be 
judged. The school teaches that any disagreeable activity should be condemned to some 
punishment. The initial punishment for the younger students may be an only slightly 
sadistic repetition—for example, repeatedly writing meaningless sentences. Along with 
this comes the public shaming of the condemned, the cut that teaches the student of his or 
her empty place in the social order away from the other students. Other students reject the 
offender and often encourage outbursts to take attention away from themselves, but also 
to enjoy the impeding and spectacular punishment. The teachers and administrators 
document student behavior, warning of the problem cases. Only one mistake can result in 
a condemned school life. As the student grows and social-systemic relations are 
solidified, punishments become more severe and greater distance is put between the 
student, other students, and the system itself. The student-criminal feels the pangs of 
condemnation by not being seen as a possibility, but as an already known problem. The 
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underlying problems that might have caused the student to misbehave in the first place 
are covered by the now greater problem of the system itself. All students are told that if 
they do poorly at the K-12 level, they will never be successful. The offending student, 
however, is described as a risk to be watched. Under constant observation, even the 
slightest mistake results in punishment and there is no real chance for success. The non-
criminalized student is also transformed in this process into a complacent and vengeful 
character. The rules are clear and the path is prepared for the docile student to act as a 
leader, an example whom the hierarchically lesser beings are supposed to admire and 
submit to. With a honed obedience, the other end of the spectrum is a soldier—perhaps 
initially a star athlete. Both the criminal and the soldier are pitted against one another as 
two ends of the same normalizing spectrum, but their behavior is not so different. 
Instruments to the system's ongoing effort to control, the characters learn the norms of the 
system: control, force, shame, individualism, and the drive for power at the expense of 
Others. The school system encourages our students to respond to problems, not through 
cooperative problem solving or by looking to root causes, but through the violent force 
that removes those who have been blamed for the problems and glorifies those who obey. 
The system is not meeting its own self proclaimed ends and it is reproducing conflict.
Foucault's account is interesting because it places the prison at the center of 
social-systemic control, treating it as the original position of our relational social-political 
activities. The prison and punishment are an ever present and strange possibility in the 
minds of those who operate under the watchful gaze of the control state, normalized 
through the school system to relate with Others via domination rather than cooperation. 
Of course, the fear of state punishment is justified because to be condemned to prison, 
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especially for a federal offense, is to be condemned to a stigmatized and almost 
insurmountable role. Unfortunately, Foucault only gives us a general perspective on the 
role of social control. Angela Davis takes us a step further, while also a bit closer in terms 
of subject matter, and asks who is being controlled, such that some people are moved in 
certain directions, while others end up in prison.209 That is, Davis addresses the problems 
of nationalism, classism, racism, and sexism that direct the US system.
Davis analyzes the emergence of US prisons through the lens of an ongoing 
conflict based in a history of slavery, revealing that the system has perpetuated the 
conditions of slavery under different names, laws, and control tactics. Davis focuses on 
the systemic response to abolition. Since the abolition of slavery, prisoners have been 
leased to companies as cheap, controlled, and reproducible labor; thus, as Davis and 
others argue, the prisoner lease system is an evolved form of slavery that objectifies 
individuals.210 Prior to abolition, prisoners were not used for labor—slaves did the work
—and prisons were predominantly occupied by Anglo men who were able to be 
imprisoned because they had rights to be taken. Before granting rights to slaves and 
women, “imprisonment could not be understood as punishment” because there was 
nothing to take away.211 Prior to the granting of rights, slaves functioned under slave 
codes or “laws that deprived enslaved human beings of virtually all rights.”212 These 
codes were surprisingly similar to regulations which existed in prisons, and once rights 
were administered to former slaves, the prisons began to fill with newly established rights 
209 Davis 2003.
210 Davis 2003; Alexander 2012.
211 Davis 2003: 44.
212 Ibid. 27.
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bearers. Indeed, the 13th amendment specifies that slavery is illegal “except as a 
punishment for crime.”213 After abolition, the slave shifted into a prisoner and prisons 
filled with former slaves. A significant amount of capital is still produced by prisoners 
working for state and private corporations, and the prison industry profits from 
maintaining a surplus of prisoner-labor.
The system operates as if it has overcome the problems of social inequality and 
slavery, but because the roots of inequality were never reconciled, the system has 
continued to mistreat the social-world, thus reinforcing discord and stigmas about those 
most rigorously targeted by its force. Rather than address this ongoing social conflict and 
bring coherence to the system/social-world relation, a misguided and racist narrative has 
been passed down and transformed throughout history that attempts to justify the ongoing 
activities of the prison-control state. Davis critiques the narrative that justifies forceful 
control tactics—to maintain safety, reduce crime, and realize justice—and reveals the 
system as misdirecting and exploiting the disparate public. The various agencies that 
work together and collectively form the penal system utilize the fear and anger of the 
unrepresented social-world to remove persons from our communities and exploit those 
bodies as a means of cheap labor. This dual exploitation in turn is destructive to society 
as a whole, because it creates instability in all communities by fragmenting families and 
leaving all victims—victims of crime and victims of the system—without support. 
For example, most Americans are unaware that “corporations producing all kinds 
of goods—from buildings to electronic devices and hygiene products—and providing all 
kinds of services—from meals to therapy and healthcare—are now directly involved in 
213 “US Constitution - Amendment 13 - The US Constitution Online - USConstitution.net” 2013.
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the punishment business.”214  We should be dismayed that the prison system is an industry 
and that companies invest in prison expansion; but, the industry relies on our 
disconnectedness and our ignorance about prisons. Hence, politicians and the media 
defend prisons for bringing security and economic growth. Those with stock in prisons 
offer regular donations to politicians during elections, thus guaranteeing the rhetoric 
normalizing their investment. The rapid prison expansions that occurred after the 1980’s
—between 1984 and 1989 the number of prisons in California alone was doubled—were 
made possible by corporate investment and political support that preyed on our 
misdirected beliefs about the prison.215 Many politicians in the 1980's defended the 
hastened prison expansion with a “tough on crime” approach.216 But, as prisons spawned 
and filled, the crime rate went unaffected.217 There is a thorny relation between the prison 
system, capital, and discourse that pretends the prison rebalances society. Adding to the 
myth of stabilization is the economic impact of prisons on local economies. 
Prisons are often built, and police often focus their efforts, in areas that are 
economically struggling. Prisons tend to be built in poor rural spaces, which stimulates 
local economies by creating new jobs. Police force is also concentrated on poor areas, but 
within the inner city, such that police presence is disproportionately directed at people of 
color. Hence, poor areas exist symbiotically with the prison because many of the bodies 
occupying such facilities—workers and inmate-workers—come from economically 
214 Davis 2003: 88.
215 Ibid. 13.
216 Ibid. 12.
217 Ibid. 
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deprived places.218 The exploited poor make contact in the prison, which reproduces 
horizontal tensions between poor and often racist prison guards who are supposed to 
control the condemned populations of color. The system relies on this underlying 
horizontal conflict, which ultimately prevents a vertical democratic power from directing 
the system. 
Davis rightly points out that investing in prisons and increased policing in areas 
that lack resources and opportunities, rather than investing in institutions that elevate the 
overall quality of life and create opportunities for all members to positively contribute to 
their community's development, “turns the men, women, and children who live in these 
damaged communities into perfect candidates for prison.”219 The poor rural community 
provides the prison guards, while the poor urban community provides the prisoners. The 
urban communities from which prisoners are being imported may notice a decrease in 
crime, which seems to improve the quality of life. The community where the prison is 
built also seems to benefit, even though the opportunities are made at the expense of mass 
imprisonment and the isolation of persons who are criminalized because they lack the 
resources to prevent the realization of this ascribed identity. In reality, by failing to invest 
in ways that encourage stability through reciprocity and participation, the system 
continues to isolate individuals and communities, while completely avoiding the 
underlying problems which led individuals to act against the law in the first place. The 
problems of the system are rooted in a history of underlying unreconciled problems that 
have only been addressed through force, which compounds the illegitimacy of its 
218 Wacquant 2001; Reiman 2001.
219 Davis 2003: 16.
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activities. Loic Wacquant explains that this ongoing movement toward control has 
thoroughly blurred the distinction between the prison and the communities from which 
the prison acquires most of its occupants.220 The prison and the poor communities upon 
which the system preys are becoming increasingly alike, such that there is not much of a 
transition when moving between a life in prison and a life in society.221 Communities are 
becoming more like prisons and the expansion of disciplinary military tactics into 
everyday life is exceeding anything Foucault had previously suggested.222
The impact of this forced social control can be seen throughout US history, at 
each moment when the system tightens its grip on the social-world. Hence, what Davis's 
critique shows is that the problems of slavery persist to this day because, rather than 
repair and reconcile, the system controls and exploits. The laws have shifted in an attempt 
to contain and control the lingering problems of the unreconciled past—and there are 
many more unreconciled events besides slavery—in the name of a population that does 
not exist, at the expense of actual people, and largely for the sake of protecting a 
profitable economic situation. For example, Davis says, 
in the aftermath of emancipation, large numbers of black people were 
forced by their new social situation to steal in order to survive.  It was the 
transformation of petty thievery into a felony that relegated substantial 
numbers of black people to the ‘involuntary servitude’ legalized by the 
thirteenth amendment.223
The law has shifted in order to maintain control over former slaves as the means of 
production. We can see the rapid expansion of the prisons in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s as 
220 Ibid. Wacquant.
221 Ibid.
222 For an updated account of the emerging police state see Parenti 2003; Balko 2013.
223  Ibid. 33.
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also being connected to a shift in the laws as a response to the triumphs of the civil rights 
movement. Abolition and the civil rights movement are only two examples of a general 
pattern: when an event occurs and the system shifts, the consistent response has been to 
increase police presence, change the laws, and remove more people from the social-
world, rather than supporting the social-world by working to reconcile systemic 
changes.224 
In other words, the system has consistently failed to work with the social-world to 
acclimate to systemic changes. When slavery was abolished, there was no serious effort 
made to educate and integrate the new rights bearing members of society or to educate 
those who already had rights about the rights of freed slaves. In the absence of efforts to 
reconcile the systemic shift, tensions were left to degenerate at the social level. The same 
pattern is repeated in response to secondary effects of the illegitimate system, when local 
crimes occur and neither the offenders, victims, nor communities are helped with 
recovery. Instead, the social-world remains conflicted and the system exploits these 
problems. Those harmed by social conflict are largely expected to care for themselves, 
leaving the portions of the community not behind bars in a fragile state.
The people most heavily targeted by the system are also the most vulnerable and 
powerless: predominantly working-class poor, immigrants, and people of color. This 
latter point is important because the system stigmatizes certain characteristics as criminal 
and persons with those characteristics as potential criminals.225 This stigma is reinforced 
224 Foucault discusses this practice, of transforming the systemic or discursive norms in order to maintain a 
certain consistency of power, throughout his writings.
225 See, for example, Glover 2009. Glover traces the intertwined relationship between racial profiling and 
slave codes, and in this it is clear that contemporary profiling and policing are a continuation of the 
same old forms of race based control and white supremacy. At the same time, if one merely watches one 
of the various popular television police dramas then it will become obvious how the media portrays 
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by the media, politicians, various agencies, and everyday people who present criminals as 
irrational animals that must be contained. Criminal profiling is deeply problematic 
because it preemptively assumes certain people are going to violate the law, thus 
subjecting suspicious characters to an intense observation that works to find legal 
violations. Profiling and targeting relies on false stigmas within the social-world. The 
profile sometimes affixes itself to persons who have never offended and obviously marks 
those who have crossed the law. Once stigmatized it is difficult to move beyond the 
categorization, especially if one is convicted of a federal offense and is required to reveal 
oneself as a felon when, for example, applying for a job. Often offenders return to prison, 
either for a parole violation or for another crime, because they lack the support needed to 
stay out of prison.226
The terms of parole vary by state, crime, and judgment, but when offenders return 
after an extended period behind bars, they often lack support to reintegrate.  The 
population of persons on probation, parole, or in prison makes the number of people who 
are under the control or watchful gaze of the penal system over seven million people.227 
Over seven million people who are defined by a mistake and condemned by a society that 
embraces the sword—or the gun, the chair, and the needle. Seven million people who are 
children, parents, siblings, friends, and neighbors, and at least an additional seven million 
overlooked victims, plus their families and friends. The social-world needs a different 
certain peoples (people of color) as committing certain crimes, while other (mostly white) peoples are 
represented as victims or righteous defenders of the good.
226 Reports have suggested that seven of every ten persons released from prison end up being rearrested 
within three years, making the recidivism rate roughly seventy percent. Langan and Levin 2002.
227 For probation/parole data, see Maruschak and Parks 2012. For incarceration, see Sabol, West, and 
Cooper 2009. 
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approach to the problems that are putting people in prison, leaving victims to fend for 
themselves, and allowing historical wounds to continuously block social-political 
transformation.
Beyond criminal cases, social conflict is sometimes dealt with through alternative 
processes. Sometimes matters are settled in civil court wherein persons are pitted against 
one another with a focus on settling the dispute, but not necessarily transforming the 
problem. In these cases, the process reinforces the norms of conflict, thus continuing to 
fragment social relations. In some cases, however, conflicts are settled outside of court 
through informal agreements or extra legal negotiations. The restorative justice 
movement is particularly interesting because it appeals to collaborative problem solving 
and reconciliation in response to social conflict.
5.3. Restorative Justice and the Tactics of Reconciliation in the United States
Following Thomas Kuhn, Howard Zehr suggests that we need a paradigm shift to 
overcome the systemic failure which has normalized the use of force as a response to 
social conflict.228 A paradigm shift is a change in the basic beliefs and activities that order 
the world. A paradigm shift entails a transformation of institutional performance and 
social relations, which is guided by different goals and values. Regarding the way we 
think of control and punishment, a paradigm shift would require changing many aspects 
of social life. Given that the system is not sufficiently addressing social conflict, 
restorative justice has emerged as an extrajudicial and predominantly grassroots attempt 
to initiate said shift in paradigm. Zehr, and many others within the restorative justice 
movement, believe that actors in the social-world can ultimately transform the bounds 
228 Zehr 2007; Kuhn and Hacking 2012.
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and the goal values of the system by creating alternative possibilities to correct for the 
system's failure. In order to successfully bring about the necessary change, the system 
would have to take up these alternative approaches to instability and conflict; hence, the 
restorative movement is most able to address those symptomatic cases of social conflict 
and through these efforts slowly change the way people think about conflict in general. 
The movement practices the change in perspective that is needed to transform the broader 
system, by moving away from forceful control and towards a relationship where those 
involved—in the case of criminal law, victims, offenders, and community members—are 
empowered and made responsible for their circumstances.
Currently, the US system embraces a retributive model of punishment and justice. 
Retributivism is rooted in a Kantian ethic, which demands that individuals be held 
responsible for taking something from society that must be repaid through punishment.229 
In practice, retributivism abstracts justice such that crimes are offenses against the state, 
not persons or communities.230 Once abstracted, retributivism treats the offender and the 
event as isolated, rather than treating both as emergent from an already problematic social 
situation. Often offenders have also been harmed and not offered opportunities for self 
development. But, the retributive system does not necessarily see life circumstances as 
relevant; thus, criminality tends to repeat itself within vulnerable communities. 
Meanwhile, the system hovers above the social-world, irreproachable, unwilling to 
account for victims and communities. Victimized subjects are therefore largely ignored 
by the system and focus centers on the state. In other words, retributivism is problematic 
229 See Tonry 2011; Simmons 1995.
230 Ibid. Also, Zehr 2007.
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because it shifts the discourse surrounding social conflicts to a state-offender relation, 
while ignoring the various ways in which the justice system fails to meet its own 
theoretical commitments: restoring balance to society and ensuring a common experience 
of justice.
Restorative justice, on the other hand, appeals to a participatory model that seeks 
mutual and transformative engagement between those caught in conflict. The 
participatory approach is critical in undermining the system's false narratives regarding 
the imagined peoples of the United States. The goal of this effort is to create a lasting 
stability wherein animosity, fear, anger, guilt, alienation, and the various other responses 
one has to social conflict that leave persons feeling powerless and traumatized, are 
transformed into feelings of strength, empathy, forgiveness, and many other experiences 
that leave persons feeling as if justice has been realized. When persons are harmed in 
social conflict and find themselves in opposition, both participants, Zehr argues, “victim 
and offender need to be healed...and this healing requires opportunities for forgiveness, 
confession, repentance, and reconciliation.”231 In other words, in opposition to the 
standard response to conflict that is the use of force for the sake of control, advocates of 
restorative justice respond to discord by attempting to reconcile divisions such that new 
self regulating social relations emerge. Daniel W. Van Ness expands on the healing 
described by Zehr, and says the restorative response to criminal cases involves four 
general activities: encounter, amends, reintegration, and inclusion.232
One approach to restorative healing involves bringing victims, offenders, and 
231 Ibid. 51.
232 See Van Ness, in Weitekamp and Kerner 2002: 1-20.
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community members into dialogue. Victim-offender encounters, which require all parties' 
consensual involvement, have a range of outcomes insofar as the goals and experiences 
are determined within the context. Encounters do not have to be a part of the restorative 
process, but they are crucial. According to Van Ness, encounters contain three broad 
elements. First, concerned parties meet in-person or through a third party. Second, 
concerned parties communicate in order to establish a better understanding of the event, 
as well as those involved, and they suggest ways to address residual harm. In 
communication, persons share their narrative accounts of the event and how it influenced 
their lives. Here, emotions are treated as central to the process. The third element of an 
encounter is for those involved to form a pragmatic agreement regarding the event and 
what can be done to move forward.233 Of course, in many cases victims do not want to 
engage with offenders. But, victim-offender dialogues are only one approach to 
reconciliation. Another way that the restorative approach attempts to reconcile and re-
stabilize is by giving the malefactor an opportunity to make amends by apologizing, 
making a recognizable and significant behavioral change, or offering restitution through 
payment, return of property, or various services.234 
Another important aspect of restorative justice is reintegrating victims and 
offenders back into their communities. Successful reintegration can be difficult, 
depending on the severity of the crime and the hostility of the damaged community. 
Reintegration requires that all parties be respected, not stigmatized, and offered material, 
233 Ibid. 3
234 Van Ness notes, “these outcomes have been features of rehabilitative and retributive programmes as 
well. However, these become components of amends in a restorative programme or system when they 
are the result of the parties’ agreement about what the offender will do to make things right. In other 
words, the obligation is voluntarily undertaken by the offender rather than being imposed by a court” 
(ibid. 4).
136
moral, and spiritual assistance.235 Victims and offenders who lack support are unlikely to 
move beyond the event, thus reducing their chances of realizing a full life where they 
transition from victims to survivors. Indeed, the final element, inclusion, is not possible if 
one is unsupported. Inclusion involves an invitation to participate in the justice process 
and in social-political activities. Inclusion also involves allowing victims and offenders to 
express their interests, and pursue those interests as part of the justice process. 
Subsequently, alternative approaches to litigation may be necessary given the needs and 
interests of those directly involved, thus the state is not put first.236 Van Ness holds 
inclusion to be the most important element of restorative justice. He says: 
Inclusion is the way that we make sure that whatever legitimate interests 
the State may have in the crime, and it does have some, these do not 
become the only focus of the processes established. It reminds us that, in 
spite of our motivations in creating processes, those processes may serve 
to exclude even when that was not our intention.237
In emphasizing the ideal of inclusion we see a fundamental characteristic that 
differentiates the restorative approach. By focusing on the concrete experience of being 
harmed in conflict, the restorative approach makes the interests and needs of those 
harmed the central priority. Inclusion is, in a sense, a demand for the process to be about 
the lives of real people and not imaginary, abstract fabrications.
In terms of crime, the restorative approach is victim centric and works to 
empower those who are harmed. As Zehr points out, victims lack support for coping with 
whatever trauma may have been experienced: information about the status of cases is 
often withheld such that victims are left in the dark; in cases of criminal trials the process 
235 Ibid. 4-5.
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 6
137
alienates victims insofar as the focus is directed toward the offender and the realization of 
right rules, rather than mended relationships; and on the part of the state there is no 
apparatus in place to bring victim and offender together in an attempt to reconcile the 
harms done.238 
Part of the problem with the present system is that it cannot account for the 
ambiguity inherent to social-conflict. That is, the system fails to address the complexity 
and nuance of the characters who are participants in a criminal event, which often 
impacts a much broader range of persons, and may be the emergent result of an already 
volatile social-historical context. Hence, another attribute of the restorative focus is that it 
treats the wounds of the offender as also being important in the reconciliation process. 
This is not to suggest that there are not direct victims who have been harmed by 
individuals. Rather, it is to suggest that harm and trauma permeate well beyond the direct 
victim and the event, and this fact is largely ignored by other approaches to justice. 
Lingering harm as trauma can be passed on for generations. In this sense, a whole 
community can be understood as being victimized by harmful actions. Offenders should 
also be understood as possible victims who at one point lacked support in the form of 
resources, protection, or mental and physical care.
Hence, restorative justice and the activities of reconciliation attempt to free 
persons from the cycle of violence, trauma, and opposition that destabilize the social-
world by focusing the efforts of justice on direct participation. By creating situations for 
people to engage, discuss their needs, and learn about the other as something more than 
just an imaginary being, the restorative justice movement creates an opportunity for a real 
238 The state often warns the offender upon release that any attempts to contact the victim(s) will be a 
parole violation and an immediate return to the prison (Zehr 2007: 211-214).
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democratic we to emerge under circumstances that normally create divisions. There is no 
guarantee that such relations will be established and, as previously discussed, getting 
persons to engage in such a mutual interaction is a central obstacle for Justice As 
Reconciliation. Similarly, the efforts of the restorative movement are, at this point, only 
able to address those second order manifestations of the much larger systemic crisis, 
which is why a call for a paradigm shift is so important—it is ultimately a call for the 
system to respond to its deeper, unreconciled problems. The deeper reconciliation 
requires that laws be rewritten and historical narrative be amended through apparatuses 
like truth-commissions. The activities of the restorative movement are an important 
ethical response to a problematic situation that alternative approaches have failed to even 
properly address. The presence of conflict in the US is not limited to the so called justice 
system and the prison. Penality is worth discussing at length in part because it does not 
receive enough critical attention, and because of its sheer size. Beyond the prison, 
however, there remains a deep divide that many theorists have attempted to problematize 
as the result of our varying comprehensive views of the world. These deep divisions 
manifest in various ways, but are maintained in part because there is no readily available 
mechanism to help persons know each other as anything more than imagined enemies.  
Here, the failure of the forceful response to social conflict has been thoroughly 
critiqued. Control through force only creates further conflict and instability. Perhaps one 
might argue that control through force is a necessary evil, given the innate maliciousness 
of humanity, and thus force is the only real response to instability.239 This pessimistic 
239 For classic examples of the pessimistic position, see Hobbes's Leviathan (1994); also, Machiavelli 
1995; also, Machiavelli 2009. In chapter 8 of The Prince, Machiavelli famously suggests that it is better 
to be feared than loved because fear affords the sort of control needed to maintain stability, while love is 
affiliated with weakness for the pessimist. Similarly, in Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy, he says: “it is 
necessary to whoever disposes a Republic and orders laws in it to presuppose that all men are bad, and 
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position is problematic in practical terms because it avoids having to respond to the 
problem of social conflict by claiming that it is not a problem at all and the state is 
perfectly justified in using violence in order to maintain power. Ethically, the pessimist 
position is problematic because it presumes that people and social relations are 
intrinsically combative, brutish, and driven by a lust for power. By assuming the nature of 
humanity to be nasty, the pessimist contributes to the reality of the belief thus making the 
belief itself an ethical choice. That is, when one maintains that the world is a particularly 
nasty way one ultimately legitimates that reality by resigning to its being so. Beyond the 
so called political realists, a contemporary liberal, like Rawls, would, I think, be largely 
in agreement with the efforts of reconciliation: On the one hand, the goal of reconciliation 
is to transition society such that, within the social world, persons appeal to an informed 
reflective equilibrium and can therefore work toward a common account of justice. 
Similarly, on the other hand, the system maintains a reciprocal relation between political 
institutions and persons such that the agreed upon notion of justice is being fully 
realized.240 
As it stands, however, liberal democratic societies lack the means to establish an 
overlapping consensus such that justice can be meaningfully discussed and this is rooted 
in the system's ongoing nonreciprocal relation to the social-world that manifests through 
force. In the United States we do not have to engage one another in any sort of 
participatory political settings and even if we could, most people would not know how to 
that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free opportunity for it” 
(ibid. 15).
240 Ibid. Rawls 1971; also, 2001: 3; and 2000: 329-372. Rawls agrees with reconciliation insofar as it is an 
institutional realization that affords a liberal peace; but, he inadequately address the problem of social 
control and the role of justice in the social-world that makes certain unpredictable demands of the 
system.
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engage in a dialogue, because we have been conditioned by the rules and norms of 
competition and conflict, not cooperation. The mistake many make, however, is to 
believe that persons are naturally violent, spiteful, cruel, and thus incapable of being 
otherwise. Believing in the imaginary people who are falsely recognized by systemic 
actors only reinforces the power of those false narratives. Overcoming those narratives 
and the fear which keeps us apart requires a different approach to our problems: 
reconciliation. Reconciliation, as a process, works to create a situation wherein persons 
directly and collectively participate in the formation of their social-political 
circumstances, which ultimately affords a shared stability and a common sense of justice. 
The role of justice and reconciliation is such that they cannot be distinguished and, as I 
continue to argue through this dissertation, justice can only be understood as, and 
through, reconciliation.
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CHAPTER VI 
RECONCILIATION POLITICS AND THE POST-
DOMINATION SOCIETY: LEGITIMACY AND TRUST
THROUGH EXPLICIT CONSENT
In this chapter, I focus on a central difficulty of reconciliation politics, which is 
establishing a legitimate relation between the social and systemic domains. Part of this 
difficulty rests in the fact that political systems are massive overarching bureaucracies 
that lack a direct relationship with the social world, a problem which is amplified by 
social fragmentation that often allows the system to be exploited for ends not endorsed by 
most members of the social world. Subsequently, political systems are abstract, tend to 
alienate, and are tolerated with suspicion by the legitimating social body. The general 
description of this captive tolerance is tacit consent; but, tacit consent—the equivalent of 
no political consent insofar as democracies require the active participation of those 
governed—is not sufficient for peace. A legitimate, stable, and peaceful politics requires 
explicit consent, and this overlapping consensus can be facilitated through tactics and 
technologies that are definitive of reconciliation politics .
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In section 6.1, I address liberal contract theory to describe why a politics of 
reconciliation is necessary for establishing consent. Following various critics of contract 
theory, I suggest that most political systems emerge not through consent, but through 
violent force and domination; thus, the claim that the legitimacy of political authority is 
granted via tacit consent includes within it an often overlooked reality of violent force 
that makes other forms of consent seem impossible, or illegal and thus revolutionary. Of 
course, real consent is complicated by other competing goods and needs.241 In section 6.2, 
I address the difficulty of competing public goods through a discussion of legitimacy and 
representation. Here, I claim that reconciliation politics prioritizes a certain form of 
legitimacy that emerges through explicit consent. Further, I suggest that this higher order 
legitimacy facilitates the peaceful realization of other public goods, specifically group 
identity and economic redistribution. 
In section 6.3, I explore one approach to alterity that has the potential to avoid the 
trappings of domination and strives to realize the legitimate consent described in sections 
1 and 2: Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs). TRCs represent an approach to 
politics that, when expanded beyond solely focusing on historical repair, makes explicit 
consent and a real legitimacy possible. One of the greatest shortcomings of TRCs, 
however, has been their inability to realize long term goals of reconciliation. South 
Africa, for example, saw great national unity while its TRC was active, but the society 
241 The variety of human experience, i.e. difference, means that overlapping consensus will be more or less 
present depending on the history of the society. Difference is not merely a matter of personal 
experience, however, and various political categorizations (e.g. native versus settler) coupled with 
temporal categorizations (e.g. modern versus not modern), make disagreement a matter of collective 
needs. Each group has its own issues to address that may be more or less related to broader political 
issues. The politically fragmented complexity of experience creates seemingly natural conflicts with 
possible Others and time itself. To add to these complexities, there are persons who have benefited from 
this general lack of solidarity and see no good reason to reconcile, or even seek to create conflicts for 
maintaining an asymmetrically beneficial situation. For an insightful analysis of the war tactics of 
categorization, specifically into a native/settler binary, see Mamdani 2012.
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remains fragmented and hostile in various ways that the TRC was unable to address.242 As 
I argued in chapter V, part of this shortcoming is systemic insofar as the liberal peace is 
not a real peace. In the case of TRCs, recommendations made by commissioners are often 
not taken up by the system because TRCs lack the power to enforce said 
recommendations, and because systemic actors wish to pursue other ideal ends and are 
afforded the opportunity to do so by the presence of unreconciled disunity. But, the 
failure to reconcile is also one of design insofar as TRCs lack a robust present- and 
future-oriented component, and are predominantly formed with the end of completion in 
view.243 The drive for completion—Closing the Books—is an understandable ideal, given 
that a closed narrative is fixed and able to be examined as an object that is no longer 
pertinent, that we can forget; but, experience is not a closed book and there is no narrator 
guiding history, describing the meaning of things at pivotal moments so that the plot, the 
progression of our story, can move toward that predetermined sealed end.244 Ultimately, 
242 “The commission took testimony from over 21,000 victims and witnesses, 2,000 of whom also 
appeared in public hearings. Media coverage of the commission was intense: most newspapers ran a 
number of stories on the commission every day, and radio and television news often led with a story on 
the most recent revelations from the commission’s hearings. Four hours of hearings were broadcast live 
over national radio each day, and the Truth Commission Special Report television show on Sunday 
evenings quickly became the most-watched news show in the country” (Hayner 2010: 28). Hayner goes 
on to describe the various problems associated with South Africa's TRC, concluding that “What 
remained clear to all, however, was that coming to terms with decades of abuses would take much 
longer than a few years, and much more than speaking the truth” (ibid. 31-32).
243 As I argued in previous chapters, the goal of completion is rooted in the notions of reconciliation being 
advocated within the society of concern. The confessional-forgiveness model, for example, much like 
its religious root, does not address the future—at least not the living future—and in its ideal cases, 
where persons find fulfillment in the confessional-forgiveness sacrament, it leaves persons content with 
their spiritual transformation, but also facing the remainder of time unprepared for how to move 
forward. The above quote by Hayner illuminates through the case of South Africa this same point: 
reconciliation is not just truth-telling and is an ongoing process. A politics of reconciliation must remain 
open in order to respond to the ongoing demands of the repairing world.
244 Elster 2004. Elster focuses on transitional justice and thus takes the point of closure to be the realization 
of a democratic society. As I argue in chapter V, Kant and most advocates of liberal peace maintain the 
same end. On the tension inherent to the politics of memory and forgetting, see Frankowski 2013.
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the hermeneutic dilemma—opening the horizon and realizing shared meaning—is outside 
of the book(s) in our to-be-determined present and future.
Based on the foregoing analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of truth-
commissions, in the closing section I offer suggestions for a future reconciliation politics. 
I advocate an ongoing and participatory politics that works to maintain a reciprocal 
relation within the social world, as well as between the social and the system. A future-
oriented politics of reconciliation is an opportunity to rectify the failures of domination 
politics. But, similar to an ethics of reconciliation, a politics of reconciliation begins with 
a great risk. Much like Walter Benjamin's angel of history, political reconciliation is 
rooted in the vulnerability most viscerally experienced when walking in the dark.245 
Rather than being fearful and believing that humanity will always come back to war, in a 
morose eternal return, it is important to face the risk of the future with hope, which is 
gained through the solidarity of working backwards toward the future with others and 
willing a new possibility through creative cooperative efforts.246 This hope is strengthened 
with each successful collaborative activity, with each rule and law that persons agree 
upon. Over time, as these hopes are validated in experience, they transform into trusting 
relations.
245 “This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a 
chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it 
in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that 
the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back 
is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress” 
Benjamin, Arendt, and Zohn 1968: 257-258.
246 Consider Jonathan Lear's analysis of the Crow: “In order to survive—and perhaps to flourish again—the 
Crow had to be willing to give up almost everything they understand about the good life. This was not a 
choice that could be reasoned about in the preexisting terms of the good life. One needed some 
conception of—or commitment to—a goodness that transcended one’s current understanding of the 
good” (Lear 2006: 92).
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6.1. Waiting for the Truly Exceptional: A Critique of the Political Contract
John Rawls defines a political conception, which concerns the basic structure of a 
closed society (e.g. a nation state), as a freestanding view upon which reasonable persons 
can agree regardless of whether they endorse other competing comprehensive doctrines. 
For an idea or action to be properly political and thus publicly reasonable, it must be 
formulated in a way that appeals to Others for reasons that are not rooted in their 
comprehensive doctrines. A political conception is the center point of the overlapping 
consensus that defines the political community, or the demos, and it guides political, 
social, and economic institutions.247 Using an elaborate thought experiment, Rawls 
suggests two institutional principles that all persons would agree upon—the difference 
principle and the principle of equal opportunity—and argues that these principles, as they 
guide political discourse, would establish a sense of fairness that is agreeable and just. 
Thus, Rawls claims, 
justice as fairness starts from within a certain political tradition and takes as 
its fundamental idea that of society as a fair system of cooperation over 
time, from one generation to the next. This central organizing idea is 
developed together with two companion fundamental ideas: one is the idea 
of citizens (those engaged in cooperation) as free and equal persons; the 
other is the idea of a well-ordered society as a society effectively regulated 
by a political conception of justice.248
Hence, Rawls implicitly suggests that justice requires agreement, but he avoids the 
difficult reality of disagreement and conflict by appealing to the tactics of contract theory 
which establish consent or agreement beforehand. By beginning with an already stable 
and reasonable society, all legal-political shifts that occur after the basic structure of 
247 Rawls 1993: 11.
248 Ibid. 14.
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society have been formally institutionalized operate through already accepted means of 
governmentality—judges, courts, voting practices, and a free market. Insofar as Rawls's 
theory does not address any real conflicted and historically-laden societies, his theory 
merely reproduces the status quo by claiming that inequality is a problem of arbitrary 
birth, not historical injustice, that can be fixed by correcting and conserving the system 
which created said inequalities in the first place. By reproducing the status quo, the 
peoples are once again left powerless, though potentially lulled into a placated state 
because a certain type of redistribution has been suggested that previous liberals would 
have found appalling for its blatant violation of free market principles.249 In other words, 
Rawls's pre-agreed-upon social-political starting point makes the rest of his theory 
possible and ideal, while simultaneously excusing the history of liberalism's emergence 
as an actually practiced political ideology.
On the one hand, the idealism of contract theory is problematic because it ignores 
the reality of historical conflict, which prevents a real collective agreement because the 
terms used have different experiential meanings rooted in different histories. And, on the 
other hand, ideal theory is problematic because it does not open the possibility of new 
future politics and often demands a return to the same liberal ideas—republican and thus 
representative governments, a constitution and clearly defined rights, and regular 
elections. This is not to suggest that liberalism ought to be abandoned, but, as I noted in 
chapter V, I am claiming that politics needs something more. Although, the outcome of 
the transformations that accompany these supplemental traits might so radically alter 
249 On governmentality, or the rational ends which guide the above mentioned means, see Foucault et al. 
2009; also, ibid. Mamdani 2012. On Rawls, many still find even the economic suggestions of social 
liberalism appalling. See, e.g., Nozick 1974; or, for a more robust libertarian defense, see Kekes 1997.
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political experience that the liberal movement becomes an anachronistic relic. A just 
society requires real consensual agreement, not hypothetical-ideal agreement, and this 
agreement becomes possible through an ethics and a politics of reconciliation.
Regarding Rawls's return to liberalism, consider “Of The Original Contract,” 
wherein David Hume claims that political parties require a “system of principles” the 
purpose of which is “to protect and cover that scheme of actions, which it pursues.”250 
These principles of rules and regulations—what Foucault and Edward Said call discourse 
and what Georg Lukács calls ideology—inform how persons can successfully speak and 
thus act within the spheres over which those discourses have influence.251 In other words, 
party principles determine whether or not utterances succeed or fail within the total 
situation that is permeated by the discursive norms. Liberal contract theory is one 
example of the system of principles to which persons appeal in protecting and covering 
certain actions and pursuits. The broader point of Hume's polemic is that there are certain 
principles to which persons involuntarily or tacitly submit: the laws of the political state, 
which form an overarching discourse that informs all other discursive formations because 
they are backed by police force. 
The protection and covering that attempts to justify this overarching system of 
rules and regulations was described by Robert Filmer in terms of a divine right.252 Locke 
and Rawls claim that the social contract emerges by way of consensus in the form of 
consent in a pre-historical event.253 Hume is critical of these approaches in part because 
250 Hume and Haakonssen 1994, “Of The Original Contract”: 186.
251 See, e.g., Foucault and Sheridan, 1972; Said 1978; Lukács 1971.
252 Filmer and Sommerville 1991.
253 Locke and Laslett 1988; Ibid. Rawls 1993, 1971.  Locke also defends tacit consent as sufficiently 
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they are not empirically grounded. He says, 
The conditions upon which they were willing to submit, were either 
expressed, or were so clear and obvious, that it might well be esteemed 
superfluous to express them. If this, then, be meant by the original contract, 
it cannot be denied, that all government is, at first, founded on a contract, 
and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed 
chiefly by that principle. In vain are we asked in what records this charter 
of our liberties is registered... It preceded the use of writing, and all the 
other civilized arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and 
in the equality, or something approaching equality, which we find in all the 
individuals of that species. The force, which now prevails, and which is 
founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and derived from 
authority, the effect of established government.254
Here, Hume is distinguishing between the sort of non-propositional social contract that is 
based in a trusting and communal relation, from the current state of politics that was 
contracted by another means. In other words, critical of Filmer and Locke, Hume offers a 
descriptive historical-empirical account of the political state and argues that the political 
contract is predominantly the result of domination by war, not consent.255 
The problem of sovereign power that is maintained by force has received much 
attention. For example, in his “Critique of Violence,” Walter Benjamin argues that the 
law emerges through and relies on the very violence it is supposed to deter, thus making 
the law a continuation of war by other means.256 The law, which is supposed to be written 
legitimating and not merely pre-historical. For Locke, if a political society is intolerable and not 
legitimate then the people should overturn the institutional order through bloody revolution. Though I 
am sympathetic to Locke's defense of tacit consent, I think he highly underestimated the extent to which 
political systems would become entrenched and invasive, thus making a successful revolution more or 
less impossible. More importantly, the use of violence to overturn a failed system ends up reproducing 
violence to maintain the replacement system, which is also not legitimate beyond a tacit toleration.
254 Ibid. Hume and Haakonssen 1994: 187.
255 Hume adds: “My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just 
foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend, 
that it has very seldom had place in any degree, and never almost in its full extent; and that, therefore, 
some other foundation of government must also be admitted” (ibid. Hume and Haakonssen, 1994: 192).
256 Benjamin et al. 1996; also see Benjamin's 8th thesis on history (ibid. 1968: 257).
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and decided through democratic means, according to a constitution, can be suspended in 
emergency, meaning that an exception can always be made for the sake of maintaining 
sovereign power over peoples and places. Following Benjamin, Agamben argues that the 
law emerges through the exception as the suspension of the law and is therefore 
dependent on the exception. In other words, the exception or the suspension of law for 
the sake of maintaining power, is the norm upon which the law has always been 
founded.257 Benjamin's critique applies beyond legal-political discourse, however, and 
also includes within it a critique of the ethos of exception. The ethos of exception can be 
seen as the ground-level social norms and micro-discursive relations which allow or 
prevent the exceptional from gaining power in the transformative emergency event. The 
rewriting and maintenance of the political contract through the suspension of systemic 
rules depends on the state of sociality, even if that dependence is not consensual or even 
aware. Hence, most political contracts depend on a war-like and fractured ethos, and 
traditionally this ethos is maintained by political violence that the state-system uses to 
protect and expand its juridical territories. Every day violence and domination normalizes 
the emergency suspension, making the forced rewriting of constitutional norms a 
seamless movement in the already subjugated minds comprising the social world. 
Subsequently, the social world is weakened via divide-and-conquer tactics, and held 
captive by top-down non-consensual political systems.
The historical and political significance of these claims regarding the relation 
between politics and war is most strikingly illuminated by the work of Charles Mills and 
257 Agamben 2005.
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Carole Pateman.258 Through Mills and Pateman, it becomes clear that the initial non-
propositional social contract of the North-Western European world contained within it 
notions of respect insofar as certain persons agreed to cooperate and form as members of 
a social world; but, it also included a sense of who was not to be trusted, who was the 
appropriate object of disrespect, exclusion, and domination. The ethos of the European 
social contract shaped contemporary class-, gender-, and race-based political imbalances 
insofar as it drove expansionist colonialist wars, imposed political contracts upon persons 
who were not allowed to consent, and fragmented other socially contracted peoples thus 
stifling their capacity to form a political contract according to alternative norms and 
beliefs. To borrow Thomas Pogge's metaphor, which is also Du Bois's metaphor, the 
political playing field was tilted in favor of some at the expense of Others.259 Following 
Carole Pateman, Mills calls this expansionist and palimpsestual tendency the 
“Domination Contract.”260 Mills says: 
as various theorists of race and imperialism have pointed out, once one 
examines the representations ("savages," "barbarians") and the 
experiences of people of color in the modern period--expropriated and 
exterminated Native Americans and Australians, enslaved and later Jim-
Crowed blacks, colonized non-Europeans--it becomes clear that both in 
theory and in practice, only white men were equal. Not merely as a matter 
of fact, but as a matter of proclaimed moral and legal norms, nonwhites 
had an inferior to non-existent schedule of rights--and were thus non-
citizens or at best second-class citizens.261
Thus, through Hume, Benjamin, Pateman and Mills, it becomes clear that historically, the 
terms of consent were anything but consensual and that only certain members have been 
258 Pateman and Mills 2007.
259 Pogge 2002.
260 Ibid. 2007: 81
261 Ibid. 98.
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allowed to participate in social-political world formation.
These critiques of the violent political contract are not coupled with a romantic 
plea for a revolutionary return to a pre-contracted state, in part because the violent return 
would just be a return to the same and the domination contract, the political master-slave 
relation, would be reproduced. We can see the latent reproduction of the domination 
contract even in Rawls's thought experiment: His imagining, though supposedly inclusive 
of difference, reformulates liberal norms and thus once again justifies their imposition by 
deciding, for Others in abstraction and without historical memory, that they are the 
principles upon which all reasonable liberal persons would agree.262 Mills criticizes one 
aspect of this reproduction, stating, “the founding and ongoing contract is better seen as a 
racial one, a "white coalition" which establishes white supremacy as the actual basic 
structure, and unfair white advantage as the norm.”263 In the case of race-based 
imbalances, Rawls begins with inequality as a given but he does not address the history 
of that inequality—which is rooted in the very tradition he is trying to reformulate—nor 
does he address the result, which is and continues to be, as Mills argues, the 
normalization of white male advantage. 
The tradition of dissent against contract theory agrees that violence, domination, 
and the suspension of norms are the norms according to which political contracts have 
been formed for generations. The violent revolutionary is not much different than the 
violent sovereign and if successful, merely takes control of the illegitimate and violent 
262 Liberal expansion was the US military's objective during Rawls' time (e.g. Vietnam, the many conflicts 
of the cold war).
263 Ibid. 117.
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system.264 Rather than reproduce violent domination that normalizes inequality, unfair 
advantage, and thus instability, a politics of reconciliation requires a reconsideration of 
how the social-political world can be transformed and ideally improved from our already 
entrenched and complex present. A genuinely exceptional response to systemic violence 
is needed. The truly exceptional and ethical response involves repair in the social world 
and a transformation of political relations. Habermas's discourse ethics, coupled with the 
practical tactics of Marshal Rosenberg's or Judith Lasater's Non-Violent Communication, 
can be understood as a tool set for realizing this peaceful and authentic exception in 
ordinary encounters, within the social world.265 The truth-commission, as a space where 
the social world can emerge and solidify, can also be understood as a tool for achieving 
the same communicative ends in relation to political systems. 
Habermas's theory of communicative action is concerned with coordinating 
meaning because in the absence of said coordination sociality risks collapsing into 
nonsense or conflict. Rather than being a comprehensive doctrine that seeks to instill a 
particular mono-logical moral-political vision, Habermas is primarily concerned with the 
264 This is not to suggest that anti-colonial or de-colonial movements are not crucial for moving toward a 
stable and legitimate social-political situation, despite their sometimes being violent; rather, I am 
suggesting that even after the war is over, the post-colonial society remains plagued by the hegemony of 
the colonial powers such that there is a great risk and a tendency to reproduce the norms of master-slave 
or domination relations. Again, Mamdani describes this tendency in Define and Rule (2012), in terms of 
the erasure and rewriting of customary law by colonial paternalism according to the norms of 
individualism and a sense of responsibility as resting in external agencies, rather than in our own 
relations. The reproduction of domination as the norm in the social-political sphere is at least part of the 
reason that many former colonies are unstable and at risk of civil war; but, as I suggest shortly, another 
reason is that said spaces were not offered reparative support by their former colonizers and thus lack 
the means necessary to reconcile their historical conflicts. Hence, Mills rightly warns, “the group 
interests of the privileged, and their resulting desire to maintain their privilege, will become both an 
ideational obstacle to achieving social transparency and a material obstacle to progressive change, 
which will need to be taken into account in theorizing the dynamics of social cognition and the 
possibilities for social transformation” (ibid. p. 99). Through human rights law and the Geneva 
Conventions, colonialist powers now use  indirect governing tactics, like 'right to protect,' to maintain 
control in the former colonies (ibid. Mamdani 2012). 
265 Habermas 1990; Lasater and Lasater 2009; Rosenberg 2012; see also Tannen 2001.
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terms through which persons engage given that they maintain different understandings of 
experience but must coexist. Habermas states:
If we keep in mind the action-coordinating function that normative validity 
claims play in the communicative practice of everyday life, we see why the 
problems to be resolved in moral argumentation cannot be handled 
monologically but require a cooperative effort. By entering into a process of 
moral argumentation, the participants continue their communicative action 
in a reflexive attitude with the aim of restoring a consensus that has been 
disrupted. Moral argumentation thus serves to settle conflicts of action by 
consensual means. Conflicts in the domain of norm-guided interactions can 
be traced directly to some disruption of a normative consensus. Repairing a 
disrupted consensus can mean one of two things: restoring intersubjective 
recognition of a validity claim after it has become controversial or assuring 
intersubjective recognition for a new validity claim that is a substitute for 
the old one. Agreement of this kind expresses a common will. If moral 
argumentation is to produce this kind of agreement, however, it is not 
enough for the individual to reflect on whether he can assent to a norm. It is 
not even enough for each individual to reflect in this way and then to 
register his vote. What is needed is a "real" process of argumentation in 
which the individuals concerned cooperate. Only an intersubjective process 
of reaching understanding can produce an agreement that is reflexive in 
nature; only it can give the participants the knowledge that they have 
collectively become convinced of something.266
Developing from Habermas's ethics, I am suggesting that the political is not possible in a 
legitimate sense if the social world cannot ethically engage and cooperatively influence 
systemic operations. The ideal discourse situation can therefore be understood as a more 
demanding political apparatus than Rawls's original position, because it is not a single 
imaginary or pre-historical event wherein a society is contracted and then left to the 
devices of ruling elites. Rather, Habermas's discourse situation is an ongoing negotiation 
of the terms of sociality such that a broader political system can emerge and operate 
according to the agreed upon norms which emerge from these negotiations.267 In other 
266 Ibid. 1990: 66-67.
267 Indeed, Habermas clarifies in an endnote that the role of a discourse ethics in an emancipatory politics 
would be to “interpret situations, as for example when it is used to differentiate between particular and 
universalizable interests” (ibid. 114, endnote 81). Here, discourse ethics mediates social enaction and 
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words, Habermas demands that politics be accountable and that the system be fallible, 
tested and tried according to the needs and demands of the people. Here, the truth-
commission represents a unique political emergence, as well as a useful addition to 
Habermas's theory, because it acts as a mediated space for said sociality to emerge and in 
some cases it influences the political system insofar as it can offer suggestions for how 
laws ought to be reformulated, where repair is needed, and who should be held 
responsible for failing the system in various ways.
6.2. Securing Public Goods: Trust Based Legitimacy As the Starting Point of a 
Future Politics of Reconciliation
In “Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy,” Seyla 
Benhabib rightly notes that an ideally functioning society works to maintain an 
equilibrium between three public goods: Legitimacy, economic welfare, and a viable 
sense of collective identity.268 “These goods stand in a complex relation to one another” 
Benhabib says, “excessive realization of one such good may be in conflict with and may 
jeopardize the others.”269 For example, an overemphasis on collective identity in the 
exclusive ethno-nationalist movements of the 19 th and 20th centuries made genocide a 
central organizing activity of many emerging states.270 Following Habermas, Benhabib 
argues, “legitimacy in complex modern democratic societies must be thought to result 
from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common 
makes explicit points of mutual consensus.
268 Benhabib 1994.
269 Ibid. 26.
270 See, e.g., Mann 2005.
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concern.”271 The ideal ethical legal-political system is directly informed through 
communicative relations, making its operations legitimate, insofar as they are consensual, 
as well as formative and representative of collective identity. Under these ideal 
circumstances, redistribution does not escalate conflict because it is justified and agreed 
upon beforehand; that is, it is considered legitimate. Thus, legitimacy is a centrally 
organizing ideal in a politics of reconciliation.
Max Weber adds a descriptive and grounded understanding to a concept of 
legitimacy. He claims that there are “Three Pure Types of Legitimate Authority”, the 
validity of which are judged on rational, traditional, and charismatic grounds.272 The 
rational grounds for critiquing authority are ultimately legal. The activities of the political 
system are, on this view, legitimate insofar as they operate according to the law and the 
constitution. Obviously this ground for critical judgment is problematic because the law 
and the constitution are, as noted above, often based in an exception to their own 
operation; hence, the legitimacy of authority does not depend on nor answer to the law 
because it determines the law by way of its suspension. Traditional grounds for gauging 
the validity of legitimate authority are rooted in “an established belief in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under 
them.”273 On the traditional view, authority can be legitimate because it has always been 
present and is inherited, giving it a historical justification (e.g. a king or the pope). This 
second form of legitimacy is problematic because it does not account for the fact that a 
position of authority does not necessitate consensual legitimacy, although it may seem 
271 Ibid. Benhabib: 26.
272 Weber, Henderson, and Parsons 1964: 328.
273 Ibid. 
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legitimate according to the rules and regulations of the discourse over and through which 
the authority figure has power. Charismatic grounds of legitimate authority are validated 
if persons are moved by the heroic leader and follow because of who the individual is qua 
individual. Contrasted with traditional and rational authority, charismatic authority can be 
legitimate according to a consenting group but delegitimated because of a lacking rational 
or traditional foundation. 
Weber goes on to say that no authority exists in a pure form and that authority 
usually operates according to a combination of these three grounds. Thinking about 
legitimacy according to Weber's distinctions reveals important tendencies in 
contemporary politics that I have already begun to challenge. For instance, it is assumed 
that legitimate authority is granted by one or a combination of circumstantial factors, all 
of which are supposed to be agreed upon by those over whom authority is exercised; that 
is, it is assumed we have already consented to the rational law, to the history of tradition, 
and to the character of the leader. Thus, we might think that there is a sufficient feedback 
mechanism through which authority can be judged, delegitimated, and empowered or 
disempowered. The representative is placed before us as the ideal form of authority, 
which is supposed to act for a constituent body, gaining legitimacy from a consent that 
was granted by election. Of course, not just any person can be a representative and those 
who do have the privilege to act as the voice of a people are often only acting for a very 
select group—those who donated to the representatives election campaign, for example. 
Beyond being a corrupt actor, the representative always disempowers communities and 
individuals insofar as representatives are described as necessary because ordinary persons 
cannot be trusted to represent themselves. Perhaps politics cannot escape a representative 
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model, because an absolutely direct democracy is not practical, but the intrinsic weakness 
of the representative system requires a simultaneously operating reparative politic that re-
empowers the social world: A participatory feedback mechanism.274
In reality, many political systems lack the necessary feedback mechanisms to 
guarantee a reciprocal relation between the dialogically functioning social base and 
systemic operations.275 In the absence of critical feedback, systemic authority cannot be 
sufficiently legitimated—sufficient being a minimal condition wherein persons no longer 
feel alienated and disempowered by the system. When a functioning feedback mechanism 
exists, the goods of legitimacy and the defining traits of a collective identity are 
addressed through the same means of political reconciliation. Voice is given to the people 
and that voice determines what is and is not authoritative. Further, it is only through a 
political reconciliation that works to give voice to all, and thus give a collective presence 
to the otherwise disparate population, that Benhabib's third social good, economic 
redistribution, becomes a possibility that does not risk escalating unresolved conflicts.276
In other words, under ideal circumstances the legal-political institutionalized 
system coordinates and reciprocally operates with the social world. A political system 
274 Indeed, Baudrillard argues that the people cannot be represented because they no longer participate 
(Baudrillard et al. 2007). In other words, participation is needed in all democratic societies. 
275 Historically, the means of participation were conscription through military service. Mandatory military 
service is not a sufficient form of participation because it does not empower in any meaningful sense 
and it is ethically problematic because it reproduces the norms of war. More creative forms of non-
violent conscription are in desperate need of broader public consideration. 
276 Though, as Nancy Fraser suggests in her debate with Axel Honneth (Fraser and Honneth 2003), 
sometimes redistribution is necessary as a form of recognition, and in some cases redistribution must 
come before or even in the absence of recognition. In these cases where the solution to social-political 
conflicts is immediate economic redistribution, the activity still must be facilitated by a reconciliatory 
politic during and after the actual economic shift; that is, the system must justify its redistribution and 
educate the social world as to why a particular change was important and necessary for maintaining a 
peaceful equilibrium. In other words, the system must constantly strive for explicit consent to legitimate 
its activities.
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that strives for reciprocity with its members ultimately seeks a legitimacy based in real 
and collective consent, rather than force or domination. Domination politics fail to realize 
a stable legitimacy because its functions are maintained by force and submission, rather 
than cooperation and consent. Like the master-slave relation, domination politics is only 
able to maintain a temporary cessation of conflict by sublimating that conflict into the 
law and law-enforcement; but, in the social world, the desire to revolt for a better 
political situation lingers in various ways, and festers as persons become increasingly 
alienated by the system that does not reflect their needs and demands, which is a system 
that few can trust.
An integrated and synchronized system, on the other hand, permeates the social 
world, such that its discursive functions (e.g. laws, historical narrative, and goal values) 
and its means of implementing those organizing norms (e.g. beuracratic operations, 
policing and protection, public works, market regulation) are directed and endorsed by 
the social world. As Pierre Rosanvallon points out, a properly functioning democracy 
does not just maintain a minimalist form of legitimacy, which he sees as a “strictly 
procedural fact” and thus an “incontestable product of voting”; rather, ideal democracies 
also work to establish the more important reciprocal relation of trust.277 Rosanvallon says 
that the more complex trust-system has at least three functions:
First, it represents an expansion of legitimacy, in that it adds to a mere 
procedural attribute both a moral dimension (integrity in the broadest 
sense) and a substantive dimension (concern for the common good). Trust 
also plays a temporal role: it implies that the expansion of legitimacy 
continues into the future...Finally, trust is an institutional economizer, in 
that it eliminates the need for various procedures of verification and 
277 Rosanvallon 2008: 3.
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proof.278
Rosanvallon's distinction between legitimacy and trust is based in a political view which 
claims that the social world's tacit consent, which is marked by a distinct lack of social 
uprising and consistent voting practices, is all that legitimacy requires. Legitimacy 
through tacit consent, that is verified through voting and non-revolution, however, is the 
equivalent of non-consent and is not really legitimate: In the domination state, votes are 
cast because persons have no other option besides violent revolt, but revolt is a risk to 
one's life and thus a cost that is not so obviously worth the unexperienced benefits of real 
legitimacy. Thus, so long as persons are kept minimally satisfied, they will remain 
complacent with their alienated relation to the political system for the sake of survival. 
The captive nature of tacit legitimacy does not undermine Rosanvallon's distinction and 
instead reveals political trust as a higher form of legitimacy as explicit, not captive, 
consent. In other words, an ideal political system is fully democratic, finding its 
legitimacy through free and explicit consent. 
Of course, current political formations are far from ideal and we are not going to 
have the opportunity to peacefully reboot the system from an original position; but, this 
does not mean that stable social-systemic transformation and equilibrium through 
reciprocal trust is impossible. Consider that in several post-conflict societies, truth-
commissions have been introduced to fulfill the minimal demands of participation in an 
attempt to transform the social-systemic relation for the sake of a lasting stability. In this 
case, participation is not merely a means to inclusion, rather participants are also 
empowered to co-author the emerging social and political contracts. Though imperfect, 
278 Ibid. 3-4.
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truth commissions represent an important beginning for a more rigorously involved 
democratic society that emerges through non-ideal conditions by making consent a real 
possibility. In terms of their imperfections, truth commissions should be taken as an 
inspiration for future political technologies. I discuss and defend truth commissions 
because they generally meet requirements for explicit political legitimacy through two 
participatory functions: first, a feedback mechanism that affords a direct critical relation 
within the social world, as well as between the social and the political (participatory 
feedback or reciprocity); second, a preventative means for displeased members to 
participate and thus inform the terms of the social and political contracts such that said 
members are not stuck in the position of an oppressed minority that is driven to either 
submit or reproduce the tactics of domination because no other means to power is made 
available (real inclusion).279 I will discuss truth commissions in more detail before 
addressing future political technologies and the evolution of reconciliation commissions.
6.3. The General Features of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
Priscilla Hayner tells us that truth commissions include five general 
characteristics: discovering, clarifying, and formally acknowledging past abuses; 
focusing on and supporting victims; holding individuals accountable; clarifying 
institutional responsibility and recommending reforms; and promoting reconciliation.280 
Here, I will discuss and problematize each of these traits.
1. A main goal of all truth commissions is “sanctioned fact finding” or an effort 
279 Enrique Dussel has many useful things to say about the needs for a responsive apparatus that deals with 
the victimization that is intrinsic to a democratic political system in his recently translated Ethics of 
Liberation (Dussel et al. 2013).
280 Hayner 2010: 20.
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“to establish an accurate record of a country’s past, clarify uncertain events, and lift the 
lid of silence and denial from a contentious and painful period of history.”281 Although, as 
John Braithwaite points out, a factual or truth based record is not always necessary for the 
purposes of reconciliation, in cases where truth commissions operate, the goal of getting 
the facts straight serves an important function in working toward a collective social-
political understanding.282 Further, even in reconciliation cases where non-truth takes 
precedent over facts, narrative coordination and consensus over the meaning of collective 
experience as it permeates the present and guides the future remains central to 
reconciliation processes. Thus, it would not be unreasonable for some spaces to employ a 
narrative and reconciliation commission, especially if said society is aware of the 
metaphysical trappings of a concept like truth.
Narrativity is crucial to both social and political reconciliation processes, because 
the stories persons tell about themselves and Others work to organize and make 
intelligible personal, social, and political relations. Within this integrative and organizing 
process, one assumes that Others also exhibit a similar activity; that is, one's narrative 
includes within it an expectation about Others that is situated along a normative spectrum 
of trust. Indeed, trust depends on a certain continuity within relational experience. 
Sometimes one's trusting expectations are disrupted or fully violated. Experiences 
wherein trust is violated, which are often also traumatic experiences, can destabilize 
fundamental beliefs which transforms the way one relates to oneself and Others. Trauma 
changes the way we narrate and in some cases persons cannot narrate beyond their 
281 Ibid.
282 Braithwaite et al. 2010.
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traumas.283 Susan Dwyer elucidates this point and reveals why narrativity would be 
central to political reconciliation efforts: 
A woman might think she “really knew” her lover; part of her self-
understanding was tied up with being his partner. But his recent treachery 
throws into doubt the meaning of their past relationship, thus threatening 
her sense of self. The diagnosis of an illness or disability can rob a person 
of a particular projected future. Where the anticipation of such a future has 
guided and shaped his past and present actions, a person may have to 
engage in a wholesale reevaluation of his life and priorities. Victims of 
crime are suddenly and sometimes violently forced to reconsider their 
previous assumptions about physical security and the predictability of 
others. We can never undo such disruptions; they are, literally, facts of life. 
But, especially when they are severe, our continued well-being—perhaps 
our very existence—depends upon our being able to incorporate them into 
our personal narratives. For persons, at least, self-understanding, 
understanding others, being understood by others, and achieving a degree 
of coherence and stability in our lives matter. The desires for intrapersonal 
and interpersonal understanding that underpin the construction of a 
coherent and stable life narrative are quite fundamental...Given this 
assumption, we can understand not only why we are motivated to pursue 
reconciliation, but why reconciliation is of deep moral significance.284
Here, Dwyer suggests that a central component of reconciliation efforts involves the 
integration of events into a story that helps persons to understand and situate themselves, 
as well as their relations, according to the stories told. The stories we tell ourselves 
represent the agreed-upon meaning that we attribute to our experiences. In the absence of 
an integrative approach to historical narrative, persons can become further fragmented 
insofar as they understand themselves according to radically different events. A divided 
social world affords different communicative tools that often do not cooperate with 
communicative styles on the other side of the divide because they have different 
283 Certain successful forms of trauma therapy (see, e.g., Herman 1997; Sack and Sachsse 2010) involve 
learning how to integrate traumatic experiences into a broader story such that one is not stuck and thus 
determined by the trauma. To a certain extent, truth commissions do similar work on a broader scale but 
with the same goal of not allowing the past to determine who We are now and into the future. 
284 Dwyer 1999: 86-87.
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experiential meanings and thus uses rooted in different histories.285
Dwyer goes on to add that this integration does not exclusively involve traumatic 
events. It is quite common for persons to tell a story that includes a great deal of 
positivity. In describing one's self, one includes proud achievements as central identity 
traits and those traits inform how one interprets and experiences the world. Hence, in 
cases of political reconciliation, having a continuous story about who 'We the people' are, 
involves integrating the good with the bad. In other words, political reconciliation must 
be radically inclusive and make room for many different stories about what it means to be 
a member of a given social-political world. Further, nothing about this narrative is given, 
and collective meaning making is always an achievement that comes out of collective 
struggle as an alternative to conflict.
2. Regarding the inclusive nature of political reconciliation, a second key attribute 
of truth commissions is the “separate and distinct aim of hearing, respecting, and 
responding to the needs of victims and survivors.”286 Unlike judicial inquiries that seek to 
prosecute offenders and treat the victim as instrumental to the prosecution, truth 
commissions focus on the stories of victims to get the facts straight, but also to help 
create a broader awareness of the suffering that occurred. Ideally, raising public 
awareness helps to transform the rooted perspectives of those who would otherwise not 
care about the experiences of Others, or, in cases where persons were tacitly complicit in 
285 Consider the language of social death. When someone is traumatized, they may say 'I died' as a result of 
a traumatic event(s). To the non-traumatized speaker, this statement does not make sense given the 
living uttering presence who made the statement. What we see in cases like this is a hermeneutic wall 
that one cannot fully surpass without knowing similar experiences or listening to and trusting the 
testimony of the traumatized speaker. Of course, it may turn out that many of us have died socially and 
can understand what it means to die while living.
286 Ibid. Hayner, 2010: 22.
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the oppression of large groups, public awareness creates a sense of guilt that can motivate 
positive social-political action.287 In some cases, commissions can help victims by “by 
designing a reparations program and providing the necessary information to the 
government to allow rapid implementation.”288 Thus, public awareness and educational 
efforts also prevent those not receiving reparative support from claiming that they are 
being victimized by said redistributions because the reasons for the repair efforts are 
publicly known and agreed upon beforehand. Other pragmatic ends of the victim-centric 
fact finding process include determining the legal status of disappeared persons, which 
impacts various “civil matters—such as processing a will or accessing money in the 
disappeared person’s bank account—[that] cannot be settled without a death 
certificate.”289 Beyond practical matters, however, victim-oriented activities are supposed 
to shift the systemic perspective from a revenge and war-like focus, to a politics of care 
and reparation. Rather than giving the offender the center stage, thus heroizing those who 
caused a great deal of harm and situating justice as the act of harming those who harmed, 
a victim centric approach challenges these misconceived notions of justice by 
illuminating the suffering as needing something that cannot be given by violence.290 But, 
287 “As the South African commission hearings progressed, for example, therapists who worked with 
torture survivors saw a marked increase in the public’s understanding and appreciation of victims’ 
needs” (Hayner 2010: 22).
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid.
290 Indeed, many historical figures (e.g. Christopher Columbus) are of the lionized sociopath type and are 
the face of domination politics. More recent and local examples of a similar vein, persons who 
disregarded the interpersonal norms of the social world for their own selfish intentions, can be seen in 
the problematic young white males who have a tendency to shoot large groups of people and then 
commit suicide. Such vile figures go down in history, despite the damage they caused, because they 
embodied the selfishness that the war-system uses to maintain itself, while also representing the logical 
outcome of that selfishness as a realization of the historical imaginary of the all-against-all state of 
nature. The heads of Goldman Sachs, Christopher Columbus, and Adam Lanza all exist on a continuum 
of anti-sociality, but it is that anti-social tendency, more frequently call rugged individualism, which 
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truth commissions are not solely focused on victims.
3. A third defining characteristic of truth commissions is that they clarify who 
ought to be held accountable for violating the rights and dignity of Others and make 
recommendations to judicial actors to pursue said offenders. In some cases, truth 
commissions not only hear the testimony of offenders, but, as was the case in South 
Africa, offenders can sometimes petition for amnesty on the condition of their full 
cooperation with the commission's pursuits.291 Regardless of whether it is just, some 
situations are such that offenders must be tried and punished in order to move forward 
with the reconciliation process.292 In cases where violent punishment can be avoided, the 
courts seek repair. For example, thieves can be demanded to repay their victims. In 
advocates of domination politics trumpet as virtue.
291 “In South Africa, many survivors were able to hear these stories through the public hearings of those 
seeking amnesty for their crimes. One condition for receiving a grant of amnesty was full disclosure of 
all details of the crimes, including answering questions directly from victims or surviving family 
members” (ibid. Hayner 2010: 22). Also, Hayner says: “The greatest innovation of the commission, and 
the most controversial of its powers, was its ability to grant individual amnesty for politically motivated 
crimes committed between 1960 and April 1994. The commission received 7,115 applications for 
amnesty. For gross violations of human rights (in contrast to politically motivated crimes against 
property, or gun running, for example), the applicant was required to appear in a public hearing to 
answer questions from the commission, from legal counsel representing victims or their families, and 
directly from victims themselves. Just under 25 percent of the applications pertained to such gross 
violations, requiring a hearing. Ultimately, the Amnesty Committee denied 4,500 applications for 
amnesty after administrative review” (ibid. 29).
292 On this point, Hayner notes that there is a tendency with truth-commissions that are not coupled with 
trials and amnesty to have a negative impact on the realization of democratic norms and the guarantee 
of human rights, but she also notes that the success of a truth-commission is not an exact science and 
that their role must be taken on a case by case basis (ibid. 26). 
I think that a politics of reconciliation should reject violent punishment, especially penalties of death or 
torture, and in general I am suspicious of the spite that is involved in violently punishing offenders for 
acts committed in the past because such activities do not repair the present. There are reparative forms 
of punishment that allow offenders to genuinely pay for their crimes. Like forgiveness, however, violent 
punishment deserves its own conceptual space and terminology, one that is divorced from the language 
of justice and labeled more honestly as spite, revenge, and state-sponsored violence. Perhaps a society 
can maintain itself while violently retaliating in some cases; but, as is clear in the United States, often 
the spite of violent punishment is abused and used to maintain the domination contract, frequently 
against innocents, while overlooking the more important needs of the people(s) thus allowing the social 
world to collapse over time. 
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considering the international extension of this reparative approach, demands have been 
made for colonial powers to repair former colonies— especially those that continue to 
experience political conditions that lead to the mass abuse of human rights—through 
various means.293
4. A fourth aspect of all truth commissions that is crucial to its status as a 
participatory democratic mechanism is the capacity to “evaluate the institutional 
responsibility for abuses, and to outline the reforms needed to prevent further abuses.”294 
Recommendations made by a truth commission are a crucial form of empowerment that 
gives ordinary people a real voice in informing how a political system ought to be 
adjusted in order to prevent further conflict and reconcile relations for the sake of 
stability, thus opening the possibility of a common sense of justice across generations. In 
truth commissions that have already concluded their inquiries, the recommendations tend 
to focus on obvious problematic aspects of the system: “the police, military, and judicial 
system.”295 Despite the ideal efforts to realize legitimate grassroots democratic 
transformations, “implementation of truth commission recommendations, however, 
continues to be weak.”296 Indeed, the weakness of what ought to be a truth commission's 
strongest feature is directly connected with what Hayner claims is a fifth aspect of truth 
commissions, the promotion of reconciliation, which also tends to fall short. The failure 
to make good on the findings of a TRC is ultimately a failure to guarantee social-political 
293 Though, in some cases, colonial powers claim that their colonies are the ones that are indebted insofar 
as colonialism introduced infrastructure and a market economy. Again, returning to Mills's point, one of 
the greatest obstacles in many reconciliation efforts is, and will continue to be, transforming the way 
that privileged persons understand and maintain their privilege.
294 Ibid. Hayner, 2010: 23.
295 Ibid. 23.
296 Ibid. 
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trust, making the TRC itself seem like a wasted effort while returning to a tacit legitimacy 
or legitimacy by domination and submission—that is, a false legitimacy.
The inability to realize these more politically engaged goals—transforming the 
system according to the demands of the people, and maintaining a political unity through 
the promotion of reconciliation, which feeds into the realization of social demands by 
continuously making coherent said pleas—is the result of two shortcomings. First, truth 
commissions have thus far acted as a temporary and backwards looking attempt to repair, 
rather than a permanent apparatus that works for the people to also transform future 
relations by consistently reporting for the people and thus pressuring the system to 
transform in many ways well beyond the most obvious transformations of the police, 
military, and judiciary. The second shortcoming is an ambiguous sense of how 
reconciliation ought to occur, coupled with an overly strong sense of what reconciliation 
is (e.g., forgiveness) which subsequently prevents a more inclusive and empowering 
reconciliation from emerging through participatory processes.
On this second point, Andrew Schaap suggests, “the aspiration to reconcile is an 
enabling condition of politics, [but] politics must be invoked to resist the moment of 
closure that reconciliation might otherwise tend towards.”297 Schaap adds that political 
reconciliation must be oriented such that the possible demos is the “contingent outcome 
of politics.”298 As I argued in chapter IV, this orientation begins with a leap of faith or the 
belief that 'We' can be a reality and a will to move toward that possibility. Thus, political 
reconciliation is a systematic attempt to facilitate new cooperative social-political 
297 Schaap 2005: 8.
298 Ibid.
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relations where they are mostly lacking, with the goals of that cooperative emergence 
determined from within the reconciliatory processes rather than imposed from without. In 
this sense, efforts must be made to prevent hero-leaders from making claim to what 
reconciliation ought to afford (e.g. forgiveness) and silencing or ignoring dissent for the 
sake of said ideal end. In other words, the goal of a ground up participatory model of 
political reconciliation is to ultimately avoid the trappings of domination politics 
wherever and however they occur, by establishing a legitimacy based on trust. 
The emergence of a stable social world and a legitimate political system requires 
not solely a backwards reckoning, however; it must also introduce tactics and 
technologies that help the emerging 'We' to face and work toward the future as the open 
possibility it ought to be. Realizing an explicitly legitimate and just political contract—a 
set of rules and regulations that are reciprocally informed and guaranteed by trust—
requires the introduction of a flexible, reparative, and adaptive apparatus that works to 
integrate and thus reconcile relations within the social world, as well as between the 
social and the systemic spheres. In the absence of a continuously operating and legitimate 
participatory feedback mechanism, a reconciliation commission, even the most 
harmonious society will risk falling back into the trappings of a top-down illegitimate and 
thus unjust politics.
6.4. The Neo-Agora and the Future Politics of Reconciliation
One of the most important traits of truth commissions is their creation of a space 
where people can meet and work through political issues together. The creation of a neo-
agora is crucial and necessary for an explicitly legitimate political system because it 
affords a situation for participation that does not require that persons imagine how Others 
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feel and think (empathy/sympathy), nor does it rely on external agencies to describe the 
thought-feelings of Others (propaganda). Direct encounters within the neo-agora make 
possible real social-political understanding. The difficulty of bringing an already 
fragmented social-world together is that most persons are not prepared to communicate in 
non-strategic or non-war like ways. Hence, the peaceful mediation of this space, coupled 
with educational efforts and the interpretation of the testimonies produced within are 
equally crucial systemic processes for a politics of reconciliation and must be carefully 
guarded from appropriation. 
One way that truth commissions have been guarded is by reducing the incentive to 
appropriate by limiting their influence over direct governing bodies and the law. 
Unfortunately, the ideal of expanding or developing a more robust political reconciliation 
is also stifled by this check. This problem can be circumvented by giving reconciliation 
commissions a greater influence in other spheres. For example, the collective activities of 
various community run reconciliation commissions could be broadcast through public 
media outlets. Obviously these outlets are equally at risk of being appropriated, but the 
fact that the media, and the news media in particular, is already controlled by wealthy 
elites makes this alternative, at the least, the lesser of two evils. More importantly, by 
having the public presentation of participatory activities coupled with a direct 
participatory space, the public representation could be held accountable by those who are 
participating. Indeed, the contemporary public relations or propaganda apparatus is able 
to operate unchecked and with great influence over the fragmented public, precisely 
because the public does not engage as a collective and remains a dormant possibility. 
The Occupy protest movement, which was inspired by various protests throughout 
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the Middle-East/Southern Europe, received popular media coverage in September of 
2011 when protesters occupied Zuccotti Park in New York City's Wall Street district.299 In 
general the protests were organized in response to the capitalist exploitation which 
affords social and economic inequality—specifically the troubling statistic that 1% of the 
population controls a majority of US wealth, while the remaining 99% are barely able to 
survive. The only clearly stated goal of the various Occupy protests that emerged after 
September of 2011 was to transform hierarchical power relations within the occupied 
space to be more evenly distributed and thus properly democratic. In other words, the 
Occupy movement attempted to correct the failures of current liberal politics by claiming 
a space where a demos could emerge and enact a shared meaning, work on common 
problems, and transform the social-political relational sphere. Occupy's success could 
have been exponentially greater were it able to bring in persons who were sympathetic to 
the movement but could not physically occupy, and if it had shut down popular 
propaganda which trivialized the Occupiers by dismissing the movement with uncritical 
and easily reproduced phrases such as 'What do they want?' 
Coupled with the news media, the police intervened and reclaimed Occupy's 
spaces through force, thus returning the system to the same non-democracy with a 
slightly different set of captions making the headlines. In other words, the social 
motivation for political reconciliation, as the collective engagement and navigation of 
difference that is needed to realize the revisable terms of our political contracts, is 
present; but, the media and the police worked to stifle the possibility of a legitimate 
politics and the collective meaning that began to surface through the Occupy movement 
299 For a more in-depth history of the US Occupy movement, see e.g., Gitlin 2012; Graeber 2012.
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remains only partially realized.
The rhetoric opposing radical democratic participation is not new and can be 
traced through liberal ideology. Kant, for example, argues that direct democracy ought to 
be prevented and is generally undesirable because it is despotic and inevitably constrains 
the freedom of the individual. In “Perpetual Peace” Kant states: 
democracy, in the truest sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism, 
because it establishes an executive power through which all the citizens 
may make decisions about (and indeed against) the single individual 
without his consent, so that decisions are made by all the people and yet not 
by all the people; and this means that the general will is in contradiction 
with itself, and thus also with freedom.300
Here, we see the fearful expectations of humanity's war-like nature, which ultimately 
justifies a (at best) soft domination-by-representation as the ideal alternative to a state of 
nature, as a repetitive and tautological premise. Kant might be read along-side the 
apologists for colonialism as claiming that persons could never be trusted with a directly 
democratic system because they are too immature, stupid, and war like, and cannot make 
decisions that would be fair, equal, and respecting of freedom. Hence, the system must be 
run by representatives, Kant tells us, because representatives will prevent a majority 
dictatorship from harming the imaginary individual without consent. In reality, of course, 
the representative system harms many non-consenting individuals and, more importantly, 
in many western representative democracies, active measures are taken to prevent a 
demos from emerging to challenge those individuals who run the system with neither 
consent nor transparency, as is evidenced in the global systemic response to the Occupy 
protests. 
On the one hand, in cases where the system is so thoroughly corrupt that peaceful 
300 Kant and Reiss 1970: 101.
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reconciliatory transformation is assaulted—wherein a demos is prevented from emerging 
because the individual, who is ultimately the wealthy elite, must be protected—
alternative tactics must be carefully embraced. As I mentioned earlier, alternative tactics 
of resistance to the anti-democratic system are distinguished from the system's own 
tactics of domination by a very thin line. In other words, grassroots tactics are preferable 
under all circumstances because they empower persons within the social world and thus 
combat alienation. [Besides, from the developed world, a plea for outside assistance is 
not going to help because other developed societies are just as deadlocked by corrupt 
political systems.]
On the other hand, the concern that a radical politics where all persons are 
empowered and expected to participate in collective decision making somehow puts the 
individual at risk assumes a political situation where persons are somehow fully 
independent (e.g. atomistic). The at-risk individual concern also assumes that it is 
impossible to introduce a mechanism that balances the demands of the majority with 
minority demands. Finally, it assumes that a coherent majority will naturally and 
inevitably form against a minority group. The first of these assumptions has been 
addressed in chapter III, wherein I suggest that individuals are neither atomistic nor fully 
social, but must be understood as both.301 The third assumption is a problem in a society 
where persons understand their relations with Others in purely strategic terms. Insofar as 
persons do often relate to Others strategically, a primary effort of reconciliation ethics 
and politics is to transform these relations through local community efforts that build 
trust and new social mores to replace the failed abstract laws which only maintain 
301 Beyond my own take on the primordial tension, the atomism/holism debate has been worked out in 
various other texts. See, e.g., Sandel 1982; Forst's critique of Sandel (Forst 2002); Dussel 1988.
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conflict through violent suppression.
One way that a politics of reconciliation can transform social relations is through 
education. Especially amongst the youth, who have yet to become overly rigid (adult), the 
right type of educational efforts open the possibility for the emergence of communicative 
relations that are based in reciprocity and not war like competition.302 The techniques of 
non-violent communication must accompany all tactics of resistance, because the 
political and the social are permeable spheres such that the reconciliation of one requires 
the reconciliation of the other. I have already begun to respond to the second assumption 
and the problem of the individual or the victimizing attributes of reconciliatory 
mechanisms are not addressed within truth-commissions because said commissions do 
not work to balance the future demands of various members of a society. This balance is 
difficult to strike in part because many post-conflict societies lack the necessary 
technology and resources; but also, because of the ideology of war (philopolemia), it is 
assumed that balance is an impossible task. In a sense, it is easier to address and find 
consensus about the past than it is to realize consensus in a future oriented way.
However, with the advent of rapidly transforming technologies and the emergence 
of social media that, when used in ideal contexts, works to bring people together, the 
problem of resources is having a less significant impact on democratic movements.303 
Further, recently founded programs in data sciences promise new ways to analyze and 
understand the seemingly infinite and complex information that is being collected about 
us and that we are unknowingly volunteering every time we use the internet or swipe a 
302 See, e.g., Freire 2000.
303 See, e.g., Nunns, Idle, and Soueif 2011.
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credit card. Indeed, the not fully voluntary nature of recent data collection is only part of 
the reason that it is frightening and problematic. What is truly frightening about our 
already despotic political system collecting data about our private activities and thus fully 
eliminating the realm of privacy is not the elimination of privacy as such, but the 
interpretation of this data as if it were testimony, as if it speaks about who we are. Likely 
appealing to some warped form of empathy as knowing imaginary Others, groups like the 
National Security Agency (NSA) are using data mining and analysis to spy on people 
around the world and find behavioral patterns in order to tell stories about the type of 
people We are, assuming to understand our habits without giving us the opportunity to 
speak for ourselves, and potentially arresting and torturing those of us it assumes to be 
problematic for the system.304 As it stands, the abuses of data are problematic; yet, the 
potential for democratic political action, reconciliation, and the emergence of a truly just 
system are also possible within these emerging technologies.
Further, the response to recent political protests and the NSA scandals reveals that 
political mis-trust goes in both directions. Most everyday people are disappointed and 
dominated by current political systems, in the developed and the developing world, and 
thus not trusting of said systems. At the same time, the system itself operates according to 
surreptitious and mistrusting norms, thus creating a nightmarish social-political feedback 
loop that is, as Benjamin and Agamben rightly point out, a war by other means. The 
master-slave relation, as manifest in war-like norms and the constant push to maintain a 
political system by domination, rather than explicit reciprocal consent, is not a natural, 
necessary, nor even a useful means of organizing the social world under common rules 
304 For an in-depth history and analysis of the NSA spying program, see Greenwald 2014.
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and regulations. Indeed, it is only a select and highly narcissistic few who benefit from 
domination politics, exploiting and profiting on suffering. The deeply problematic reality 
of this lopsided, unstable, and destructive approach to experience becomes more 
transparent each day. The way we respond to the war infection is crucial, as it has already 
caused a great deal of potentially irreparable damage.
Hence, my goal here has been to present an alternative understanding of our 
social-political circumstances that is based in reconciliation, guided by the ideals of 
peace, reciprocity, and trust, and necessary conditions for the possibility of realizing 
justice. The chicken-hawks of the world and those who benefit from the suffering of 
others, would dismiss all of this as idealistic wishful thinking. Perhaps those who worship 
war are correct: this is idealistic. But, given our circumstances and the alternative 
approach—which is the reproduction of the same sociality and politics by domination 
that ultimately fails to bring about a sustainable, stable, and non-alienating society—my 
hope is that I will have at least prepared my readers to be suspicious of those who 
uncritically dismiss peace and push for a return to the tautological ideology of war. Real 
change is possible. At the very least, we can reconcile our interpersonal conflicts by 
changing the way we relate. With collective efforts, we can do much more. Those who 
point the guns of the war machine know and fear the power of a collective and 
reciprocally operating demos, which is why great efforts are made to crush solidarity 
wherever it begins to emerge. But, reciprocity, solidarity, and trust can emerge 
everywhere and anywhere. The neo-agora, made visible by the Occupy movement, is also 
ubiquitous. Where previous attempts at a politics of reconciliation have been stopped, 
future efforts must begin. What was said over one hundred and sixty years ago is even 
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more true and meaningful today: We have nothing to lose but our chains.
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